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ABSTRACT 
 
The central objective of this thesis was to explore relationships between personal 
values, and depressed mood and subjective wellbeing, and to determine if the notion 
of values can be more useful in the fields of clinical and positive psychology. An 
initial literature review of values identified the potential importance of values in 
relation to mood and wellbeing, but also showed that more research was required to 
clearly establish such links. Two survey studies using Schwartz‟s model of values 
(Schwartz, 1992), and one longitudinal study investigating relational aspects of 
values, were conducted to explore these relationships. Study 1 was a New Zealand 
paper-based study and investigated links between the importance of, and satisfaction 
with, values and depressed mood and subjective wellbeing. Study 2 was a larger 
international internet-based study which sought to replicate important findings from 
Study 1 and investigate links between people‟s knowledge of their values and the 
extent to which they were living in alignment with values. Study 3 consisted of a sub-
sample of participants from Study Two who completed a subset of Study 2 
assessment measures six months later. This study explored how relational aspects of 
values (knowledge of values, living in alignment with values) related to changes in 
depressed mood and SWB over time.  
Cumulatively the results from these studies re-orientate our thinking towards 
an increased utility for the notion of values in the areas of clinical and positive 
psychology. Regarding depressed mood, these studies found links between greater 
depressed mood and lesser importance of Self-Direction, Stimulation and Hedonism 
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value types. The importance of values as a whole was not associated with depressed 
mood; however being satisfied, knowing values, and living in alignment with values 
were associated with less depressed mood. Regarding subjective wellbeing, these 
studies found links between greater subjective wellbeing and greater importance of 
Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, and Benevolence value types. The importance 
of values as a whole was not associated with subjective wellbeing; however being 
satisfied, knowing values, and living in alignment with values were associated with 
greater subjective wellbeing. A causal relationship was found between living in 
alignment with values and latter subjective wellbeing, but not for knowledge of 
values and later subjective wellbeing. In addition, no major deviations in the 
coherence of values‟ systems between individuals with and without depressed mood, 
or for individuals with and without high subjective wellbeing, were found.  
Strengths, implications, and limitations of the studies are noted for the fields 
of clinical and positive psychology, and suggestions for future research are made.  
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All sciences are now under the obligation to prepare the ground for 
the future task of the philosopher, which is to solve the problem of 
value, to determine the true hierarchy of values. ~ Friedrich 
Nietzsche 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1. 1  Introduction  
 
Values are common to all people and are regularly endorsed because they are 
of foremost importance in people‟s lives. Discourse pertaining to the importance of 
values can be traced back to the early Greek philosophers. Socrates believed that the 
good life, rather than life itself, was to be chiefly valued (Rachels, 1993), and 
Aristotle promoted numerous values (Aristotle, trans. 1967). Values have been central 
in various historical commentaries and dialogues (e.g., poetry, plays, novels, 
scriptures), the most famous being the Ten Commandments which permeate western 
society (Smiley, 1985). More contemporary reference to values is also easily 
detectable in various popular media, such as politics, science, business, art, and 
movies (Davis, 2001; Hitlin, 2003).  
Popular discourse aside, there is little contemporary psychological research on 
values, especially regarding theoretical explanations and practical applications. Given 
this omission, this thesis focuses on values in psychology by exploring relationships 
amongst personal values, and mood and wellbeing. In doing so, key aspects of 
personal values are explored, in particular, relationships between the types and 
coherence of values people endorse, and their depressed mood and subjective 
wellbeing. This thesis also explores people‟s relationships with values, such as the 
extent to which they view their values as important, know what their values are, live 
their life in alignment with their values, and are satisfied with their values. 
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This first chapter is presented in six main sections. First, the notion of values 
in psychology will be broadly reviewed, and conceptualisations and definitions of 
values outlined. Next, the main theory of values in this thesis is described, and issues 
surrounding the measurement of values are considered. Following this, aspects of the 
fields of clinical and positive psychology relevant to values, mood and wellbeing are 
summarised. This chapter concludes with an outline of the aims of this thesis, the 
research questions addressed, and a broad summary.  
 
1.1.1 The importance of values.  
 
The reason values are endorsed and easily detectable is because they are, 
prima facie at least, of major importance. As Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach and Grube state, 
“in a nutshell, values represent what is most important to us and form the basis of 
how we approach life…[they are] …the silent forces behind many of our actions and 
decisions” (1984, p. 15). Braithwaite and Law comment that values “are usually 
based on what genuinely matters most to us as people, and are things that are of 
intrinsic worth to us” (1985, p. 252). Indeed, people talk of and endorse values as 
cherished possessions (Leichtentritt & Rettig, 2001), as notions they are personally 
invested in, regard highly, seek to uphold and defend (Maio, Olson, Bernard, & Luke, 
2003), and hold tenaciously (Morris, 1956). Values tell the world, and ourselves, who 
we are and what is important about us (Peterson, 2006), and “reflect an essential, 
inalienable aspect of what it means to be human” (Bain, Kashima, & Haslam, 2006, 
p. 355). People hold values as foundation blocks for living and of how they relate to 
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others, as they represent what is most important in life (Henderson, 2003), are 
pertinent to the very nature of being human (Harari, 1989), form the core of personal 
identity (Hitlin, 2003), function as standards that guide thought and action (Feather, 
2002; Rohan, 2000; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), and provide justifications for what we 
do and how we feel (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994).  
Because values are important in facilitating the functioning of life, theorists 
use the ubiquity of values to argue for their significance at both individual and social 
levels. As Straker commented: 
 
Values are, in fact, powerful drivers of how we think and behave. They 
tell us what is good and bad, right and wrong. They tell us the shoulds and 
shouldn‟ts, musts and can‟ts of life. They also help us decide which is 
more and less important. (2008, p. 43)  
 
Leichtentritt and Rettig (2001) argued that values play an important role in 
human behaviour by influencing perceptions, decisions and actions, and, as a result, 
impact on the welfare of individuals, family members, and the community. Thus, 
values provide ways of conceptualising life-guiding principles, or „ways to live‟ 
(Morris, 1956), and are an important component in guiding our behaviour and 
attitudes, and in making sense of others. Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) suggested that 
values operate as guiding mechanisms, and Mandler (1993) maintained that valuing 
necessarily occurs as we encounter the world.  
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At the social level, relationships with others are bound and coordinated by the 
values individuals endorse (Spates, 1983). Knowing others‟ values aids in smooth 
and conventional relations by allowing a sense of predictability, which reduces group 
conflict (Tetlock, 1986). Indeed, out-groups with dissimilar prioritised values are 
regarded as less human (Schwartz & Struch, 1989) and experience out-group 
prejudice (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996). Conversely, people who act in 
ways which support others‟ values obtain increased trust (Devos, Spini, & Schwartz, 
2002; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995). Values regularise social behaviour by providing 
general rules, negating the ongoing reinvention of standards and their justification 
(Marini, 2000). Values also provide standards to determine which beliefs, attitudes, 
and actions of others are worth challenging, protesting, and arguing about, or worth 
trying to influence or change (Rokeach, 1973). 
At the individual level, values fulfil a number of roles. Values guide conduct 
and help direct life towards the attainment and accomplishment of personal goals 
(Deci & Ryan, 1985), as people are goal orientated by nature (Aristotle, trans. 1967). 
Dewey (1938) held that values take root in us and are the basis for our goals. Rokeach 
commented that: 
 
Values are multifaceted standards that guide conduct in a variety of ways. 
They lead us to take particular positions on social issues and they 
predispose us to favour one ideology over another. They are standards 
employed to evaluate and judge others and ourselves. (1973, p. 13)  
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Sanchez (2000) viewed values as critical to processes of self-regulation, 
maintenance and enhancement of self-esteem and decision making, and Hayes, 
Strosahl, and Wilson (1999) argued that following personal values provides a sense 
of consistency that structures experience, and to an extent, defines who a person is.  
At the same time as values exert influence at both individual and social levels, 
the importance theorists place on values is also becoming more discernible in the 
public domain. For example, a 1990 survey by Public Addenda cited „not learning 
values‟ as the most important problem facing youth, more so than drugs and violence 
(Peterson, 2006), and the Dalai Lama surmised, “the problem is that the majority 
have lost, or ignore, the deeper human values – compassion, a sense of responsibility. 
That is our big concern” – (Iyer/Dharamsala, 1997, p. 4). Havel remarked that 
“without commonly shared and widely entrenched values, neither the law, not 
democratic government, nor even the market economy will function properly” (1993, 
p. 8). Such public comments further allude to the importance of values. 
 
1.1.2 The neglect of values. 
 
Although values are important, very little is known about what values are, 
how they are useful, or how they fit within psychology. Research into values has been 
at the periphery of the psychological landscape in recent times, with theorists from 
several different domains of psychology endorsing this view. For example, Kasser, a 
self-determination theorist, commented that “unfortunately values remain a rather 
neglected topic in mainstream psychology, as far more energy has been devoted to 
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other issues of the self-concept, other types of beliefs, and other types of motivational 
dynamics” (2002, p. 124). Cohen and Cohen, social psychologists, commented that 
the area of values has “been generally neglected, and more work is needed” (1995, p. 
xii) and that “a review of the literature has shown that values have not been an area of 
much research interest…[with] …very few citations found on these issues” (1995, p. 
2). Bergin, Payne and Richards, clinical psychologists, commented that “a large 
number of influential psychologists have chosen, for one reason or another, to 
exclude issues of purpose, meaning, and values from their theorizing about human 
behaviour” (1996, p. 317). Hitlin and Piliavin, values theorists, noted that “work 
expressly on values – both the nature of individual values systems and values‟ place 
in action – has been sparse since the mid 1960‟s” (2004, p. 359). Schuman, a 
sociological psychologist, commented that “we find almost no work on values in 
sociological social psychology” (1995, p. 69). Rohan, a values theorist, asserted that 
values have been “marginalized in psychology” (2000, p. 255). Lindeman and 
Verkasalo, values researchers, commented that “values deserve more research 
attention than they have received thus far” (2005, p. 170). Howard (1985) argued that 
values are inherent in all psychological research. Thus, amongst the main current 
theorists in psychology concerned with values, there is overwhelming agreement that 
the study of values has been neglected, that values are at the periphery, and that little 
is currently known.  
Supporting this view that values have been neglected, there is unsurprisingly a 
lack of mention of „value‟ or „values‟ in popular psychology textbooks. Proctor and 
Williams (2006) surveyed 33 introductory psychology textbooks published between 
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2003 and 2005 in order to determine their most frequently cited concepts. A search of 
textbook glossaries found 428 terms in 50% or more of the 33 texts. These terms 
were designated „core concepts‟ in psychology. The notion of „value‟ or „values‟ was 
not among these core concepts. Likewise, Rohan (2000) observed that there was no 
discussion of value theory in a sample of 10 introductory social psychology and 
personality textbooks published between 1990 and 2000. Findings such as these 
suggest that values are not recognised as important in the domain of psychology.  
 
1.1.3 Why the concept of values has been neglected.  
 
Various reasons have been offered explaining the current lack of focus on 
values in psychology. Rohan (2000) argued that values lack an adequate operational 
definition, and Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) contended that values have been too 
subjective to study and too difficult to measure adequately. Hechter (1993) attributed 
the limited research progress to values being unobservable because the processes that 
generate values are unknown. Schwartz (1992) viewed values as difficult to study 
because of their historical and cultural variability in content. De Bono attributed lack 
of focus on values to their confidential nature: “values are private and talking about 
values is like talking about sex” (2006, p. 86). More broadly though, the rise of 
behaviourism around the late 1960s and into the 1970s took the focus off values in 
psychology (Clawson & Vinson, 1978).  
Compounding these challenges, theorists concur that there has been a lack of 
standardisation related to values across theoretical and empirical research. Many 
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researchers examine attitudes, beliefs, or opinions and categorise their work as studies 
of values (Kilby, 1993; Rohan, 2000; Schuman, 1995), or they “employ cursory 
understandings of values, labelling a broad array of social psychological phenomena 
as values” (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 359). Several researchers have attributed the 
neglect of values to their conflation with other social psychological phenomena, such 
as attitudes, traits, norms, and needs (e.g., Bergin et al., 1996; Hechter, 1992; 
Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994; Peterson, 2006; Rohan, 2000). Moreover, different 
disciplines outside of psychology render dissimilar meanings when referring to 
values. As Hitlin and Piliavin noted, “when one reads about values across the 
disciplines of sociology, psychology, philosophy, and political science, the 
balkanized nature of the research is striking” (2004, pp. 359-360). Various 
disciplines, for example economics (Scitovsky, 1993) and sociology (Hitlin & 
Piliavin, 2004), have likewise reported difficulty engaging with the topic of values. 
Although many of these criticisms are valid and have contributed to the 
neglect of values, they are by no means insurmountable. Although psychology has 
had difficulty engaging with the topic of values (Clawson & Vinson, 1978; Davis, 
2001; Epstein, 1989; Nenon, 1997), recent advances in values‟ theory, measurement, 
and research methodology have started to take account of these criticisms (e.g., Hitlin 
& Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000; Schwartz, 2006) leading to a recent increase of 
discussion and research into values.  
 
1.1.4 An increase of interest in values. 
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The concept of values became a focus of research interest for scholars in the 
early 1930s (Davis, 2001; Rohan, 2000), culminating in a “heyday in the 1950s and 
1960s” (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 360). By the 1960‟s, values were an explicit focus 
of nearly all the social science disciplines (Barth, 1993), including anthropology, 
economics, political science, sociology, and psychology (Adler, 1956; Hull, 1943; 
Kluckhohn, 1951; Sherif, 1936; Allport & Vernon, 1931). The growing influence of 
the anti-cognitivist movement led to very little research on values being conducted 
between the mid 1960s and late 1980s. Contemporary interest regarding the place of 
values in psychology is increasing, however, and has accelerated in the past two 
decades with “mainstream psychology beginning to show awareness of this formally 
taboo area” (Bergin at al., 1996, p. 297). The increase of interest is associated with 
the realisation that a value-free or value-neutral approach to psychological research 
(Howard, 1985) and psychotherapy (Bergin, 1980; Beutler, 1979) is untenable, as 
both are value-laden enterprises. As Bergin et al. noted: 
 
Beginning in the late 1940‟s and continuing into the 1960‟s and 1970‟s, 
the belief that values could be kept out of psychological theory, research, 
and practice was challenged theoretically and empirically. By the late 
1970‟s to early 1980‟s, it was widely agreed that it was impossible to 
keep values completely out of psychological work. (1996, p. 298) 
 
Thus, the 1980s saw a renewed interest in the notion of values in 
psychological research. Many theorists (e.g., Feather, 1984; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; 
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Rohan, 2000) attributed this interest to either Bergin‟s seminal article (Bergin, 1980) 
and Ellis‟s reply (Ellis, 1980), which sparked much debate and documented the 
growing interest in values issues among helping professionals (Bergin at al., 1996), or 
to Rokeach‟s seminal book The Nature of Human Values (1973). Rokeach‟s book in 
particular “caused a surge of empirical studies which investigated the role of human 
values in many branches of psychology” (Debats & Bartelds, 1996, p. 48), 
particularly in the domains of social and cross-cultural psychology. Rokeach even 
suggested that “the value concept…[is] able to unify the apparently diverse interests 
of all the sciences concerned with human behaviour” (1973, p. 3) and should thus be 
central. This debate between Bergin and Elis, and Rokeach‟s book are historically 
definitive in setting a point of demarcation for the recent infusion of values into the 
domain of psychology. 
Interest in values has sporadically emerged recently in various psychological 
sub-disciplines. For example, in social psychology: moral reasoning (Schwartz, 1990; 
Schwartz & Bardi, 2000; Weber, 1993); and religious and spiritual values (Duriez, 
Luyten, Snauwaert, & Hutsebaut, 2002; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002; 
Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). In clinical and counselling psychology: therapists‟ 
values (Homes, 1996; Kelly & Strupp, 1992; Strupp, 1980); the transmission of client 
values towards therapist values (Arizmend, Beutler, Shanfield, Crago, & Hagaman, 
1985; Beutler & Bergan, 1991; Kessell & McBrearty, 1967; Patterson, 1958; 
Tjeltveit, 1986); values-based interventions (Ernst, 2002; Greenstein, 1976; Wagner 
& Sanchez, 2002); and process and outcome of psychotherapy (Bergin, 1985; 
Beutler, 1981; Herr & Niles, 1988; Kelly, 1990). In organisational psychology: 
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workplace values (Crosby, Bitner, & Gill, 1990; Dose, 1999; Hofstede, 2001; Judge 
& Bretz, 1992); and consumer behaviour (Allen, 2001); and personality assessment 
(Heaven, 1993). In cross-cultural psychology: the universality of values (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1995; Schwartz, 1992, 1994, 2005b); and cultural and national values 
(Abramson & Inglehart, 1995; Fischer, 2006; Halman & de Moor, 1994; Inglehart & 
Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995; Smith & Schwartz, 1997; 
Spini, 2003). In human development: the transmission of values within the family 
(Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004); and the intergenerational transmission of values (Schwartz 
& Bilsky, 1990). Given the recency of focus on values, these specialised areas have 
not been comprehensively researched; likewise research in other psychological sub-
disciplines is almost non-existent (e.g., in positive psychology).  
 
In summary, research on values has been neglected for a number of reasons, 
yet values are nonetheless important. In an empirical sense, research on values is now 
increasing as there is still much to learn about values and their utility, and indeed, 
values researchers now posit values as an important core concept for psychology. 
 
1.1.5 Conceptualisations and definitions of values in psychology. 
 
Although there have been many pioneering values theories and theorists (e.g., 
Allport 1961; Feather, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Joas, 2000; Kluckhohn, 1951; Kohn, 
1969; Morris, 1956; White, 1951), two theorists have dominated the psychological 
literature: Rokeach (1973) and Schwartz (1992, 1994a, 2006). This section contains a 
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brief historical overview of the main conceptions and definitions of values within the 
psychological literature, including Rokeach‟s and Schwartz‟s conceptions. Rokeach‟s 
conception is outlined as it represents the most significant early advance in values 
research, and Schwartz‟s conception is briefly sketched here as it represents the most 
contemporary and popular theory, and is then outlined in full in section 1.2.  
Although Rokeach and Schwartz have largely influenced the recent 
conceptual understanding of values within psychology, definitions of values abound 
within the literature (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Kilby, 1993). These notions have 
both historical and contemporary significance, and contain common conceptual 
elements of values as beliefs, guiding principles, priorities, desirable conceptions, 
preferences, preferred goals, and motives. Following this historical exposition, 
constructs similar to values, noticeably attitudes, traits, norms and needs are briefly 
discussed.  
 
1.1.5.1 Early conceptions. 
 
Although the roots of the term „value‟ are known (deriving from the Latin 
word valere, meaning to be strong, prevail, or to be of worth: Meinert, 1980), there 
have been many variations in the literature, making the term hard to define. For 
example, Timms (1983) outlined 180 different definitions for the term „value‟ in 
reviewing social science publications. In psychology, several early approaches to 
conceptions and definitions of values were vague and confusing (Prillentensky, 1997; 
Smith, 1991). The most influential early definition of values was by Kluckhohn, who 
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defined a value as “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or 
characteristic of a group, of the desirable, which influences the selection from 
available modes, means, and ends of action” (1951, p. 395). This functionalist 
definition, which focused on the potential for action, was ingrained in the literature 
until the early 1970s (Rohan, 2000). Around the same time as Kluckhohn presented 
his definition, Allport, Vernon and Lindzey (1951) conceived of values as having six 
basic interests and motives (social, theoretic, religious, economic, political, and 
aesthetic), with Allport later defining a value as “a belief upon which a man acts by 
preference” (1961, p. 454). Lewin asserted that: 
 
Values influence behavior but have not the character of a goal (i.e., of a 
force field). For example, the individual does not try to „reach‟ the value 
of fairness, but fairness is „guiding‟ his behavior. It is probably correct to 
say that values determine which types of activity have a positive and 
which have a negative valance for an individual in a given situation. In 
other words, values are not force fields but they „induce‟ force fields. 
That means values are constructs that have the same psychological 
dimensions as power fields. (1952, p. 41) 
 
Thus, Lewin took values to be guides for behaviour, rather than attainable 
goals. Morris (1956) regarded values as „ways to live‟, and described thirteen ideal 
ways for living, such as „cultivating independence‟ and „enjoying life through group 
participation‟. Heider defined values as “meaning the property of an entity (x has 
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values) or as meaning a class of entities (x is a value) with the connotation of being 
objectively positive in some way” (1958, p. 223). Scott (1959) envisaged values as 
preferred goals that one regards as (a) inherently good – being ultimate goals; (b) 
absolutely good – holding in all circumstances; and (c) universally good – applying to 
all people. Williams (1968) maintained that values are static constructs which involve 
a focus on criteria or standards of preference, yet are also socially approved verbal 
representations of basic motivations. Many of these early conceptions provided useful 
insights into the construct of values, although several were also criticised on 
methodological grounds, such as for the wording of values questions (Kilby, 1993) or 
for lacking comprehensiveness (Handy, 1970).  
 
1.1.5.2 Milton Rokeach. 
 
In 1973 Rokeach published The Nature of Human Values, in which he defined 
a value as an “enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of 
conduct or end-state of existence” (1973, p. 5). In general terms, a value was a stable 
belief that some goals were to be preferred to others. The idea that values were 
related to preferences, as opposed to moral imperatives as previously conceived by 
sociologists (e.g., Adler, 1956) and philosophers (e.g., Hartman, 1967), was central to 
Rokeach‟s work. Whereas Kluckhohn (1951) and others emphasised action, Rokeach 
saw values as giving meaning to action.  
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Rokeach also differentiated between types of values, distinguishing between 
terminal values and instrumental values. Terminal values consist of „prioritised end 
states of existence‟, whereas instrumental values consist of „prioritised modes of 
behaviour‟ essential to the realisation of various end states of existence. Terminal 
values represent goals to be achieved during a lifetime, whereas instrumental values 
consist of the means of achieving terminal values. Both terminal values and 
instrumental values are either socially or person centred (Leichtentritt & Rettig, 
2001). For example, „justice‟ is a socially centred terminal value, whereas „wisdom‟ 
is a personally centred terminal value. „Love‟ is a socially centred instrumental value, 
whereas „honesty‟ is a personally centred instrumental value. Together, an 
individual‟s terminal and instrumental values form a value system, which was 
conceptualised as: 
 
An organization or structure of deeply held beliefs, limited in number, 
very close to the core of self-identity, that provides a mechanism for 
assigning relative priority and importance to the individual values. The 
system works to resolve conflicts between competing, activated values 
and to motivate goal-directed behavior. In addition, it serves an ego-
defensive function and can incorporate and rationalize undesirable 
behavior into values seen as „more important‟. (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5) 
 
According to Rokeach‟s value system, everyone endorses the same values, but 
to different degrees. Particular values are important when they are preferred to 
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opposite or converse values. In this way, the significance of a value is determined by 
its relative importance within an individual‟s value system. Guiding values organise 
attitudes, emotions, and behaviours, and endure across time and situations. Someone 
with a particular value is thus expected to consistently express behaviour relevant to 
that value in a variety of situations over time. In short, Rokeach‟s theory identified a 
core set of relatively stable fundamental values (instrumental and terminal values), 
provided both a model of value systems and the means to research it (i.e., the 
Rokeach Value Survey – see section 1.3.1.2), and examined relationships between 
dominant values, attitudes and behaviours, for both individuals and societies.  
 
1.1.5.3 Shalom Schwartz. 
 
In 1987 Schwartz and Bilsky outlined five features that were common and 
implicit in definitions of values in the literature up until that time. According to their 
analysis, values were:  
 
(a) concepts or beliefs, (b) about desirable end states or behaviors, (c) that 
transcend specific situations, (d) guide selection or evaluation of behavior 
and events, and (e) are ordered by relative importance. (p. 551) 
 
In other words, values were conceptualised as stable motivational constructs 
that represent broad goals which apply across context and time. Using this conceptual 
approach to values they developed a tentative theory of the universal content and 
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structure of human values (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), which Schwartz (1992, 1994a, 
2006) further refined and tested empirically.  
Schwartz defined values as “desirable transsituational goals, varying in 
importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social 
entity” (1994a, p. 21). He later adapted his definition of a value to “conceptions of the 
desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g., organisational leaders, policy-makers, 
individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their 
actions and evaluations” (1999, p. 24). Taking into account the five common features 
above, values were viewed as a set of general conceptions about desirable ways to 
live that people use to guide their actions (Bain, 2005). 
Although Schwartz agreed with much of Rokeach‟s approach to values, he 
also believed that Rokeach‟s approach did not fully address the underlying structure 
of value systems, especially the relationships individual values have with each other 
(Schwartz, 1992). He also thought Rokeach‟s paradigm needed further refinement 
given that the number and types of values in Rokeach‟s model were largely based on 
intuition and North American research samples (Schwartz, 1992). Although Schwartz 
had found support for Rokeach‟s terminal/instrumental distinction in his earlier work 
(1987), his subsequent work (1992) did not support such a distinction as a basis on 
which people organise their values, and thus he eliminated it. These concerns 
prompted Schwartz to develop his own model. 
Nonetheless, both Rokeach and Schwartz share a functional approach to 
values in that values address fundamental and important individual and social needs. 
The two theorists differ in which needs values primarily address and in how they 
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address them. For Rokeach, values maintain and enhance our conception of ourselves 
and our self-esteem, and are important because of shared socialisation and 
conventions (Bain et al., 2006; Rokeach, 1973). For Schwartz, values address the 
needs of individuals as biological organisms, aid the coordination of social 
interaction, and benefit group survival (Schwartz, 1992). Both functionalist 
approaches to values imply that values are important because they serve useful 
individual and social functions.  
 
1.1.5.4 Other definitions and conceptions. 
 
In addition to the definitions proposed by Rokeach and Schwartz, Super 
defined a value as “an objective, either a psychological state, a relationship, or 
material condition, that one seeks to attain” (1980, p. 130). Hofstede defined values 
as involving “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others” (1980, p. 
18). Epstein (1989) contended that there are two different value systems, one 
conscious (reflective and reportable) and one unconscious. Hill described values as 
“the priorities individuals and societies attach to certain beliefs, experiences, and 
objects, in deciding how they shall live and what they shall treasure” (1994, p.7). 
Feather defined values as “beliefs about desirable or undesirable ways of behaving or 
about the desirability or otherwise of general goals” (1996, p. 222). Maio and Olson 
defined values as “simply truisms, endorsed but lacking argumentative support” 
(1998, p. 379), and Maio et al. (2003) considered that values are derived in part from, 
but also influence, ideologies. Carver and Scheier (1982) conceived of values as 
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higher order goals which involve longer time spans, have more extensive networks of 
meaningful associations and interpretations, and involve more distal or abstract goals. 
Likewise, Maes and Gebhardt (2000) conceived of values as higher order goals. 
Marini described values as “evaluative beliefs that synthesize affective and cognitive 
elements to orientate people to the world in which they live” (2000, p. 2828). 
Henderson defined values as “the priorities and preferences of individuals and 
groups, which reflect what is important to them” (2003, p. 11). He further 
conceptualised values as abstract concepts and ideas that are intangible, and represent 
lifestyle preferences and priorities, specific ideas about what is held to be important 
or meaningful, and are “strictly concepts that we use in order to evaluate the 
relevance, appropriateness or effectiveness of our behaviours” (2003, p. 40). Bain et 
al. (2006) argued that values are cognitive representations that act as conduits 
between social influences and personal preferences. Nevertheless, these more recent 
definitions or conceptions have not gained widespread support to date as the literature 
has largely used Rokeach‟s and Schwartz‟s notions.  
This historical synopsis highlights the pervasive indeterminism in definition 
and conceptualisation of values across psychological literature. Early approaches 
conceived of values as guides and motives, with more recent approaches envisaging 
values as cognitive preferences and desirable conceptions. However, as Schwartz has 
commented, “most social scientists view values as deeply rooted, abstract motivations 
that guide, justify or explain attitudes, norms, opinions and actions” (2003, p. 260), 
and recently Schwartz has further elaborated on the five common features of values: 
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 Values are beliefs. But they are beliefs tied inextricably to 
emotion, not objective, cold ideas 
 Values are a motivational construct. They refer to the desirable 
goals people strive to attain 
 Values transcend specific actions and situations. They are 
abstract goals. The abstract nature of values distinguishes them 
from concepts like norms and attitudes, which usually refer to 
specific actions, objects, or situations 
 Values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, 
people, and events. That is, values serve as standards or criteria 
 Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. 
People‟s values form an ordered system of value priorities that 
characterize them as individuals. This hierarchical feature of 
values also distinguishes them from norms and attitudes. (2006, 
p. 249.) 
 
In alignment with Schwartz, this thesis conceives of values as beliefs held by 
individuals and shared by groups about desirable ends (i.e., larger ideologies about 
the world and how it should be); they transcend specific situations; they guide how 
we select actions and evaluate others and ourselves; and they are ordered by their 
relative importance.  
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Looking past conceptions and definitions, theorists have also focused on 
values‟ place within the psychological landscape. For example, the evolutionary 
psychologist Wright (1994) viewed values as nearly universal, as programmed into 
us, similar to the ability and urge to speak. Moral psychologists have pointed out that 
values are often moral, religious, or political in nature (Fromm, 1949; Prillentensky, 
1997), and Rokeach (1973) took values to be related to life-orientating principles 
such as ethics or morals. There is in addition a substantial literature on the link 
between values and actions (for an overview see Feather, 1992). Nonetheless, this 
indeterminism in definition as the literature developed has contributed to values being 
confused and conflated with various similar constructs.  
 
1.1.6 Values and similar constructs. 
 
Related to the different conceptions and definitions in the literature, there 
have been numerous distinct constructs blended or confounded with values. As 
Williams mentioned, “the term „values‟ has been used variously to refer to interests, 
pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, desires, wants, goals, needs, 
aversion and attractions, and many other kinds of elective orientations” (1979, p.16). 
Likewise, Peterson concurs regarding the sprawling use of the term: “most 
commentators observe that the term value has been used promiscuously to refer to all 
sorts of entities: Interests, pleasures, likes, preferences, duties, moral obligations, 
desires, wants, goals, needs, and orientations” (2006, p. 173). The more central 
concepts in the literature with which values have been confounded include attitudes 
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and traits, and to a lesser extent, norms and needs, and these will now be briefly 
reviewed. 
From a conceptual point of view, values differ from attitudes in that values are 
more abstract (Williams, 1979), focus on ideals (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004), are 
inherently positive (Rokeach, 1968, 1973), are subject to hierarchical ordering by 
importance (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a), are more durable as they show marked 
differences in changeableness over the life course (Bardi, Lee, Towfigh, & Soutar, 
2009; Konty & Dunham, 1997), are more central to issues of personhood (Erickson, 
1995; Hitlin, 2003; Smith 1991), and are less directly implicated in behaviour (Bardi 
& Schwartz, 2003; Feather, 1992). Attitudes, on the other hand, are more specific to 
concrete situations and objects (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), more numerous (Rokeach, 
1973), do not serve as standards (Beutler, 1972), are less central to personality and 
motivation (Maio & Olson, 1995), and attitudinal evaluations can be either 
favourable or unfavourable (Braithwaite & Scott, 1991), or “carry both positive and 
negative valences” (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004, p. 363).  
In addition, some theorists, rather than differentiating values from attitudes, 
bind the two concepts together, or see values and attitudes as interrelated. It has been 
held, for example, that values are a special kind of attitude object (Bem, 1970), that 
value expressions are a function of attitudes (Katz, 1960), that attitudes are 
expressions of our values (Henderson, 2003), that values are used as justifications for 
attitudes (Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994), that values are the foundations upon which 
attitudes are formed (Hog & Vaughan, 1995), and that attitudes moderate the 
relations between values and behaviours (Maio & Olson, 1995). The general 
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consensus is that values, compared to attitudes, are more abstract, inherently positive, 
less specifically evaluative, less numerous, not applied to concrete social objects, and 
hold a higher place in an individual‟s internal evaluative hierarchy.  
Traits are conceptualised as fixed aspects of personality (Hog & Vaughan, 
1995), and trait-based behaviour is often confused with value-based behaviour 
(Roccas et al., 2002), as values are inherently linked with personality, motivation, and 
behaviour (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005; Rohan, 2000). Epstein (1989) provided the 
example that one might have a disposition towards being aggressive (a trait), but not 
highly value aggression. Roccas et al. (2002) advocated that values-based behaviour 
suggested more cognitive control over one‟s actions, and that traits are enduring 
dispositions, whereas values are enduring goals. Traits can be positive or negative, 
whereas values are inherently positive, and values, unlike traits, serve as standards for 
evaluating behaviour (Schwartz, 1992). Rokeach (1973) also thought that viewing 
people in regards to their values, rather than their traits, was more advantageous for 
the possibility of personal change.  
Values differ from norms in that norms are situation specific, whereas values 
are transsituational and ordered by hierarchical significance (Schwartz, 1992). Values 
are commonly measured at the level of the individual, whereas norms are measured at 
the level of the group (Marini, 2000). Norms capture an „ought sense‟, whereas 
values capture ideals. For example, people acting in accordance with values do not 
feel pushed as they do when acting under normative pressure (for a full comparison 
between values and norms, see Marini, 2000).  
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Needs connote a biological influence on behaviour, whereas values capture a 
feature of individual and social life. Some theorists take values to be partly rooted in 
biology, in that both biological and cultural mechanisms explain the maintenance of 
values (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza, 1993). Others differ, such as Hitlin and Piliavin, who 
have commented that “values serve as socially acceptable, culturally defined ways of 
articulating needs” (2004, p. 361).  
Thus, as the values literature has developed, values have been confused or 
conflated with numerous constructs, most noticeably attitudes, but also traits, norms 
and needs. However, recent conceptualisation and research into values, along with 
Schwartz‟s five common features (2006), is beginning to lessen this confusion.  
 
1.2 Shalom Schwartz’s theory of the structure of human values 
 
Building on Rokeach‟s (1973) seminal work, and others (Adler, 1956; Hull, 
1943; Kluckhohn, 1951; Sherif, 1936; Allport & Vernon, 1931), Schwartz‟s value 
theory (1992, 1994a, 2004, 2006) represented a major theoretical advance in our 
understanding of values and value systems. Schwartz began with a vision of what was 
universally required for individuals and groups to survive and thrive (see section 
1.1.5.3), pointing specifically to the (a) biologically based needs of individuals; (b) 
requirements for social coordination and interaction; and (c) institutional demands 
concerning group survival and welfare. Schwartz then searched for an underlying 
universality of the content and structure of values across cultures (1992, 1994a). 
Others had previously attempted the grand goal of identifying universally held 
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values: Hofstede (1980); Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961); Parsons and Shils 
(1951); and Rokeach (1973). The philosophers Hartman (1967), and more recently 
Bok (1995), have also attempted to bring the universality of values from philosophy 
into the realm of science. However, these attempts have not gained popularity in the 
literature to date.  
Defining values as “desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, 
that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity” 
(Schwartz, 1994a, p. 21), and from the basis of his three universal requirements to 
survive and thrive, Schwartz described three levels of values: individual values, value 
types, and value dimensions. The lowest, most specific level describes individual 
values (e.g., „protecting the environment‟, „obedience‟, „ambition‟), which lead to the 
promotion of broader motivational values he termed „value types‟. Value types, the 
middle level, classify many individual values into 10 motivationally distinct, broad 
and basic values. The highest level, value dimensions, consists of two higher order bi-
polar value dimensions along which the 10 value types vary. While values can be 
studied at any of these levels, most research has focused on value types.  
In the following sections Schwartz‟s model is outlined, including the 10 value 
types and two higher order bi-polar value dimensions. Example findings from 
research utilising Schwartz‟s model are presented. 
 
1.2.1 The 10 value types. 
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Schwartz postulated 10 value types, each defined in terms of its motivational 
goal, which were theoretically derived from the universal requirements of human 
existence. As Schwartz commented: 
 
The 10 basic values are intended to include all the core values recognized 
in cultures around the world. These 10 values cover the distinct content 
categories found in earlier value theories, in value questionnaires from 
different cultures, and in religious and philosophical discussions of 
values. It is possible to classify virtually all the items found in lists of 
specific values from different cultures, into one of these 10 motivationally 
distinct basic values. (2006, p. 1) 
 
The 10 value types are Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, 
Universalism, Benevolence, Conformity, Tradition, Security, and Power, and are 
further described in Table 1.  
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Table 1  
Schwartz’s 10 Value Types 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Achievement. The defining goal of Achievement is personal success through 
demonstrating competence according to social standards. Competent 
performance that generates resources is necessary for individuals to survive, 
and for groups and institutions to reach their objectives.  
 Hedonism. The defining goal of Hedonism is pleasure and sensuous 
gratification for oneself. Hedonism values derive from organismic needs and 
the pleasure associated with satisfying them.  
 Stimulation. The defining goal of Stimulation is excitement, novelty, and 
challenge in life. Stimulation values derive from the organismic need for 
variety and arousal in order to maintain an optimal, positive, rather than 
threatening, level of activation.  
 Self-Direction. The defining goal of Self-Direction is independent thought, 
choice of actions, creativity, and exploration. Self-Direction values derive 
from organismic needs for control and mastery, and interactional requirements 
of autonomy and independence.  
 Universalism. The defining goal of Universalism is understanding, 
appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and nature. 
Universalism values derive from survival needs of individuals and groups.  
 Benevolence. The defining goal of Benevolence is preservation and 
enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal 
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contact. Benevolence values derive from the basic requirement for smooth 
group functioning and from the organismic need for affiliation.  
 Conformity. The defining goal of Conformity is restraint of actions, 
inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others, or violate social 
expectations or norms. Conformity values derive from the requirement that 
individuals inhibit inclinations that might disrupt smooth interaction and 
group functioning. 
 Tradition. The defining goal of Tradition is respect, commitment, and 
acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide 
to the self. Groups everywhere develop practices, symbols, ideas, and beliefs 
that represent their shared experience and fate, which eventually become 
sanctioned as valued group customs and traditions and are passed on.  
 Security. The defining goal of Security is safety, harmony, and stability of 
society, of relationships, and of oneself. Security values derive from basic 
individual and group requirements.  
 Power. The defining goal of Power is social status and prestige, and control or 
dominance over people and resources. Power values derive from a certain 
degree of status differentiation that is required for the functioning of social 
institutions and emphasise the attainment or preservation of a dominant 
position within the more general social system.  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Adapted and summarised from Schwartz (1992).  
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In the literature, this middle level of Schwartz‟s model is interchangeably 
referred to as value types, value domains, value constructs, basic values, and 
motivational values. The most common term „value types‟ is used in this thesis to 
avoid confusion. 
 
1.2.2 Schwartz’s model. 
 
According to Schwartz‟s value theory (1992, 1994a, 2004, 2006), the content 
of a value consists of the type of goal, or motivational concern, it expresses. For 
example, the value type Stimulation is underpinned by specific values such as „an 
exciting life‟, „being daring‟ and „a varied life‟. The value type Security is 
underpinned by specific values such as „safety of loved ones‟ and „stability of 
society‟. The model further specifies structural aspects of values, namely the 
dynamics of conflict and congruence among the 10 value types, as the structure 
derives from conflicts people experience when they act on their values. In particular, 
the 10 value types are structured in a circle where adjacent domains are most 
compatible (i.e., adjacent values share motivational emphasis) and opposite domains 
are in conflict (i.e., do not share motivational emphasis). Thus, each of the 10 value 
types is considered to have either a complementary or oppositional relationship with 
the other value types, depending on the degree to which they share motivational 
emphasis. This arrangement can be seen in Schwartz‟s circumplex model, which is 
shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Shalom Schwartz‟s theoretical model of relations among 10 value types. 
 
Simply, the closer any two values are around the circle, the more similar their 
underlying motivations; the more distant any two values are, the more antagonistic 
their motivations. For example, Power and Achievement are relatively 
complementary as both are self-enhancing, emphasising social superiority and 
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esteem. Achievement and Hedonism are also relatively complementary both focusing 
on self-centred satisfaction.  
In contrast, Schwartz‟s model also highlights the difficulty in concurrently 
following values which are in conflict (i.e., in positional opposition). For example, in 
some situations it may be difficult to pursue Achievement values, such as obtaining 
personal success, whilst at the same time adhering to Universalism or Benevolence 
values, such as enhancing or protecting the welfare of others. As another example, in 
some situations it may be difficult to pursue Stimulation values, such as pursuing an 
exciting and varied life, whilst at the same time adhering to Conformity or Tradition 
values, such as being obedient or adhering to moderation.  
Schwartz‟s model does not postulate that any values, such as Conformity or 
Tradition, are good or bad per se, just that values such as these may not be as 
important as Self-Direction or Hedonism for an individual who highly values 
Stimulation. This motivational structure of relations among values, with the order of 
associations of the 10 value types following a reasonably predictable pattern, makes it 
possible to study how values‟ systems, rather than solely individual values, relate to 
other variables of interest. 
In addition to relations between the 10 value types, oppositions between the 
value types are seen as a function of two higher order bi-polar orthogonal dimensions 
along which the 10 value types vary. These Schwartz labelled Openness-to-Change 
vs. Conservation, and Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence. With the Openness-
to-Change vs. Conservation dimension, Openness-to-Change (Self-Direction, 
Stimulation, Hedonism) emphasises independent thought, action, the pursuit of new 
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ideas and experience, and welcomes change. Conservation (Conformity, Security, 
Tradition), on the other hand, emphasises favouring self-restraint, tradition, 
maintaining the status quo and avoiding threat. With the Self-Enhancement vs. Self-
Transcendence dimension, the Self-Enhancement (Achievement, Power, Hedonism) 
construct focuses on personal success, achievement, power, the pursuit of personal 
interests, and dominance over others. Self-Transcendence (Benevolence, 
Universalism), on the other hand, emphasises acceptance of, and concern for, the 
welfare and interests of others. These two continua are also shown in Figure 1 in that 
Openness-to-Change is in opposition to Conservation, and Self-Enhancement is in 
opposition to Self-Transcendence. 
These two higher order bi-polar dimensions represent two primary human 
problems (or two individual or social needs). With Openness-to-Change vs. 
Conservation, the conflict is between following intellectual and emotional interests 
on the one hand (Openness-to-Change), and preserving the status quo and capitalising 
on the certainty that conforming to norms provides on the other (Conservation). With 
Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence, the conflict is between concern for 
individual interests and personal outcomes on the one hand (Self-Enhancement), and 
concern for the welfare of others on the other (Self-Transcendence).  
Similar dimensions to these two higher order bi-polar dimensions have 
previously been postulated by others; for example, Rokeach‟s (1973) personal-social 
dimension, Eysenck‟s (1954) liberalism-conservatism dimension, Kohn and 
Schooler‟s (1983) self-direction vs. conformity dimension, Baker‟s (2005) traditional 
vs. secular dimension, and Fromm‟s (1976) humanistic vs. authoritarian conscience 
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typology. Schwartz (1992, 1994b) compared his dimensions to those articulated by 
others and found substantial similarity. Indeed, the individual vs. social continuum 
(i.e., Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence), however termed, has commonly 
been used in values research, especially social values research (Markus & Kitayama, 
1991; Triandis, 1995), and is one of the most common forms of demarcation (for a 
review, see Hui, 1988).  
Schwartz‟s model, however, is not completely symmetrical. Firstly, Hedonism 
relates to both higher order bi-polar dimensions (or human problems), relating 
mutually to Openness-to-Change and Self-Enhancement. Hedonism values derive 
from organismic needs and the pleasure associated with satisfying them, and 
sensuous gratification for oneself is important for both promoting Openness-to-
Change and for pursuing Self-Enhancement. Secondly, the values of Conformity and 
Tradition share a very similar broad motivational goal and are located in a single 
wedge (see Figure 1), with Conformity more toward the centre and Tradition toward 
the periphery. This positioning signifies that Tradition values conflict more strongly 
with the opposing values of Hedonism, and to a lesser extent Stimulation and 
Achievement, than Conformity values do. In this regard, Schwartz commented that: 
 
Tradition and Conformity values are close motivationally because they 
share the goal of subordinating the self in favour of socially imposed 
expectations. They differ primarily in the objects to which one 
subordinates the self. Conformity entails subordination to persons with 
whom one is in frequent interaction – parents, teachers or bosses. 
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Tradition entails subordination to more abstract objects – religious and 
cultural customs and ideas. (2006, p.1) 
 
In summary, the important aspects of Schwartz‟s value theory are that values 
address individual and social needs, which are organised in three levels: individual 
values, value types, and value dimensions. People may differ in the importance they 
attribute to each of the 10 value types; however their values are generally organised 
by a similar structure of motivational oppositions and compatibilities. This 
motivational structure of relations among values makes it possible to study how 
values‟ systems, rather than individual values, relate to other variables because the 
order of associations follows a relatively predictable pattern. 
 
1.2.3 The importance of Schwartz’s model.  
 
Schwartz‟s model rose to prominence and is important for three main reasons: 
it expanded on past models; it was empirically verifiable; and it gained cross-cultural 
support. Firstly, Schwartz drew on the theoretical foundations of Rokeach and others 
(e.g., Allport 1961; Feather, 1995; Kluckhohn, 1951; Kohn, 1969; Morris, 1956; 
White, 1951) as the basis for the development of his model (Schwartz, 1992, 1994a). 
In this way he expanded on past models in developing and refining his values‟ theory. 
Secondly, Schwartz was the first to gain widespread empirical support for his 
systematic theory regarding the organisation of an individual‟s value system (Hitlin 
& Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000). That research is reviewed in more detail in section 
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1.2.4. It was Schwartz‟s focus on structure that allowed the study of both individual 
values and entire value systems. In addition, he provided a tool (the Schwartz Value 
Survey, see section 2.4.3.1) for others to test and research his model, and as Peterson 
noted, “a psychologist becomes important not just by having good ideas but by 
providing concrete methods that allow others to investigate these ideas” (2006, p. 
179). Lastly, Schwartz gained empirical support for his model across many 
populations and cultures, reporting cross-cultural empirical support from 
approximately 70 cultures (Schwartz et al., 2001), with the Schwartz Value Survey 
being translated into 47 languages (Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Schwartz commented 
that his model is “a reasonable approximation of the structure of relationships among 
the 10 value types in the vast majority of samples” (1994a, p. 35) and that “95% of 
samples from 63 nations support the distinctiveness of the 10 values and the 
prototypical circular structure of relations among them” (Schwartz et al., 2001, p. 
523). This empirical support gave his model credibility, further increasing its 
prominence.  
Among values researchers, Schwartz currently has the most active research 
program, with his theory and its associated measurement tools widely supported and 
used by other values researchers. Currently no other values‟ theory has such 
theoretical or empirical foundation as Schwartz‟s model. For these reasons 
Schwartz‟s value theory is utilised in this thesis.  
 
1.2.4 Research on Schwartz’s model. 
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Since its inception, Schwartz value theory has generated much research. As 
Sagiv and Schwartz comment, “the theory has been tested in cross-cultural research 
in more than 200 samples from over 60 countries” (2000, p. 179). Using the Schwartz 
Value Survey (described in section 2.4.3.1.1), and multi-dimensional scaling 
(Smallest Space Analysis: Davison, 1983) to assess and confirm the organisation of 
the 10 value types (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990), differences in values 
profiles and priorities have been found to be associated with age, sex, country, 
educational level and a host of other variables. These findings are not surprising 
given that aspects such as age, sex, country and educational level largely determine 
the life circumstances to which people are exposed; their socialisation and learning 
experiences, the social roles they play, the expectations and sanctions they encounter, 
and the abilities they develop (Schwartz, 1994a). Thus, differences in background 
characteristics represent differences in life circumstances, which in turn influence 
values and value priorities. This is likely a reciprocal influence; life circumstances 
impact on values, and values-based choices impact on life circumstances (Schwartz, 
1994a).  
The brief synopsis that follows focuses on general and central research 
findings from Schwartz‟s model, as well as research on common demographic 
variables (age, sex, country, educational level) and relational variables relevant to this 
thesis (importance of values, knowledge of values, living in alignment with values, 
and satisfaction with values).  
 
1.2.4.1 General research findings. 
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Schwartz‟s model has received strong and widespread support, having been 
assessed using teacher, student, and general population samples (Bardi et al., 2009; 
Schwartz, 1994a; Schwartz, 2005a; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001; Spini, 2003; Struch, 
Schwartz, & Van der Kloot, 2002). His model has been researched mostly at the 
middle value type level (Rohan, 2000), but also at the higher value dimension level 
(e.g., Sanchez, 2000). Schwartz has reported that value priorities have shown 
relationships with a wide range of phenomena:  
 
Among the behaviors studied are use of alcohol, condoms and drugs, 
delinquency, shoplifting, competition, hunting, various environmental 
and consumer behaviors, moral, religious and sexual behavior, 
autocratic, independent and dependent behavior, choice of university 
major, occupation and medical specialty, participation in sports, social 
contact with out-groups, and numerous voting studies. Among attitudinal 
variables that have been related to value priorities are job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, trust in institutions, attitudes toward ethical 
dilemmas, toward the environment, sexism, religiosity, and 
identification with one‟s nation or group. Among personality variables 
studied are social desirability, social dominance, authoritarianism, 
interpersonal problems, subjective well-being, worries, and the Big 5 
personality traits. This proliferation of behavior, attitude, and personality 
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studies testifies to the fruitfulness of the values theory and its promise 
for future research. (2006, p. 17) 
 
1.2.4.2 Demographic findings.  
 
Robust relationships have been found between values and age, gender, 
country and educational level. Age correlates positively with values that are 
positioned close to Conservation: Tradition, Security, and Conformity (Schwartz, 
2006). Tradition values become more important with increasing age as further 
customs, cultures and traditions are experienced. Security values become more 
important with increasing age because a safe, predictable environment is critical as 
capacities to cope with change diminish with age. Conformity values become more 
important with increasing age as accepted ways of behaving are less demanding and 
threatening than are less known ways. In addition, as one ages, Stimulation values 
become less important because novelty and risk are threatening, Hedonism becomes 
less important because dulling of the senses reduces the capacity to enjoy sensual 
pleasure, and Achievement and Power values become less important because older 
people are less able at demanding tasks and in obtaining social approval (Schwartz, 
1994a). Thus, younger individuals give greater priority to Openness-to-Change 
values (Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism), and less priority to Conservation 
values (Security, Tradition, Conformity).  
Gender differences are also noticeable as women attach less importance to 
Openness-to-Change (Stimulation, Self-Direction, Hedonism) and Self-Enhancement 
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(Power, Achievement, Hedonism) values, and more importance to Self-
Transcendence and Conservation (Universalism, Benevolence, Conformity, 
Tradition, Security) values compared to men (Feather, 1984; Kasser, Koestner, & 
Lekes, 2002; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005; Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz & Rubel, 
2005; Struch et al., 2002; Verkasalo, Daun, & Niit, 1994). Evolutionary psychologists 
(e.g., Wright, 1994) postulate that women gain evolutionary advantage from caring 
for the welfare of in-group members, whereas men gain evolutionary advantage from 
attaining and exploiting status and power. Women are more relational, expressive, 
and communal; men more autonomous, instrumental, and agentic. These dissimilar 
motives find expression as different value priorities (for a full discussion of values 
and gender differences, see Schwartz & Rubel, 2005).  
Research indicates widespread consensus regarding the hierarchical order of 
values across continents and countries. Schwartz and Bardi (1997) describe a „pan-
cultural‟ baseline ranking of values in which Benevolence is most often ranked first, 
followed by Self-Direction, Universalism, Security, Conformity, Achievement, 
Hedonism, Stimulation, Tradition, and finally Power, and state that this order is found 
within 40-50% of nations. However, specific value priorities are more evident in 
particular countries. For example, Bain et al. (2006) found that Australians valued 
freedom and honesty more, compared to Japanese who valued social order and 
pleasure more.  
Values are also associated with level of educational attainment (Schwartz, 
2006). Obtaining greater formal education correlates with Self-Direction, Stimulation 
and Achievement values, and negatively with Conformity, Tradition, and Security 
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values. Self-Direction and Achievement, rather than Conformity and Tradition, have 
been shown to promote persistence through higher education (Schwartz, 2006). Kohn 
and Schooler (1983) contended that this is because educational experiences promote 
intellectual openness, flexibility, and breadth of perspective essential for Self-
Direction and Achievement values. Schwartz (2006) postulated that obtaining 
education provides increasing competencies to cope with life, which reduces the 
importance of Security values.  
To recap, individual value priorities arise out of adaptation to life experiences. 
Socio-demographic characteristics such as age, gender, country and educational level 
contribute to explaining individual differences in value priorities because they 
represent different life experiences. 
 
1.2.4.3 Relational findings.  
 
Few studies have investigated relational variables, such as the importance  
individual‟s place on values, their knowledge of their values, the extent to which they 
are living in alignment with values, and their satisfaction with their values, with the 
majority that have carried out such investigations choosing to focus on value 
importance. With regard to the importance of values, Bernard, Maio and Olson note 
that “there has been relatively little investigation into the psychological bases of value 
importance” (2003, p. 351), and Rohan (2000) concluded that the basis people use to 
determine the relative importance of their values has hardly been addressed in the 
values literature. Nonetheless, Verplanken and Holland (2002) demonstrated that the 
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importance of values has effects on behavioural decisions in that behavioural changes 
can occur through cognitively activating important values. In their study, when 
environmental words (e.g., earth, nature) were primed in participants for whom 
environmental values were central to their self-concept, these participants made more 
environmentally friendly choices. Likewise, Grunert and Juhl (1995) found certain 
values to be relevant for environmentally concerned behaviour, and Schultz and 
Zelezny (1999) found values to be predictors of environmental attitudes. In research 
where values are traded off for monetary or economic gain, some values are so 
important that they are treated as protected (Baron & Leshner, 2000; Baron & 
Spranca, 1997) or sacred (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000; Tetlock, 
McGraw, & Kristel, 2004). Maio and Olson (1998) asked people why their values 
were important and found that people lacked explicit reasons, concluding that values 
are self-evident truisms. Schwartz and Bardi (1997) concluded that people adapt their 
values to their life circumstances; people upgrade the importance they attribute to 
values they can readily attain, and downgrade the importance of values they cannot. 
Although there are multiple influences on value priorities (e.g., parenting, 
temperaments, abilities, friends, the cultural environment, political and economic 
systems), people attribute varying degrees of importance to the values they hold.  
There is little empirical psychological literature on the extent to which people 
know what their values are. In contrast, there is much commentary in popular 
discourse within the public domain. For example, Disney commented that “it‟s not 
hard to make decisions when you know what your values are” (Disney, 2006, para. 
1). Gaining knowledge of one‟s values has often been referred to as „values 
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clarification‟ (Mickleburgh, 1992; Simon, Howe, & Kirschenbaum, 1995), and Sichel 
observed that “the goal of „values clarification‟ is for their influence to become fully 
conscious, for you to explore and honestly acknowledge what you truly value at this 
time in your life” (1993, p. 55). The assumption here is that priority values are at the 
forefront and have a significant impact (Henderson, 2003), and as such, various 
values clarification manuals have been produced (e.g., Henderson, 2003; Miller, C‟de 
Baca, & Matthews, 1999; Vachon & Agresti, 1992). Hiltin (2003) argued that such 
reflection on values produces personal identity, and in addition, Bain commented: 
 
Knowing your values also helps you make decisions, and evaluate other 
people. For example, when a person is formulating intent and choosing 
from alternatives, their values tell them if their decision will help them 
reach their goal, or if it would be socially unacceptable. In such 
situations where individual values conflict, value priorities help decide 
what is more or less important. Values also help in the evaluation of 
other people or situations, thus deeming individual action good or bad, 
right or wrong. (2005, p. 21)  
 
In regard to living in alignment with values, a link has been postulated 
between not living in alignment with values and a range of negative consequences. 
For example, Peterson commented that “when we fail to express our values in our 
actions we feel discomfort or disappointment” (2006, p. 174). Conversely, Miller and 
C‟de Baca (2001) have used case studies to outline the positive benefits of living a 
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life in alignment with personal values. The extent to which people live their lives in 
alignment with their values is, however, unclear, and the opportunity to express 
values is sometimes limited as people‟s life circumstances provide opportunities to 
pursue or express some values more easily than others (Schwartz, 2006). Schwartz 
provided the example that wealthy people can pursue Power values more easily, and 
people who work in free professions can express Self-Direction values more easily. 
Thus, life circumstances make the pursuit or expression of different values more or 
less rewarding, costly, or possible. As Peterson noted, “as ideal standards, values are 
not always achieved, and we should not be surprised when people‟s concrete 
behaviours do not map neatly onto what they profess, although there is usually a 
modest empirical association between values and behaviours” (2006, pp. 167-168). 
Bardi and Schwartz (2003) also note that behaviours may be influenced by more than 
one value, and Maio and Olson (1995) argued that situational forces and normative 
pressures can overwhelm values. Of course, it may be necessary for a person to first 
know their values, to internalise them into a cohesive network, and prescribe 
importance to them before they can live their life in alignment with them.  
Although there is a limited amount of research on the importance of values, 
and a lesser amount on peoples‟ knowledge of their values or if they are living in 
alignment with their values, there has been no research on the extent to which people 
are satisfied with their values, and thus the influence of this relational aspect remains 
unknown. The closest the literature has come to touching on this aspect is in Miller 
and C‟de Baca (2001), who provide various depictions of individuals who have 
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changed the importance they attribute to various values, resulting in increased 
satisfaction with their values and improved life satisfaction.  
 
In summary, Schwartz‟s model has produced considerable research on 
relationships between specific values and behavioural, attitudinal, and personality 
variables, as well as on various demographic characteristics. There is also some 
limited research on relational variables relevant to this thesis, such as the importance 
of values, and to a lesser extent knowledge of values and living in alignment with 
values. However this research is scant and inclusive.  
  
1.3 The measurement of values 
 
The most common way of measuring values has been self-report (Braithwaite 
& Scott, 1991), as “researchers for the most part have assumed that people know 
what they think is desirable and hence can report their values” (Peterson, 2006, p. 
179). In measuring values, researchers ask about attitudes and behaviours that 
presumably represent specific values, and from response patterns, infer people‟s 
values. Thus, self-report measurement of values is subject to the same biases as other 
self-report methods (Schuman, 1995), and is not necessarily a valid indicator of an 
underlying phenomenon.  
As values‟ measures have amassed in the literature, they have been 
consolidated, elaborated and refined over time. Through this refinement, two 
principle foci of measurement have become apparent: identifying important 
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individual values, and assessing values‟ systems. Researchers originally focused on 
the importance of different values for different people, before focusing on the 
importance of values within people‟s value systems. As Kasser noted, “while 
individual values provide some information about people‟s experience and behaviour, 
most values theorists emphasize that it is best to assess the entire organization of 
values a person holds, that is, the person‟s value system” (2002, p. 124). Theorists 
generally conceive of value systems as a reasonably coherent set of values 
(individual, societal or absolute), which are used to set and readjust priorities and 
resolve conflicts (Joas, 2000; Seligman & Katz, 1996). 
The following review of values‟ measures briefly covers four main 
instruments used in the domain of psychology for assessing personal values. 
Although many other values‟ measures exist, most are not widely used and many 
have been criticised on methodological grounds. In addition, there is still much 
debate regarding the best way to measure values (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004), as values 
measurement is perceived as more complex than the measurement of most other 
psychological phenomena (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985; Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; 
Schwartz, 2006). As Hitlin and Piliavin mentioned, “measuring values, like 
measuring many social psychological concepts, is imperfect” (2004, p. 365). This 
brief review ends with a short outline of the three measures used in this thesis to 
assess and evaluate Schwartz‟s model. 
 
1.3.1 Values’ measures.  
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1.3.1.1 The Study of Values. 
 
One of the first measurement instruments, and regarded as the first systematic 
attempt to measure values (Gordon, 1975), was Allport and Vernon‟s (1931) Study of 
Values (SOV), which “had a substantial impact on psychological practice and 
research” (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985, p. 536). The SOV consists of 45 items and relies 
on behavioural scenarios in measuring six types of values: aesthetic, political, social, 
religious, economic, and theoretical. Decades after its development, the SOV was 
widely used for counselling, pedagogical, and research purposes (Kopelman, 
Rovenpor, & Guan, 2003). A newly revised 4
th
 edition of the SOV was published in 
2003, in which the authors “spruce up” (Kopelman et al., 2003, p.205) the SOV for 
the 21
st
 century, noting that previous versions suffered from outdated language and 
archaic content (Kopelman et al., 2003), which contributed to its “descent into 
psychological oblivion” (Peterson, 2006, p. 179). Changes to the 4th edition included 
gender-inclusive wording, expanded religious inclusiveness, and updated cultural 
conventions. Example items from the 4
th
 edition include, „the main object of scientific 
research should be the discovery of truth rather than its practical applications‟ and 
„assuming that you have sufficient ability, would you prefer to be: (a) a banker; (b) a 
politician?‟. From these items an individual‟s six types of values are inferred.  
 
1.3.1.2 The Rokeach Value Survey. 
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Following the SOV, the most notable measure of values was the Rokeach 
Value Survey (RVS: Rokeach, 1973) (for a full discussion of pre-RVS value 
instruments, see Braithwaite & Scott 1991). The RVS was designed to operationalise 
the value construct, to measure personal and social values, and was the dominant 
method for measuring values from the 1970s until the early 1990s (Bain, 2005; 
Johnston, 1995). Many of the findings in the values literature have used the RVS. In 
answering the RVS, participants rank order the importance of 36 values as guiding 
principles in their lives; 18 terminal values (e.g., freedom, an exciting life, national 
security, true friendship) and 18 instrumental values (e.g., honesty, courage, 
ambition, politeness). Thus, the RVS measures two different types of values: terminal 
values (prioritised end states of existence) and instrumental values (prioritised modes 
of behaviour).  
However the RVS has received various criticisms in the literature. Critics 
(e.g., Braithwaite & Scott, 1991; Schwartz, 1994a) lament that Rokeach relied on 
intuition in the development of both terminal and instrumental values, with various 
values drawn from his own values, his students‟ feedback, and research samples 
based solely on US citizens. Thus, the ability of the RVS to capture all values has 
been questioned (Braithwaite & Law, 1985). 
 
1.3.1.3 The List of Values. 
 
Following the RVS, Kahle (1983) produced the List of Values (LOV), which 
reduced Rokeach‟s list of 18 terminal values to nine (self-respect, security, warm 
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relationships with others, sense of accomplishment, self-fulfilment, sense of 
belonging, being well respected, fun and enjoyment in life, and excitement), and 
excluded instrumental values. Unlike other common measures, the nine values in the 
LOV can be scored in a number of ways; rated, ranked, or a combination. Values are 
described as „things some people look for or want out of life‟, and as Bearden and 
Netemeyer have noted, the LOV measures values “that are central to people in living 
their lives, particularly the values of life‟s major roles (i.e., marriage, parenting, work, 
leisure, and daily consumptions)” (1999, p. 115). 
The LOV was developed primarily from Feather‟s (1975) theoretical base of 
values, Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs (1959), and Rokeach‟s 18 terminal values 
(1973), and is tied most closely to Social Adaptation Theory. Kahle (1983) found the 
LOV to be significantly correlated with various measures of mental health, well-
being, and adaption to society, and Kahle, Beatty and Homer (1986) found it to 
predict consumer behaviour.  
 
1.3.1.4 The Personal Values Card Sort. 
 
Miller et al. (1999) developed the Personal Values Card Sort (PVCS) as a 
clinical tool to assist clients in the exploration of their values. In this task, clients are 
asked to sort 72 values cards (e.g., achievement, compassion, creativity, growth) into 
one of three categories: „very important to me,‟ „important to me,‟ or „not important 
to me‟, with the goal being to identify the person‟s top five or six values. Although no 
classification of values is included, the result of this sorting is said to provide 
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information of value content, structure and priorities (Miller, personal 
communication, April, 2003). Although there is scant empirical data available, due to 
its face validity and ease of use, the PVCS has been gaining in popularity in the 
clinical, coaching and counselling fields. 
 
1.3.2  Measuring Schwartz’s value theory.  
 
The main difference between Rokeach‟s and Schwartz‟s approaches to 
measurement is that Rokeach advocated asking respondents to rank values, whereas 
Schwartz advocated a rating, nonforced-choice approach. Schwartz (1994a) also 
questioned Rokeach‟s distinction between terminal and instrumental values, and 
noted that the RVS provided little explanation of how values are related to each other, 
and whether each value had independent relationships with other variables such as 
attitudes and behaviours. These reasons prompted Schwartz to develop the Schwartz 
Value Survey.  
In the literature to date, the three main instruments used to assess Schwartz‟s 
value theory have been the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS: Schwartz, 1992), the 
Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ: Schwartz et al., 2001) and the Short Schwartz 
Value Survey (SSVS: Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005)
1
.These three measures are 
further described in section 2.4.3.1. In brief, the Schwartz Value Survey consists of 
56 items and measures values via rating the 10 value types. The 40 item Portrait 
                                                 
1
 A revised PVQ, the PVQX5, is also being released early 2011 by Schwartz (Schwartz, personal 
communication, August, 2010). 
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Values Questionnaire contains less-abstract items, making it more accessible to a 
wider population. The more concise 10 item Short Schwartz Value Survey directly 
assesses the 10 value types. However, there has been no research comparing these 
three measures, and little research comparing any two other than by the scale 
developers themselves (e.g., Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). There is also no clear 
guidance as to which particular measure is superior; indicating that further 
comparative research between these measures is needed.  
 
1.3.3 Measurement concerns.  
 
There are numerous issues regarding the measurement of values in the 
literature. These include debates around rating vs. ranking values, the use of 
behavioural scenarios, drawing on theory in measure development, and even whether 
it is possible to measures values at all. 
Firstly, there is disagreement surrounding the psychometric adequacy of 
rating vs. ranking values. Rating involves evaluating the numerical worth of a 
particular value, whereas ranking involves ordering values by determined criteria 
(e.g., importance). On the one hand, rating values is said to be easier for participants 
(Schwartz, 1992) and allows for more comprehensive lists of values. However, rating 
is subject to ceiling effects, as people tend to rate values towards the higher end of 
rating scales due to their positive nature (Gordon, 1975; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). 
Thus, distinctions among particular values can be difficult to measure reliably or 
meaningfully as respondents may provide little variance with respect to 
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discriminating among values (Alwin & Krosnick, 1985). Schwartz addressed this 
concern by using an asymmetrical scale in the SVS to reflect the desirable nature of 
values (see section 2.4.3.1). Others found that ratings obtain greater variance if 
respondents were asked to pick their most and least important values from a list 
before rating the items (e.g., McCarty & Shrum, 2000), similar to the procedure of 
the SVS (see Appendix A). Schwartz (1992, 1996) also thought that rating values was 
closer to the way in which values enter into situations of behavioural choice. Thus, he 
concluded that rating provides more useful statistical properties, enables the use of 
longer lists, does not force respondents to discriminate between equally important 
values, and is closer to the way values are used as it allows people to indicate the 
importance of a value while keeping in mind the importance of other values.  
On the other hand, ranking values yields ipsative scores; the position of each 
value held by the individual relative to other values (Cattell, 1944). Ranking is 
perceived by some as more „real world‟ (Ball-Rokeach & Loges, 1996; Krosnick & 
Alwin 1988; Rokeach, 1973) and aligned with how people‟s value systems work; 
values are often in competition with one another. However, ranking abstract values is 
a cognitively challenging and taxing task (Alwin & Krosnick 1985; Schwartz, 
1994a), and many (e.g., Braithwaite & Law, 1985) have criticised the more 
statistically complex ranking procedures as unnecessary on both theoretical and 
empirical grounds. Additionally, a limitation of ipsative scores is that comparisons 
cannot be made between samples (Peterson, 2006).  
Most theorists (e.g., Bardi et al., 2009; Munson & McIntyre, 1979; Peterson, 
2006; Schwartz, 2004) now take the view that ranking methods yield similar results 
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regarding the relative importance of values compared to rating methods. Given that 
many different values‟ measures agree substantially (e.g., Alwin & Krosnick, 1985; 
Beatty, Kahle, Homer, & Misra, 1985; Braithwaite & Law, 1985; Hechter, 1993; 
Kahle et al., 1986; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz, Lehmann, & Roccas, 
1999), this has allowed researchers to rely on the simpler, and more participant 
friendly, strategy of rating. Indeed, the literature currently contains more work 
employing the rating approach than the ranking approach (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004), 
and rankings can be calculated after the fact from ratings (Peterson, 2006). For a 
review of the rating vs. ranking values debate, see Alwin and Krosnick (1985) or Ng 
(1982). 
Secondly, in measuring values some theorists advocate using behavioural 
scenarios, such as in the SOV or PVQ (see list of abbreviations, p. xviii), rather than 
abstract ideals. In recent years, several researchers (e.g., Konty, 2002; Kopelman et 
al., 2003) have lamented the limited validity of currently used values‟ measures, and 
have called for the development of measures that rely on behavioural scenarios. The 
use of behavioural scenarios mitigates against requiring respondents to consciously 
access and report values. Some research suggests that what is valued in abstract terms 
may be differently valued using a behavioural scenario (Peng, Nisbett, & Wong, 
1997). For example, Peng et al. (1997) compared three methods of value assessment: 
Rokeach rankings, Schwartz ratings, and a behavioural scenario method. Their 
findings indicated that rankings correlated only modestly with themselves (across 
samples) and showed small correlations with ratings. Neither ratings nor rankings 
related to an external criterion. In contrast, behavioural scenarios showed high 
 70 
 
external validity. Hence, they suggested the use of behavioural scenarios to assess 
values, of which the SOV is a long-existing alternative, and the PVQ a more recent 
alternative. Indeed, rankings have been shown to change depending on the 
individuals‟ mindset (personal life vs. societal perspective), and location (work vs. 
home) (Brown & Crace, 1996). Consequently, Connor and Becker (1994) have 
advocated the development of an instrument that incorporates realistic behavioural-
choice situations. Likewise, Peng et al. concluded that “the low criterion validity of 
commonly used value survey methods might be avoided by using the behavioral 
scenario method” (1997, p. 341).  
Thirdly, most measures of values have not been derived from theory, and 
many of the measures are continual refinements of earlier scales. This approach fails 
to recognise the emergence of new values because of its reliance on theorising about 
old values (Peterson, 2006). For example, Braithwaite and Law (1985) discovered 
that Australians valued physical wellbeing and human rights, two values not assessed 
with original instruments such as the RVS. Instead, the trend has been for researchers 
to rely on their own intuitions and experiences in identifying a core of important 
values. For example, Rokeach (1973) relied largely on his own notions of what 
people value in developing his list of terminal values, and Miller and colleagues 
developed the PVCS “at the pub” (Miller, personal communication, April, 2003).  
Finally, some question the very possibility of measuring values, pointing to 
various methodological concerns. For example, people may not always know what 
their values are due to their values cognitive accessibility (Hechter, 1993), or context 
may be important in influencing how people complete values‟ surveys. Using the 
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RVS, Seligman and Katz (1996) found situational variability of rankings for values 
such as „freedom‟ and „wisdom‟ in situations in which people were primed for their 
views on abortion and various environmental issues. They hypothesised that there 
may be different schemas activated by different contexts so that different values‟ 
systems are activated accordingly. This suggests that the abstract nature of Rokeach‟s 
and Schwartz‟s original inventories may influence the values people report as being 
important. Konty (2002) developed a measure of values sensitive to contextual 
concerns and argued that such an approach offers more utility than the original SVS. 
However it is debatable whether any measure can assess the full dimensionality of 
values. As Schwartz commented, “the comprehensiveness of any set of value 
orientations in covering the full range of motivational goals cannot be tested 
definitively” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 2). There are also methodological concerns with 
studying values across the life course. Period, cohort, and aging effects are easily 
conflated (Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991). Roberts and Bengtson (1999) used 
hierarchical linear models in an instructive attempt to disentangle these issues, 
arguing that more work needs to engage the longitudinal nature of values (e.g., Bardi 
et al, 2009). These methodological concerns deserve further consideration, and call 
into question the validity of values measurement. 
 
In summary, there are various concerns regarding the measurement of values 
in the literature. Chiefly amongst these are debates around the superiority of rating vs. 
ranking values, the use of behavioural scenarios, drawing on theory in measure 
development, and whether it is possible to measure values at all. 
 72 
 
 
1.4 Clinical Psychology 
 
While Schwartz‟s work to date has been used primarily to examine the 
relationship between values and various social behaviours, attitudinal variables, and 
personality characteristics, there is growing interest in using the notion of values in 
the field of clinical psychology, particularly by the newer therapies, and particularly 
in relation to depression. In the following section, depressed mood is explained, its 
role in the clinical syndrome of depression is outlined, and its causes, costs, and 
treatments are briefly summarised. Following this, contemporary therapies that 
incorporate values are noted, as well as the challenges they face and benefits they 
confer. Empirical studies that have investigated the link between values and 
depressed mood are reviewed, and possible relationships between values and 
depressed mood are suggested.  
 
1.4.1 Depressed mood. 
 
The clinical syndrome of depression is characterised in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR: American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) by a number of symptoms, including depressed mood, diminished 
interest or pleasure in activities, weight loss or gain, sleep disturbances, psychomotor 
agitation, fatigue, worthlessness or guilt, diminished concentration, and suicidal 
ideation. Depressed mood is thus one of the nine DSM-IV-TR symptoms that 
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characterise a major depressive episode, where the individual indicates “depressed 
mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either subjective report (e.g., 
feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (e.g., appears tearful)” (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 356), and is a change from previous functioning.  
The need to understand more about the clinical syndrome of depression 
remains as compelling as ever. Within the field of clinical psychology, depression is 
central (Bergin & Garfield, 2003), and is frequently identified as the most common 
and co-morbid of mental disorders in the western world (Klerman & Weissman, 
1989). Young, Beck and Weinberger (2001) cite depression as the leading cause of 
disability, and the World Health Organisation cites depression as the second leading 
cause of disability in the age category 15-44 years for both sexes (WHO, 2005). At 
present in New Zealand, an estimated 6% of men and 9% of women (about 320,000 
people) experience a depressive episode in any given year (Carter, 2004), and 
worldwide approximately 121 million people meet criteria for a depressive disorder 
(WHO, 2007). Seligman, Schulman, and Tryon (2007) estimated that depression will 
affect between 10% and 25% of adults during their lifetime, and in New Zealand, 
depression is the most prevalent psychological disorder with an overall lifetime 
prevalence of 16% (Oakley-Brown, Wells, Scott, & McGee, 2006). The World 
Health Organisation projected that depression will be the world‟s second leading 
health problem by the year 2020 (WHO, 2005), and that increasing rates of 
depression have been well documented (see Fombonne, 1995). These statistics and 
projections highlight the seriousness and widespread nature of this disorder.  
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In addition to being common, depression has numerous human, social, and 
financial costs. The costs of depression are estimated in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars (US) a year internationally (Martell, Addis, & Jacobson, 2001). In 1990, 
depression was ranked as the fourth most costly of all illnesses worldwide (Keller & 
Boland, 1998), with further estimates that by 2015 depression will be the second most 
costly of all illnesses worldwide. The National Institute of Mental Health in the 
United States of America estimated the associated cost of depression to be more than 
30 billion dollars (US) each year in the United States of America alone (Spielberger, 
Ritterband, Reheiser, & Brunner, 2003). In 2004 the World Bank estimated the global 
cost of depression solely to the corporate world at 240 billion dollars (US) each year 
(Layard, 2005). Depression also has many negative and disabling personal effects, 
such as increased risk of heart attacks, and is a frequent and serious complicating 
factor in stroke, diabetes, and cancer (Young et al., 2001).  
There have been many causes postulated for depression, which include 
psychological, psychosocial, genetic, and biological factors. For example, commonly 
cited causes include negative life events and traumas, poor coping resources and 
skills deficits, low engagement in pleasant activities, neurochemical imbalances, and 
avoidant coping mechanisms (Beck, 1995; Brown, 1996; Fombonne, 1995; Martell et 
al., 2001) to name a few. It is generally thought that these various factors, or a 
combination thereof, influence the onset and maintenance of depression (Roth & 
Fonagy, 2005).  
Currently, Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is considered a „well 
established treatment‟ (Butler & Beck, 2000) and the most empirically supported 
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psychological treatment for depression (Beck, 1995; Bergin & Garfield, 2003; 
Kazantzis, Deane, & Ronan, 2000; Young et al., 2001). Mainstream cognitive 
behavioural theories of depression include those developed by Beck (1976); Ellis 
(1962); Lewinsohn, Muñoz, Youngren, and Zeiss (1978); and Seligman (1991). 
Depending on the study, efficacy rates (or rates of „marked relief‟) for CBT are 
usually reported around the 60% to 80% range (Bergin & Garfield, 2003; Dobson, 
1989; Roth & Fonagy, 2005; Seligman et al., 2007; Young et al., 2001), meaning that 
roughly two out of every three people are successfully treated with a CBT-type 
approach (or received „marked relief‟). Effect sizes in large scale meta-analyses 
support these efficacy rates when comparing CBT to wait list, no-treatment list, or 
placebo controls (Butler & Beck, 2000). These efficacy rates are similar to the use of 
medications in the treatment of depression (Bergin & Garfield, 2003). Given that 
medications are a cheaper form of treatment (Roth & Fonagy, 2005), although only in 
the shorter term in comparison to CBT (Young et al., 2001), treatment providers often 
opt for medications before psychological treatments (Brown, 1996). However as 
Layard (2005) pointed out, this may also be due to a lack of available psychologists. 
Nonetheless, as Prochaska and Norcross state:  
 
Probably the safest prediction about cognitive therapy‟s direction is that it 
is moving up. Cognitive-behavioural therapies in general, and Beckian 
cognitive therapy in particular, are the fastest growing and most heavily 
researched orientations on the contemporary scene. The reasons for its 
current popularity are manifest: Cognitive therapy is manualized, 
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relatively brief, extensively evaluated, medication compatible, and 
problem focused. Let us put it this way: If we were forced to purchase 
stock in any of the psychotherapy systems, Beck‟s cognitive therapy 
would be the blue-chip growth selection for the next five years. (2003, p. 
369)  
 
However, neither CBT nor medications are completely efficacious treatments 
for depression, as there is still much unknown about this clinical syndrome, as well as 
how CBT treatment works and why CBT is not a complete and comprehensive 
treatment for all individuals (Jacobson et al., 2000). For example, Wampold (2001) 
argued that alliance factors between therapist and client account for up to 60% of 
therapeutic outcome, rather than the 8% that is due to the model or technique. 
Previous research (Jarden, 2002, 2005) has also questioned the utility and 
effectiveness of the core construct of „belief‟ in CBT as one potential reason 
hindering higher treatment success rates.  
Nonetheless, health care providers are faced with a widespread, debilitating, 
and costly clinical syndrome for which the best current treatment is not completely 
efficacious for all individuals and for which treatment response lessens over time 
(Roth & Fonagy, 2005). There is a need for an improved approach to treating this 
clinical syndrome. Indeed, public health benefits on a large and long lasting scale 
may be possible through discovering inexpensive ways to prevent and treat this 
condition. Given this, cheaper, more effective, and more accessible treatments should 
be a high public health priority. Additionally, the need for a quick and effective way 
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to predict and screen for depression is also compelling, as Shapiro et al. (1984) 
indicate that as few as 20% of individuals with an affective disorder seek treatment.  
 
In summary, depression is widespread, rates are increasing, the syndrome 
imposes huge costs on individuals and societies, and there is much room for 
improvement in both assessments and treatments.  
 
1.4.2 Values and mood. 
 
Whilst CBT has focused on constructs such as beliefs, thoughts, and 
explanatory style, rather than values, some contemporary therapies have incorporated 
the notion of values into their approach. This inclusion has largely been in 
recognition of the view that psychotherapy incorporates values out of necessity 
(Bergin, 1980; Beutler, 1979; Patterson, 1989). Examples of empirically supported 
therapeutic approaches that contain a focus on values include Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) (Hayes et al., 1999), Motivational Interviewing (MI) 
(Miller & Rollnick, 1991), Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Kasser, 2002), Quality of Life Therapy (QOLT) (Frisch, 2006), and Rational-Emotive 
Therapy (RET) (Ellis, 1994). For instance, Wilson and Murrell note that “ACT is a 
client-centred treatment in the sense that it is the client‟s values that direct the 
therapy” (2004, p. 140) and that “ACT is aimed squarely at helping clients to… live a 
life in pursuit of their most deeply held values” (2004, p. 124). As another example, 
Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone explain that in SDT: 
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The translation of values into behaviour is facilitated by a developmental 
process by which an individual integrates values and the associated 
regulatory mechanisms into their organized value system, even their core 
self. In essence, the individual becomes autonomous with respect to and 
takes full responsibility for the goal and the behaviours required. With 
integration, the importance of the goal is established and enhanced. It 
becomes a priority in relationship to other goals less integrated. (1994, p. 
126) 
 
In contrast to these approaches that incorporate and focus on values, the more 
central, predominant and currently popular psychotherapies, such as CBT (Beck, 
1976; Beck, 1995; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979) Behavioural Activation (BA) 
(Martell et al., 2001) or Interpersonal Psychotherapy (IPT) (Weissman & Markowitz, 
1998) do not have a focus on values in their approaches. 
Nonetheless, progress in approaches that do incorporate a focus on values 
remains relatively undeveloped and novel, as these approaches acknowledge that 
working with values in a therapeutic context is a new frontier and that “work in this 
area is just beginning” (Wilson & Murrell, 2004, p. 136). Despite previous research 
(see section 1.1.4), values work in psychotherapy is currently in a confused, 
uncertain, and ambiguous state regarding how to address values issues (Bergin at al., 
1996; Wilson & Murrell, 2004). Most of this uncertainty reflects unresolved issues in 
working with values in a therapeutic context. For example, some note difficulty in 
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getting clients to engage fully in values work (Wilson & Murrell, 2004) and others 
note that the reliable and valid measurement of values remains impractical and 
problematic (Miller & Rollnick, 1991). Despite these issues, those working with 
values in a therapeutic context report therapeutic benefits (Hayes et al., 1999; Miller 
et al., 1999). Other helping professionals who work in the area of depressed mood, 
such as counsellors, psychiatrists, and life coaches, have also commented on the 
utility of values. For example, Henderson commented that:  
 
The key to having a fulfilling life is to do things that are in alignment 
with your personal values. When you bring your life into alignment with 
your values and are living according to these values, you will feel 
excited, energised, in control, and productive. Generally you will feel 
more confident and happy with your life as a whole. (2003, p. 7)  
 
There is some, though not much, research on values in a therapeutic context. 
Ernst (2002) has outlined the importance of values in determining and promoting the 
health behaviours of fire-fighters, and the potential usefulness of values-based 
interventions in changing behaviour. Jessor (1991) found that high salience of values 
and low achievement (or expectation of achievement) of values led to higher rates of 
mental illness. Bergin at al. (1996) found that beneficial mental health consequences 
are an outcome of congruence or of behaving in synchrony with one‟s religious 
values, whereas acting contrary to personal values results in dissonance, with 
consequences of guilt, anxiety, despair, or alienation. Wilson and Murrell describe 
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individuals with a high discrepancy between rated importance and rated consistency 
of values as expressing a “lot of distress” (2004, p. 136). They noted that they “have 
found clinically that clients experience these discrepancies as very disturbing,...[that] 
they tend to be associated with a great deal of negative self-evaluation, guilt, sadness, 
and anxiety” (2004, p. 137), and that “a life that is lived outside a person‟s most 
closely held values feels lousy” (2004, p. 124). Peterson commented that “we feel 
righteous when we live up to our values and shame and guilt when we do not even 
try” (2006, p. 168). Examples of other clinical studies include investigations into the 
relationship between values and worries (Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000), 
alcohol use (Sanchez, 2000), drug use (Phillips & Bourne, 2007; Phillips, Russell, & 
Brennan, 2002), weight loss (Schwartz & Inbar-Saban, 1988), and smoking behaviour 
(Conroy, 1979). The picture that is emerging from such research and commentary is 
that values provide useful insights in a therapeutic context.  
Nonetheless, with only a few limited studies, the paucity of research on the 
relationship between values and psychopathology is surprising given that helping 
professionals believe that people‟s values have an impact on their mental health and 
emotional functioning (e.g., Patterson, 1958; Sichel, 1993; Timms, 1983; Van der 
Wateren, 1999), and that some values do more to promote mental health than others 
(Jensen & Bergin, 1988). For instance, Bergin et al. comment that it is “clear that 
clients‟ values have negative emotional or physical consequences” (1996, p. 300), 
and Van der Wateren noted that “people with a clearly clarified values system in 
general utilise more constructive coping strategies and report a higher level of 
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psychological wellbeing” (1999, p. 15). However, this perspective on values in 
relation to psychopathology is based on a small amount of empirical research. 
To date there have been only two small scale empirical studies that have 
specifically investigated the relationship between an individual‟s values and their 
depressed mood (Lester, 1991, 1993). With regard to the importance of values, Lester 
administered the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, 
& Erbaugh, 1961) and Rokeach Values Survey (RVS) (Rokeach, 1973) to 127 
college students and found that depression scores were not associated with responses 
on the RVS. However, later Lester (1993) acknowledged that errors were made in the 
scoring of the RVS in his initial 1991 study, so he undertook a second identical study 
with a further 108 college students (noting that the original data was unavailable). 
Results of his second study indicated that depression scores were negatively 
associated with the terminal value of „equality‟ (r = -.27), and positively associated 
with the terminal value of „pleasure‟ (r = .20). He again concluded that, on the whole, 
“responses to the Rokeach Value Survey were not associated with current depression” 
(1993, p. 1202).  
In contrast to these two empirical studies, and as indicated above, there have 
been numerous clinical reports and observations indicating positive relationships 
between a person knowing, giving importance to, and living by their values, and their 
mental health functioning. For example, Sichel commented that a person can be 
“more self-directed and effective when they know which values they really choose to 
keep and live by as an adult, and which ones will get priority over others” (1993, p. 
49). Donahue noted that “positive mental health indexes are generally aligned with a 
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person knowing and living by their values”, with the converse leading to “less healthy 
and sometimes pathological or negative correlates” (1985, p. 412). Bergin et al. stated 
that “it sometimes becomes clear that clients‟ values have negative emotional or 
physical consequences” (1996, p. 300). In their clinical work with values, Wilson and 
Murrell describe individuals with “extreme low total importance scores” as a 
“clinically and theoretically interesting profile” (2004, p. 137). However, in regard to 
the contents of the values per se (i.e., value types), there is very little comment, and 
thus it is not known which values a person with depressed mood would endorse as 
most important, or indeed in which particular theoretical configuration. It remains 
possible that certain values may provide a protective function against depressed 
mood, whereas others may be associated with depressed mood. 
 
In summary, the need to understand more about the common clinical 
syndrome of depression, including depressed mood, in order to address its numerous 
human, social, and financial costs by improving assessments and treatments, remains 
as compelling as ever. However to date, the main therapeutic approaches have 
focused on constructs such as beliefs and thoughts rather than values, with newer 
approaches and a broader spectrum of helping professionals just beginning to utilise 
the notion of values. Much of this advance, however, is limited by a paucity of 
research on the contents, coherence and relational aspects of values in relation to 
depressed mood.  
 
1.4.3  Possible relationships between values and depressed mood.  
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Schwartz‟s integrated structure of values enables theorising about possible 
relationships between value priorities and other variables, such as depressed mood. 
As Schwartz commented:  
 
Theorizing begins with reasoning about the particular values that are 
most and least positively related to a variable. The circular motivational 
structure of values then implies a specific pattern of positive, negative, 
and zero associations for the remaining values. The next step is to 
develop theoretical explanations for why or why not to expect these 
implied associations. The integrated structure serves as a template that 
can reveal „deviations‟ from the expected pattern. Deviations are 
especially interesting because they direct us to search for special 
conditions that enhance or weaken relations of a variable with values. 
(2006, p. 6) 
 
Thus, given Schwartz‟s theoretical model, the research above, and in view of 
what is known about depression (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1978; Martell et al., 2001), 
one might reasonably expect individuals high in depressed mood to value Security, 
Conformity and Tradition more, and conversely attribute lesser value to the opposing 
values of Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction. Thus, one might expect 
depressed individuals to be more invested in subordinating themselves by following 
and conforming to widespread rules and expectations (Conformity), to avoiding 
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change (Tradition), and to being safe (Security), and conversely be less invested in 
gratifying themselves (Hedonism), obtaining excitement and novelty (Stimulation), or 
in exploring or gaining autonomy (Self-Direction). It may also be reasonable to 
expect that individuals with high depressed mood have less coherent value systems 
compared to individuals with low depressed mood. Additionally, one might expect 
that individuals with more depressed mood place lesser importance on their values, 
have less knowledge of their values, are living in alignment with their values less, and 
are less satisfied with their values compared to individuals with less depressed mood.   
 
1.5 Positive psychology 
 
The field of positive psychology is a new direction for psychology (Peterson, 
2006; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). Martin Seligman‟s 1998 APA 
presidential address is seen by many as the fields‟ inception date. In contrast to 
psychology‟s customary focus on the negative side of life and with what is going 
wrong with individuals, such as depression, anxiety and trauma, a steadily growing 
number of researchers has begun to focus on the positive side of life and on what is 
going right with individuals (Baumgardner & Crothers, 2009; Ben-Shahar, 2007; 
Boniwell, 2006; Burns, 2010; Carr, 2004; Diener & Biswas-Diener, 2008; Eid & 
Larsen, 2007; Kahneman, Diener, & Schwarz, 1999; Kashdan, 2009; Layard, 2005; 
Linley & Joseph, 2004; Peterson, 2006; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Schwarzer & 
Peterson, 2008; Seligman, 2002; Van der Wateren, 1999). Moreover, there is growing 
interest in using the concept of values in the field of positive psychology in addition 
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to the field‟s current focus on constructs such as strengths, savouring, happiness, 
meaning, flow and mindfulness (e.g., Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Oishi, Diener, Suh, & 
Lucas, 1999; Joshanloo & Ghaedi, 2009). 
The following section describes subjective wellbeing (SWB), including its 
history, recent conceptualisation and definition, example research findings, and 
various issues surrounding its measurement. Empirical studies that have investigated 
links between values and SWB are reviewed, and possible relationships between 
values and SWB are suggested. 
 
1.5.1 Subjective wellbeing.  
 
Subjective wellbeing is a prominent area of research within positive 
psychology (Davern, Cummins, & Stokes, 2007; Diener, Emmons, Larson, & Griffin, 
1985; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Eid & Larsen, 2007; Hayes & Joseph, 
2003; Kashdan, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999; Oishi et al., 1999), with the 
term frequently used interchangeably in the literature with “happiness” (Diener 
claims he invented „SWB‟ in 1984 to gain a research grant; research on „happiness‟ 
was not viewed as scientific: Diener, personal communication, July, 2008). 
Historically, discourse pertaining to happiness has been extensive. For example, 
Aristotle‟s view was that happiness is so important that it transcends all other worldly 
considerations (Aristotle, trans. 1967), and James‟s view was that “happiness is for 
most men, at all times, the secret motive of all they do…” (1902, p. 76). Indeed, 
“western culture has embraced happiness as one of its most important goals – both at 
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an individual level and for society at large” (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, p. 137), 
and “personal happiness is generally held to be the most important goal in life” 
(Fordyce, 1988, p. 63). However, there are 21 articles on depression for every one 
article on happiness (Ben-Shahar, 2007), and thus the science of happiness, rather 
than the discourse, has not been so extensive (Graham, 2009).  
Serious research into happiness began around the 1960s. A leading study at 
that time was Wilson‟s (1967) review of the characteristics of a happy person; young, 
healthy, educated, well paid, extraverted, optimistic, married, religious, and 
intelligent, with high esteem and job morale. Happiness research increased in the 
1970s; for example, Psychological Abstracts International began listing happiness as 
an index term in 1973 (Diener, 1984). From the 1980s onward there was “an 
explosion of research on happiness” (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, p. 138.) 
culminating in hundreds of studies being published annually. For example, Schwarzer 
and Peterson (2008) noted that the keyword „wellbeing‟ was linked to only 20 journal 
articles in the year 1999, but to 300 articles in 2006. Within positive psychology, the 
notion of SWB (or „happiness‟) is central (Lopez & Snyder, 2003). This increasing 
trend in SWB research has taken place against a backdrop where the secret of and 
path to happiness have remained a subject of tremendous popular interest (Freedman, 
1978; Layard, 2005). For example, a poll in the United Kingdom found that 81% of 
respondents thought the government‟s primary goal ought to be the „greatest 
happiness‟ rather than the „greatest wealth‟ (Easton, 2006).  
Research to date has found that individuals reporting high SWB have, for 
example, stronger social relationships (Christakis & Fowler, 2009; Diener & 
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Seligman, 2002), greater marital satisfaction (Glenn & Weaver, 1981), greater 
academic success (Borrello, 2005), lower suicide risk (Diener et al., 1999), and 
improved important life outcomes, such as better physical and mental health (Pavot & 
Diener, 2008). Indeed, people with positive self-perceptions also tend to live longer 
(Carr, 2004), earn more (Graham, 2009; Layard, 2005), and are more productive (Eid 
& Larsen, 2007). In contrast, researchers have identified groups low in SWB; e.g., 
prison inmates, divorced individuals, sex workers, and individuals with various health 
concerns (see Pavot & Diener, 2008). 
Three lines of research into influences on SWB are noteworthy (Sagvi & 
Schwartz, 2000). One line has examined effects of objective life circumstances on 
SWB (e.g., relationship status, employment, location), another the effects of the 
behaviours and activities that people engage in on SWB (e.g., exercise, sexual 
practices, internet use), and lastly how personality attributes are related to SWB (e.g., 
extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness). For example, extraversion consistently 
relates to SWB (DeNeve & Cooper, 1998) with happy individuals having “social, 
outgoing personalities, as well as positive feelings about themselves, their sense of 
mastery, and the future” (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, p. 367).  
Research has begun to investigate the factors influencing SWB. Suggested 
components include aspects such as using psychological strengths (Linley, 2008), 
being curious (Kashdan, 2009), discovering meaning in life (Steger, 2009), finding 
flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), and being connected (Christakis & Fowler, 2009). 
Recent research (Jarden et al., in press) has also highlighted additional components 
that contribute more to wellbeing than aspects currently studied (e.g., people‟s 
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satisfaction with their use of time). These findings have led to various approaches to 
increasing peoples‟ wellbeing, including wholesale approaches such as Frisch‟s 
Quality of Life Therapy (2006) or Fordyce‟s Happiness Increasing Program (1977), 
and to smaller „interventions‟ such as increasing hope (Snyder, 2002), discovering 
meaning (Steger, 2009), or utilising strengths (Linley, Willars, & Biswas-Diener, 
2010). However, none of these focus on values.  
Similar to clinical interventions, these current approaches to increasing 
wellbeing have not been shown to lead to either total or long lasting increases in 
SWB. Conversely, people are largely bound by „hedonic adaptation‟ in which “people 
soon adapt to their new circumstances, and their level of SWB returns to a level 
similar to that reported before the event of change occurred” (Pavot & Diener, 2008, 
p. 139). For an overview of the area of hedonic psychology, see Kahneman et al., 
(1999). 
Much of the research to date has relied on dissimilar definitions of SWB. In 
conceptualising SWB, the term has been used inclusively to refer to life satisfaction, 
happiness, the presence of positive affect, and the absence of negative affect (Davern 
et al., 2007; DeNeve & Cooper, 1998; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999; Kashdan, 
2004). Thus, SWB has been conceptualised as multifaceted, having both a cognitive 
and an affective component. The cognitive component usually consists of life 
satisfaction; a global evaluation of the quality of one‟s life as a whole (Pavot & 
Diener, 1993). The affective component usually consists of either a combination of 
positive and negative affect (e.g., Diener et al., 1999), or of solely positive affect 
(e.g., Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000).  
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An early definition by Diener (1984) defined SWB as a combination of life 
satisfaction (a cognitive judgement) and the balance of the frequency of positive and 
negative affect (i.e., “hedonic tone”: Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999, p. 365). Prior to 
this the focus was solely on positive affect; however life satisfaction was found to 
provide “important additional predictive power, over and above moment-to-moment 
assessment of affect” (Pavot, & Diener, 2008, p. 141), with “the current view in the 
well-being literature that the cognitive and affective aspects of subjective well-being 
are distinct and their indexes should be kept separate” (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000, p. 
184). As the literature developed, researchers identified problems with using the 
balance of the frequency of positive and negative affect (e.g. Argyle & Martin, 1991), 
arguing that positive and negative affect are largely independent factors (e.g., 
Bradburn, 1969). In addition, others have criticised the Positive and Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), one of the main measures used to 
assess the balance of positive and negative affect in the assessment of SWB, for 
various reasons (e.g., its unipolar nature, or that it only includes high arousal 
emotions) (Schimmack & Grob, 2000; Watson & Vaidya, 2003). Although this 
debate has not concluded, in line with how the literature is developing, this thesis 
conceptualises SWB as a combination of life satisfaction and positive affect
2
.  
Given this conceptual disparity, SWB has been measured in a number of 
ways. As Fordyce mentions, “over the years, no measure of happiness has emerged as 
a standard reference-point for ongoing study” (1988, p. 65). Nonetheless, as SWB is a 
                                                 
2
 An additional reason is that this thesis also focuses on the conceptually similar notion of depressed 
mood, and thus leaving negative affect out makes the distinction between depressed mood and SWB 
more discrete.  
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subjective experience, similar to depressed mood, it is best assessed by directly 
asking people (Abbe, Tkach, & Lyubomirsky, 2003). As Lyubomirsky and Lepper 
note, “most people know that they are happy or that they are not” (1999, p. 138). 
Moreover, Diener (2000) argues that this self-referential approach is democratic as it 
respects a person‟s right to make his or her own evaluations about their happiness. 
Common measures of SWB include the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SwLS: Diener et 
al., 1985), the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999), the 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988), the Happiness 
Measures (HM) (Fordyce, 1988), and the Affect Balance Scale (Bradburn, 1969). 
Previous popular measures also include the Delighted-Terrible Scale (Andrews & 
Withey, 1976) and Self Anchoring Striving Scale (Cantril, 1965); both single item 
scales. The Psychological General Well-being Index (Dupuy, 1984) has also been 
popular (for an overview of the development of SWB measures, see Angner, 2005).  
Nonetheless, there is still considerable debate over whether self-reports of life 
satisfaction are related to SWB. Self-reports of life satisfaction are considered valid if 
they correlate reliably with predicted objective indicators associated with wellbeing. 
Indeed, high correlations have been found between SWB measures and expert ratings, 
family and friend reports, time smiling, with frequency of good moods, and with 
memory of positive and negative life events (Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993). As 
well as being valid, self-reports of life satisfaction are reliable as findings are 
consistent and stable across cultures, between varied samples, and over time 
(Fordyce, 1988; Pavot & Diener, 2008). People tend to give the same patterns of 
response over time, even when slightly different question wordings are used 
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(Graham, 2009). Currently cited problems associated with SWB measures include the 
possibilities of response and memory bias, context and priming effects (Diener et al., 
1999), as well as vagueness and influences of mood and culturally determined beliefs 
about happiness (see Thomas & Diener, 1990). 
 
In summary, SWB is important on both theoretical and practical levels, 
research on SWB is increasing, issues with measurement are being addressed, and 
conceptual clarification is improving.  
 
1.5.2 Values and wellbeing. 
 
There are limited findings to date on the relationship between values and 
wellbeing. Indeed, of all the main books published in the field of positive psychology 
to date, only two specifically address the topic of values; both focusing on Schwartz‟s 
model (i.e., Peterson, 2006; Boniwell, 2006). In addition, there are only a handful of 
journal articles that focus specifically on the association between values and 
wellbeing (e.g., Joshanloo & Ghaedi, 2009; Oishi et al., 1999). The most notable 
article is by Sagiv and Schwartz (2000), who investigated direct relations and 
congruity effects of values priorities on SWB. They investigated whether SWB 
depends on congruence between values and the prevailing value environment; how 
situational opportunities for realising values moderate the relations of value priorities 
to SWB.  
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Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) have hypothesised direct associations between 
increased SWB and Stimulation, Self-Direction, Achievement, Benevolence and 
Universalism, and low SWB and Conformity, Tradition, Security, and Power 
(Hedonism was excluded). They based their reasoning on various psychotherapy 
theories, inferences and findings from self determination theory, and a conceptual 
analysis of the relationships of value priorities to needs and emotional resources. As 
Sagiv and Schwartz mention:  
 
There is a considerable agreement in the psychotherapy literature in the 
West that particular values contribute positively to personal mental health 
whereas other values are detrimental. For example, Jensen and Bergin 
(1988) identified values from the self-direction (e.g. autonomy, freedom), 
benevolence (e.g. responsibility, inter-personal and family relationships), 
and universalism (e.g. self-awareness, personal growth) value types as 
„healthy‟. Similarly, Strupp (1980) referred to autonomy (self-direction), 
responsibility (benevolence) and fairness to others (universalism) as 
„healthy values‟. There is also some agreement that achievement and 
stimulation values are „healthy‟ values. In contrast, values of the 
conformity, tradition, security and power types are often considered 
„unhealthy‟. (2000, p. 180) 
 
Sagiv and Schwartz also note that although there is agreement, “data to 
support these speculations is sparse” (2000, 180), and indeed psychotherapy 
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researchers have not explicitly discussed the causal processes that might link mental 
health to the importance attributed to healthy or unhealthy values. However, 
Freedman (1978) reported that older people who are happy are more confident in 
their guiding values, and Vachon and Agresti commented that “it appears as though 
people with a clearly clarified values system in general utilise more constructive 
coping strategies and report a higher level of psychological wellbeing” (1992, p. 513). 
Pavot and Diener mentioned that “a person‟s conscious evaluation of her or his life 
circumstances may reflect conscious values and goals” (1993, p. 165). However, 
similar to the area of depressed mood, there is little research indicating which types of 
values, or which configuration, may be associated with higher SWB. Findings to date 
indicate that Self-Direction, Stimulation, Achievement, Tradition, Conformity and 
Security values are correlated with the affective component of SWB, but not with the 
cognitive component (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). In addition, several empirical studies 
have reported associations between „life goals‟ or „personal strivings‟ and indicators 
of „wellbeing‟ (Emmons, 1991; Kasser & Ryan, 1993, 1996; Sheldon & Kasser, 
1995). According to self determination theory, people are likely to experience a 
positive sense of wellbeing to the extent that they pursue intrinsic rather than 
extrinsic needs or goals (Deci & Ryan, 1995). Schwartz (1992) takes life goals and 
personal strivings to be value constructs in that they motivate action and serve as 
standards for evaluating behaviour and events across situations. These studies have 
generally found positive associations between having „life goals‟ or „personal 
strivings‟ and various indicators of wellbeing.  
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In summary, the need to understand more about SWB remains as compelling 
as ever. However to date positive psychologists have focused on constructs such as 
strengths, meaning, savouring, mindfulness, and flow rather than values. There is 
currently a paucity of research on the contents, organisation and relational aspects of 
values in relation to SWB.  
 
1.5.3 Possible relationships between values and subjective wellbeing 
 
Theorising from Schwartz‟s model, and in light of the research indicating that 
a person‟s subjective sense of wellbeing might depend on their profile of value 
priorities, one might reasonably expect individuals high in SWB to value Self-
Direction, Stimulation, and Hedonism highly, and conversely attribute lesser value to 
the opposing values of Security, Conformity and Tradition. Thus, one might expect 
high SWB individuals to be satisfying their pleasures (Hedonism), leading an exciting 
and challenging life (Stimulation), and having some control, independence and 
mastery over their experiences (Self-Direction), and conversely be less invested in 
subordinating themselves by conforming to rules and expectations (Conformity), to 
avoiding change (Tradition), and to being safe (Security). It may also be reasonable to 
expect that individuals high in SWB have more coherent values‟ systems compared to 
individuals low in SWB. Additionally, one might expect that individuals with high 
SWB place more importance on their values, have more knowledge of their values, 
are living in alignment with their values more, and are more satisfied with their 
values compared to individuals with low SWB. 
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1.6 Research goals 
 
Given the paucity of empirical research to date, specific predictions 
concerning the relationships between personal values, and depressed mood and SWB 
are tentative. Although the above reviews of clinical and positive psychology have 
speculated at possible relationships, they also highlight that there is very little 
empirical justification for these speculations. With this point in mind, the broad 
research questions were as follows: 
 
1. Are people‟s values related to their moods? More specifically, are the 
types of values (value types) people endorse or their coherence related to 
their depressed mood, and are people‟s relationships to their values 
(importance of, knowledge of, living in alignment with, or satisfaction 
with) related to their depressed mood. 
 
2. Are people‟s values related to their wellbeing? More specifically, are the 
types of values people endorse or their coherence related to their SWB, 
and are people‟s relationships to their values related to their SWB. 
 
The broad aim of this thesis was to investigate and clarify these relationships, 
and to determine if the notion of values can be more useful in the fields of clinical 
and positive psychology. This thesis aims to contribute to our knowledge of values in 
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these domains in particular. In view of the prima facie importance of values, 
researchers and practitioners may benefit from explicit descriptions of the types, 
coherence, and relational aspects of values underlying depressed mood and SWB. 
 
1.7 Summary 
 
There has been little contemporary research investigating values in 
psychology, especially in relation to clinical or positive psychology. Currently the 
role that personal values play in relation to mood or wellbeing is largely unknown, as 
highlighted by the limited use of the concept in the clinical and positive 
psychological literature, which scarcely mentions values. Instead, clinical psychology 
has focused on constructs, such as beliefs, thoughts, and explanatory style, and 
positive psychology has focused on constructs such as strengths, meaning, flow and 
savouring.  
Given that values are important, that both clinical and positive psychology 
have largely neglected the subject of values, that work pertaining to values to date 
shows considerable promise, that treatments for depression are not completely 
efficacious, that values seem to be related to wellbeing, and that values are set to play 
a bigger part in clinical and positive psychology in particular, it seems imperative for 
psychology to learn more about values, the influence they have, and their 
relationships to both depressed mood and SWB. With these points in mind, the 
purpose of this thesis was to explore important relationships between personal values, 
and depressed mood and SWB.   
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CHAPTER 2: STUDY ONE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Study One analysed the degree to which people‟s values related to their 
depressed mood and SWB. In investigating these relationships, participants 
completed eight measures: four measures of personal values, one of depressed mood, 
and three of SWB. This second chapter is in four main sections. The first section 
outlines the hypotheses investigated, the second outlines the method, and the third 
reports the results. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results of this study. 
 
2.2 Aims 
 
The first aim was to identify the best values measure of three main 
approaches: the SVS, SSVS, and PVQ (see list of abbreviations, p. xviii). The second 
aim was to investigate relationships between the importance of individuals‟ values, 
and their depressed mood and SWB. The third aim was to investigate relationships 
between individuals‟ satisfaction with their values, and their depressed mood and 
SWB. In doing so, the overarching goal was to increase understanding of the 
relationships between the importance of, and satisfaction with, personal values, and 
with mood and wellbeing.  
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2.3 Hypotheses  
 
Four hypotheses (H1 to H4) addressed the relationship between values and 
depressed mood, and four (H5 to H8) addressed the relationship between values and 
SWB. It was expected that greater depressed mood would be associated with lesser 
importance of, and current satisfaction with, values as a whole; and that greater SWB 
would be associated with greater importance of, and current satisfaction with, values 
as a whole. It was also expected that greater depressed mood and lower SWB would 
be associated with greater importance of, and current satisfaction with, the value 
types of Security, Conformity and Tradition, and conversely that lower depressed 
mood and greater SWB would be associated with greater importance of, and current 
satisfaction with, the value types of Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction. These 
hypotheses are outlined in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Hypotheses Tested in Study One 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Label Actual Hypothesis    
____________________________________________________________________ 
H1 The importance of 
values as a whole 
and depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be negatively related 
with importance ratings of values as a whole.  
H2 The importance of 
specific values and 
depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be positively related with 
importance ratings of Security, Conformity and 
Tradition, and negatively related with importance 
ratings of Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-
Direction.  
H3 The current 
satisfaction with 
values as a whole 
and depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be negatively related 
with ratings of current satisfaction with values as 
a whole.  
 
H4 The current 
satisfaction with 
specific values and 
depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be positively related with 
current satisfaction ratings with Security, 
Conformity and Tradition, and negatively related 
with current satisfaction ratings with Hedonism, 
Stimulation and Self-Direction.  
H5 The importance of 
values as a whole 
and SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with 
importance ratings of values as a whole.  
H6 The importance of 
specific values and 
SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with 
importance ratings of Hedonism, Stimulation and 
Self-Direction, and negatively related with 
importance ratings of Security, Conformity and 
Tradition.  
H7 The current 
satisfaction with 
values as a whole 
and SWB. 
 
 
 
 
 
SWB would be positively related with ratings of 
current satisfaction with values as a whole.  
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____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.4 Method  
 
2.4.1 Design.  
 
A battery of previously validated instruments was selected to measure the 
variables of interest via a paper-based survey. These instruments comprised the 
primary source of data for this study (labelled The Important Values Study - see 
Appendix A) and were brief psychometric scales (i.e., 40 items or fewer). This 
battery consisted of seven standardised self-report questionnaires and one adapted 
scale.  
These measures are reviewed in detail in section 2.4.3. All of the measures used 
were suitable for the intended participants of this research in that they met age, 
language and user qualification requirements. The measures were also freely 
available or available with permission; with the exception of the BDI-II which cost 
NZ$5 per form. Five trial participants took an average of 22 minutes to complete this 
battery of measures. Taken as a whole, these measures focused on personal values, 
depressed mood, and SWB. 
 
H8 The current 
satisfaction with 
specific values and 
SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with current 
satisfaction ratings with Hedonism, Stimulation 
and Self-Direction, and negatively related with 
current satisfaction ratings with Security, 
Conformity and Tradition. 
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2.4.2 Participants. 
 
Participants for this study consisted of a convenience sample, and were invited 
to participate via recruitment display posters around the University of Canterbury 
campus, snowballing through friends and family (in person, phone, e-mail), and by 
being approached in public places (e.g., airport lounge, city library, train station). 
Study One was limited to approximately 100 participants due to the NZ$5 cost per 
form for the BDI-II. One hundred and three participants volunteered and completed 
Study One. These participants were all 18 years of age or older; those under 18 were 
excluded due to psychometric instrument age requirements. 
 
2.4.2.1 Demographics. 
 
Participants were asked to provide information regarding six variables of 
interest: their gender, age, whether English was their first language, whether they 
were a current New Zealand university student, if they had a current or previous 
psychiatric diagnosis, and whether they had any current medical illness. This 
information is displayed in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Demographic Information for All 103 Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
N   %  
____________________________________________________________________ 
Gender  
   Male        45  44 
   Female       58  56 
 
English as a first language 
   Yes        76  74 
   No        27  26 
 
Current New Zealand university student 
   Yes        33  32  
   No        70  68 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes        17  17 
   No        86  83 
 
Medical illness 
   Yes        23  22  
   No        80  78 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participants‟ ages ranged from 19 to 72 years, with a mean age of 35.63 (SD = 
12.13). Further description of how demographic information was collected is 
included in section 2.4.4. 
 
2.4.3 Materials. 
 
The standardised measures included three of personal values, one of depressed 
mood, and three of SWB. The three of personal values included the Schwartz Value 
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Survey (SVS) (Schwartz, 1992), which measures the 10 Schwartz values, the Short 
Schwartz Value Survey (SSVS) (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005), which explicitly 
measures the 10 Schwartz values, and the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) 
(Schwartz et al., 2001), which is an implicit measure of the 10 Schwartz values. The 
depressed mood measure was the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) (Beck, 
Steer, & Brown, 1996), which is a measure of depressed mood. The three SWB 
measures included the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SwLS) (Diener et al., 1985), 
which measures global cognitive judgments of life satisfaction, the Happiness 
Measures (HM) (Fordyce, 1988), which is a measure of emotional wellbeing (i.e., 
positive affect), and the Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 
1999), which is a measure of global happiness. The non-standardised measure was 
the Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value Survey (CS-SSVS), which is an 
adaptation of the SSVS in which the 10 value types from the SSVS are listed and 
respondents rate their current satisfaction with each of the 10 value types. Thus, the 
CS-SSVS purports to measure both current satisfaction with values as a whole, and 
current satisfaction with each of the 10 value types. These measures are presented in 
Appendix A and reviewed in detail below.  
 
2.4.3.1 Values’ measures. 
 
2.4.3.1.1 Schwartz Value Survey. 
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The Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) (Schwartz, 1992) consists of 56 value 
items, which represent and relate to the 10 Schwartz value types. The SVS presents 
two lists of value items. The first contains 30 items that describe potentially desirable 
end-states in noun form; the second contains 26 items that describe potentially 
desirable ways of acting in adjective form. Respondents first anchor the scale with 
their most important and least important values from the list of 56, then rate the 
importance of each remaining value item as “a guiding principle in my life”. The 
rating scale consists of a 9-point non-symmetrical scale, ranging from 7 (of supreme 
importance) through 0 (not important), to -1 (opposed to my values). A non-
symmetrical scale is used because people‟s values vary from mildly to very 
important, and thus the scale is stretched at the upper end and condensed at the lower 
end in order to map the way people think about values (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & 
Bilsky, 1987). Each of the 56 value items is followed by an explanatory phrase in 
parenthesis that clarifies its meaning (e.g., Social Order - stability of society, 
Freedom - freedom of action and thought) and is a marker for one of the 10 value 
types – each item expresses an aspect of the motivational goal of one value type. 
Each value type ranges from having three to eight items associated with it, and thus 
scores for each of the 10 value types consist of average ratings of importance for each 
value type‟s set of items. The SVS also provides index scores of instrumental and 
terminal values. The psychometric properties of the SVS have been extensively 
evaluated (e.g., Rice, 2006; Ryckman & Houston, 2003; Sarros & Santora, 2001; Yik 
& Tang, 1996), demonstrating high reliability. Lindeman and Verkasalo comment 
that “studies in 70 countries have supported the validity of the SVS” (2005, p. 171), 
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and that the SVS is “the most commonly used method in recent value research” 
(2005, p. 170). The SVS takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. For a more 
detailed discussion of the SVS, see Struch et al. (2002). The average reliability of the 
10 SVS values is reported as ranging from .49 to .79 (Schwartz, 2005b); in Study One 
the SVS‟s Cronbach Alpha was .85, and individual value reliabilities ranged from .41 
to .69. 
 
2.4.3.1.2 Short Schwartz Value Survey. 
 
The Short Schwartz Value Survey (SSVS) (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005) 
was derived from the longer SVS. The SSVS consists of the 10 value types, each with 
a description to clarify its meaning (e.g., Power - social power, authority, wealth; 
Benevolence - helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility; Hedonism - 
gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence). Participants rate the 
importance of the 10 items as life guiding principles in their lives on a 9-point non-
symmetrical scale ranging from 0 (opposed to my principles), to 1 (not important), to 
4 (important), to 8 (of supreme importance) – in line with Schwartz‟s 
recommendation (see Schwartz, 1992). Lindeman and Verkasalo investigated the 
reliability and validity of the SSVS in four separate studies, and with the aid of multi-
dimensional scaling, concluded that the SSVS has “good reliability and validity and 
that the values measured by the SSVS were arrayed on a circle identical to the 
theoretical structure of values” (2005, p. 170). The SSVS takes on average 2 minutes 
to complete, and the scale authors note that it gives insight into the 10 broad value 
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types, not the 56 specific individual values of the SVS. The average reliability of the 
10 SSVS values is reported as ranging from .34 to .77 (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 
2005); in Study One the SSVS‟s Cronbach Alpha was .73, and item total correlations 
ranged from .24 to .54. 
 
2.4.3.1.3 Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value Survey. 
 
The Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value Survey (CS-SSVS) was derived 
from the SSVS. The CS-SSVS has the same 10 value items as described in the SSVS, 
but with two modifications. Firstly, rather than ask respondents to think about what 
their values are and rate their importance as life guiding principles (as in the SSVS), 
respondents are asked to think about whether they possess each of the 10 value types 
and how satisfied they currently are with each. Secondly, rather than rating on a non-
symmetrical scale from 0 to 8, where 0 is „opposed to my principles‟, and 8 is „of 
supreme importance‟ (as in the SSVS), participants rate the 10 value items on a 0 to 8 
scale, where 0 is „completely unsatisfied‟ and 8 is „completely satisfied‟. Individual 
value type scores range from 0 to 8, and total current satisfaction scores range from 0 
to 80, with 0 representing completely unsatisfied, 40 representing neutral satisfaction, 
and 80 representing complete satisfaction with values as a whole. In Study One the 
CS-SSVS‟s Cronbach Alpha was .70, and item total correlations ranged from .41 to 
.68 (with the exception of Power = .12). 
 
2.4.3.1.4 Portrait Values Questionnaire. 
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The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz et al., 2001) consists of 40 
items which implicitly measure the 10 Schwartz value types. Each item is a short 
verbal portrayal of a person‟s goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the 
importance of one of the 10 value types. For example (male version), „it is important 
to him to listen to people who are different from him‟ or „even when he disagrees 
with them, he still wants to understand them‟ both implicitly measure the value type 
Universalism. A description such as, „it is important to him to be rich. He wants to 
have a lot of money and expensive things‟ implicitly measures the value type Power. 
As an implicit measure, respondents are unaware that they are answering a values 
questionnaire. Each of the 10 value types is measured by a set of PVQ items, which 
contain three to six short statements (i.e., value items). For example, the value type 
Universalism has six items and the value type Hedonism has three items. Participants 
are instructed to read each description and consider the extent to which the person in 
the description is like them (i.e., „how much like you is this person?‟). For each item, 
respondents check one of six boxes ranging from (6) „very much like me‟, through to 
(1) „not like me at all‟, in order to indicate how similar they perceive the person in the 
scenario to be to themselves. Respondents‟ values are inferred from the implicit 
values of the people they consider similar to themselves. Both male and female 
versions of the PVQ are available; the only difference between versions is the 
wording of the gender of the characters in the descriptions.  
The PVQ is reported by the authors as being easier and less cognitively taxing 
to complete than other values‟ measures, as it involves less abstract thinking ability. 
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Indeed, the PVQ was developed as an alternative to the SVS to measure values in 
samples of children from age 11, the elderly, and persons not educated in Western 
schools that emphasise abstract, context-free thinking. Studies in seven countries 
have supported the reliability of the PVQ for measuring the 10 value types 
(Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). For example, multi-method, multi-trait analyses in 
Germany, Israel, and the Ukraine compared the measurements of the 10 value types 
using the PVQ and SVS and confirmed the convergent and discriminate validity of 
the 10 value types measured by the PVQ (Schwartz, 2003). The validity of the PVQ 
has also been established by Koivula and Verkasalo (2006), who compared it between 
samples of students who completed the PVQ and SVS, and concluded that the value 
structure produced by the PVQ is similar to the SVS and follows Schwartz‟s model. 
The PVQ takes approximately 10 minutes to complete. The average reliability of the 
10 PVQ values is reported as ranging from .37 to .79 (Schwartz et al., 2001); in Study 
One the PVQ‟s Cronbach Alpha was .76, and individual value reliabilities ranged 
from .31 to .55. 
 
2.4.3.2 Mood measure. 
 
2.4.3.2.1 Beck Depression Inventory–II. 
 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II: Beck et al., 1996) consists of 21 
self-report items, and assesses the severity of depression in diagnosed patients and 
screens for depression in the normal population. The 21 items cover symptoms and 
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aspects of the experiences of depression. Respondents are asked to endorse the most 
characteristic statement under each of the 21 item headings, over a period of „the past 
two weeks, including today‟. Respondents rate each symptom on a four point scale 
ranging from „minimal‟, to „mild‟, to „moderate‟, to „severe‟. As examples, item one 
is headed „sadness‟ and respondents choose from „0 – I do not feel sad‟, to „1 – I feel 
sad much of the time‟, to „2 – I am sad all the time‟, to „3 – I am so sad and unhappy 
that I can‟t stand it‟. Item two is headed „pessimism‟ and respondents choose from „0 
– I am not discouraged about my future‟, to „1 – I feel more discouraged about my 
future than I used to be‟, to „2 – I do not expect things to work out for me‟, to „3 – I 
feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse‟. Scores range from 0 to 63, with 
scores in the 14 to 19 range indicating mild depression, scores in the 20 to 28 range 
indicating moderate depression, and scores over 29 indicating severe depression 
(Beck et al., 1996). Dozois, Dobson, and Ahnberg (1998) recommend similar cut-off 
scores: 0 to 12 indicating non-depressed, 13 to 19 indicating dysphoria, and 20 to 63 
indicating depressed mood. The psychometric properties of the BDI-II have been well 
assessed using clinical and non-clinical samples, and according to Watson and 
Vaidya (2003), are exceptional (for a full review, see Dozois et al., 1998). The BDI-II 
takes approximately 5 minutes to complete, and is the most widely used clinical 
measure for the assessment of depression (Martell et al., 2001). The average 
reliability of the BDI-II is reported as .91 (Dozois et al., 1998); in Study One the 
BDI-II‟s Cronbach Alpha was .81.  
 
2.4.3.3 Wellbeing measures. 
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2.4.3.3.1 Satisfaction with Life Scale. 
 
The Satisfaction with Life Scale (SwLS) (Diener et al., 1985) is a five item 
measure that assesses an individual‟s global judgement of life satisfaction as a whole. 
The SwLS measures the cognitive component of SWB, and provides an integrated 
judgement of how a person‟s life as a whole is going. In completing the SwLS, 
participants rate five statements („In most ways my life is close to my ideal‟, „the 
conditions of my life are excellent‟, „I am satisfied with my life‟, „so far I have gotten 
the important things I want in life‟, and „If I could live my life over, I would change 
almost nothing‟) on a seven point Likert scale, ranging from (1) „strongly disagree‟, 
to (4) „neither agree nor disagree‟, to (7) „strongly agree‟. The five items are keyed in 
a positive direction so that responses can be added to calculate a total score, which 
ranges from 5 to 35. Pavot and Diener (2008) report that scores from 5 to 9 indicate 
that an individual is extremely dissatisfied with life, from 10 to 14 dissatisfied with 
life, from 15 to 19 slightly dissatisfied with life, that a score of 20 indicates neutral 
life satisfaction, from 21 to 25 slight satisfaction with life, from 26 to 30 satisfaction 
with life, and from 31 to 35 extreme satisfaction with life.  
The SwLS has been used in hundreds of studies and has demonstrated good 
psychometric properties (Pavot & Diener, 2008; Pavot, Diener, Colvin, & Sandvik, 
1991). Hayes and Joseph (2003) reported an adult mean score of 24.1 (SD = 6.9), 
Chang and Sanna (2001) reported mean scores for adults in international and cross-
cultural samples of 23.0 (SD = 6.8) for males and 23.7 (SD = 6.7) for females, and 
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Gannon and Ranzijn (2005) reported an adult mean of 24.9 (SD = 6.0). The SwLS 
takes approximately 2 minutes to complete. For a complete review of psychometric 
properties and a full discussion of associated issues, see Pavot and Diener (1993, 
2008). The average reliability of the SwLS is reported as .87 (Diener et al., 1985); in 
Study One the SwLS Cronbach Alpha was .81. 
 
2.4.3.3.2 Happiness Measures. 
 
The Happiness Measures (HM) (Fordyce, 1988), also known as the Fordyce 
Emotion Questionnaire, is a measure of emotional wellbeing that provides an 
indication of a person‟s perceived happiness, and measures the affective component 
of SWB. The HM consists of two questions on happiness. The first item measures 
happiness on a „happiness/unhappiness scale‟. Respondents choose from 11 
descriptive phrases on a 0 to 10 scale. These descriptors range from (0) „extremely 
unhappy‟, to (5) „neutral‟, to (10) „extremely happy‟, and measure perceived quality 
of general happiness. The second item is an estimate of the percentages of time 
respondents feel happy, unhappy, and neutral. With both items, the HM assesses both 
intensity and frequency of affect; the first question measuring intensity, and the 
second item‟s percentage estimates measuring frequency. In scoring the HM, the 
scale score (item one) and three percentage estimates (item two) are used directly as 
raw scores. A combination score can also be calculated, which combines the scale 
score and percentage happy score in equal weights (combination score = [scale score 
 10 + happy%]/2). However, this score is seldom reported in the literature. As an 
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example, reported norms for community college students with a mean age of 26 years 
include a HM scale mean score of 6.92 (SD = 1.75), a percentage happy mean score 
of 54.13 (SD = 21.52), a percentage unhappy mean score of 20.44 (SD = 14.69), and a 
percentage neutral mean score of 25.43 (SD = 16.52). Fordyce commented that “it 
would be safe to classify the HM as the most thoroughly analyzed wellbeing measure 
developed in the field” (1988, p. 81), including over 1,500 administrations, and that it 
is “considered by some to be the „grand daddy‟ of them all [of happiness measures]” 
(1988, p. 65). Fordyce further noted that “from the collected data, it would appear 
that the Happiness Measures demonstrates strong reliability; remarkable stability; 
relative freedom from response, sex, age, and race bias; and an exceptionally wide 
background of evidence supporting it‟s convergent, construct, concurrent, and 
discriminative validity” (1988, p. 81-82). Diener reviewed 20 happiness and 
wellbeing instruments and concluded that the HM, in comparison to other measures 
of wellbeing, has the strongest correlations with daily affect and life satisfaction 
(1984), and is a reliable and valid test that “should receive more widespread use” 
(1984, p. 549). The HM takes approximately 2 minutes to complete.  
 
2.4.3.3.3 Subjective Happiness Scale. 
 
The Subjective Happiness Scale (SHS) (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) is a four 
item measure of global subjective happiness. Whilst other measures assess the 
affective (the HM) and cognitive (the SwLS) components of SWB, the SHS measures 
SWB as a whole. Lyubomirsky and Lepper claim that the SHS reflects “a broader and 
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more molar category of wellbeing and taps into more global psychological 
phenomena” (1999, p. 139). In completing the SHS, respondents rate four items on 
different Likert scales, each ranging from 1 to 7. Participants are asked to „circle the 
point on the scale that you feel is most appropriate in describing you‟. The first item 
asks respondents whether, in general, they consider themselves to be (1) „not a very 
happy person‟ to (7) „a very happy person‟. The second item asks if, compared to 
their peers, they consider themselves to be (1) „less happy‟ to (7) „more happy‟. Both 
the third and fourth items give descriptions and ask „to what extent does this 
characterization describe you?‟, with responses ranging from „not at all‟ to „a great 
deal‟. For item three, the description is „some people are generally very happy. They 
enjoy life regardless of what is going on, getting the most out of everything‟, and 
item four is „some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not 
depressed, they never seem as happy as they might be‟. Scores are totalled for the 
four items, and range from 4 to 28. An average of the four items provides a composite 
score for global subjective happiness; most research reports this score. Seligman 
(2002) reported an adult US mean score of 4.8, and that two-thirds of people score 
between 3.8 and 5.8. Lyubomirsky and Lepper (1999) report mean scores for 14 
studies, ranging from 4.02 (SD = 0.93) to 5.62 (SD = 0.96). As examples, a US adult 
city community sample mean was 5.62 (SD = 0.96), a US female adult town 
community sample mean score was 4.80 (SD = 1.12), and a US public college student 
sample mean score was 4.89 (SD = 1.11). Lyubomirsky and Lepper also noted that 
the SHS is “suited for different age, occupational, linguistic, and cultural groups” 
(1999, p. 150) and takes approximately 2 minutes to complete. The average reliability 
 114 
 
of the SHS is reported as .86 (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999); in Study One the 
SHS‟s Cronbach Alpha was .81.  
 
The above scales provided a comprehensive assessment of the important 
domains of interest. In combination they provided a general assessment of an 
individual‟s personal values, depressed mood, and SWB.  
 
2.4.4 Procedure. 
 
Depending on the method by which the participant became aware of the study 
(i.e., e-mail, recruitment poster, personal approach), participants were invited to 
contact the researcher by phone, e-mail or psychology department office number. For 
those who volunteered at the University of Canterbury campus, a convenient time and 
place (a private and quiet testing room) in the Psychology Department was arranged 
to complete the study forms and measures. For those who were approached in person, 
a quiet place was sought that was as free as possible from interruptions.  
When participants were presented with the questionnaires, they firstly read a 
short information sheet which described the study and then signed a consent form. 
They then entered demographic information for the six demographic variables of 
interest. After demographic questions were completed, the measures in Study One 
were randomly presented. At the completion of the study, participants were thanked 
for their time and given a NZ$5 Instant Kiwi ticket for their participation. Once the 
respondent had completed the measures, as a condition of ethical approval from the 
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University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee, the suicide screening questions 
in the BDI-II (i.e., items two and nine) were viewed by the researcher, with 
accommodations made for positive indications of suicide (i.e., referral to Psychiatric 
Emergency Service, or the University of Canterbury psychology clinic). However, no 
respondents indicated suicidal ideation or intent.  
The raw data from the questionnaires was manually entered into a Microsoft 
Excel spreadsheet, and analysis of the data was conducted using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 17) (Miller, Acton, Fullerton, & Maltby, 
2009; Pallant, 2007). Ten percent of the data (n = 10 questionnaires) was randomly 
selected and independently cross checked for data entry accuracy, with no errors 
being detected. No data is available on how many people were reached by the 
recruitment e-mails or display posters, so response rates cannot be calculated. 
 
2.5 Results 
 
This section presents analyses of the data from Study One. Firstly, a preliminary 
analysis compared the six demographic variables for all participants (age, gender, 
English as a first language, New Zealand university student, psychiatric diagnosis, 
and medical illness) against the 12 main outcome variables provided by the study 
measures (total SVS score, SVS Instrumental Values total, SVS Terminal Values 
total, total SSVS score, total PVQ score, total CS-SSVS score, total BDI-II score, 
total SwLS score, total SHS score, HM scale score, HM percent happy score, and HM 
percent unhappy score). Next, the reliabilities of the three values‟ measures were 
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analysed (Cronbach Alphas), as well as their inter-relationships (correlations). Each 
values measure‟s ability to assess Schwartz‟s model in the data was also assessed 
(multidimensional scaling). Following this, analysis focused on the two main research 
questions: the relationship between the importance of, and satisfaction with, personal 
values and with depressed mood, and between the importance of, and satisfaction 
with, personal values and with SWB. In each of these two sections, within groups 
analysis is presented first (correlations, sinusoid curves, and regression analyses) 
followed by between groups analysis (t-tests, multidimensional scaling).  
 
2.5.1  Demographic variables and main outcome variables. 
 
The results in this section address the relationship between the six demographic 
variables and the 12 main outcome variables provided by the study measures. Firstly, 
Pearson Product-moment correlations were calculated to look at how age related to 
the 12 main outcome variables. There were no statistically significant correlations (p 
< .05) between age and the 12 main outcome variables.  
Next, a series of 60 (512) independent samples t-tests were performed to 
investigate the effects of each of the remaining five demographic variables (gender, 
English as a first language, New Zealand university student, psychiatric diagnosis, 
and medical illness) on the 12 main outcome variables. There were no statistically 
significant (p < .05) effects of participant gender, English as a first language, or 
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current New Zealand university student, on how participants responded on the 12 
main outcome variables. 
However, participants with a current or previous psychiatric diagnosis reported 
greater depressed mood on the BDI-II (M = 10.24, SD = 10.21) than those without a 
diagnosis (M = 6.26, SD = 6.14), t(101) = 2.159, p = .033, d = .47, and lower 
emotional wellbeing on HM scale score ratings (M = 6.59, SD = 2.09) compared to 
those without a diagnosis (M = 7.44, SD = 1.16), t(101) = -2.355, p = .021, d = .50.  
In addition, participants with a current medical illness also reported lower life 
satisfaction on the SwLS (M = 21.89, SD = 6.32) compared to those without a current 
medical illness (M = 24.71, SD = 5.04), t(101) = -2.038, p = .045, d = .49.  
 
In summary, analysis of the six demographic variables indicated that age, 
gender, having English as a first language, or being a current New Zealand university 
student were not associated with values, depressed mood or SWB. However, as 
would be expected, participants with a psychiatric diagnosis reported greater 
depressed mood and lower emotional wellbeing, and participants with a medical 
illness reported lower life satisfaction. 
 
2.5.2  The relationship between values’ measures. 
 
The results in this section concern the relationships between three different tools 
for measuring personal values: the SVS, SSVS and PVQ. Previous research (e.g., 
Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005; McCarty & Shrum, 2000; Schwartz et al., 2001) has 
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indicated that the three different ways of measuring Schwartz‟s value theory provide 
highly comparable results, although only one study has compared all three measures 
directly (i.e., the developers of the SSVS: Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). The 
following analysis was conducted to assess the reliability and validity of the three 
measures, as well as their ability to measure Schwartz‟s model, in the current data.  
Firstly, reliability analysis indicated that all three measures were reliable. The 
SVS Cronbach Alpha coefficient was .85, the PVQ Cronbach Alpha coefficient was 
.76, and the SSVS Cronbach Alpha coefficient was .73. Table 4 shows internal 
reliability coefficients for the SVS, SSVS, and PVQ value types. 
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Table 4 
Cronbach Alpha Coefficient Reliabilities for the SVS, SSVS and PVQ Value Types 
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. SVS = Schwartz Value Survey. PVQ = Portrait Values 
Questionnaire. SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey.  
 
Although never large, reliability varied little across measures and was within the 
range of variation commonly observed for the individual value types (E.G., Joshanloo 
& Ghaedi, 2009; Schwartz, Verkasalo, Antonovsky & Sagiv, 1997). 
Next, Pearson Product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated between 
the three measures. There were large positive correlations between the SVS and 
SSVS total importance of values scores (r = .73, p < .01), between the SVS and PVQ 
total importance of values scores (r = .57, p < .01), and between the SSVS and PVQ 
total importance of values scores (r = .53, p < .01). As shown in Table 5, there were 
moderate to large positive correlations between importance ratings of the 10 value 
types and the three values‟ measures, indicating that all three measures were 
reasonably inter-related. 
 
  
 
Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
           
SVS  .41 .54 .69 .55 .61 .44 .60 .67 .51 .66 
PVQ .55 .47 .33 .41 .31 .26 .48 .44 .43 .51 
SSVS .40 .48 .34 .37 .38 .24 .42 .32 .43 .54 
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Table 5 
 Pearson Product-moment Correlations relating the SVS, SSVS and PVQ Value Types 
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. SVS = Schwartz Value Survey. SSVS = Short Schwartz 
Value Survey. PVQ = Portrait Values Questionnaire.  
**p < .01.  
 
Following this, and in line with previous research (e.g., Koivula & Verkasalo, 
2006; Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000), multidimensional 
scaling analysis (MDS: Davison, 1983) was performed using SPSS 17 (Miller et al., 
2009) to verify the distinctiveness of the 10 value types in the data as being similar to 
Schwartz‟s values structure (see Figure 1, p. 47). Multidimensional scaling (MDS) 
provides a visual representation of the pattern of proximities (i.e., similarities or 
distances) among a set of objects on two dimensions (Schiffman, Reynolds, &Young, 
1981). Cox and Cox define MDS widely as “any technique which produces a 
graphical representation of objects from multivariate data” (2001, p. 2) and narrowly 
as “the search for a low dimensional space, usually Euclidian, in which points in the 
space represent the objects, one point representing one object, and such that the 
distances between the points in the space, match, as well as possible, the original 
           
 Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
           
SVS & 
SSVS 
.640** .765** .614** .627** .625** .463** .708** .574** .824** .559** 
SVS & 
PVQ 
.416** .628** .414** .644** .437** .588** .512** .503** .639** .501** 
SSVS  
&PVQ 
.353** .514** .336** .585** .520** .483** .569** .611** .539** .439** 
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dissimilarities” (2001, p. 3). In short, the distances between the points reflect the 
empirical relations among the values, and MDS thus examines the spatial 
representations of relations (i.e., similarities or dissimilarities) among the 10 values. 
As Lindeman and Verkasalo (2005) mention: 
 
The more similar two values are conceptually, the higher the 
intercorrelation between their importance ratings, the more similar their 
pattern of correlations with all other values, and the closer they lie in the 
multidimensional space. Dissimilar values have opposing patterns of 
correlations and will thus be located at a substantial distance from one 
another.” (2005, p. 172) 
 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 confirm the value structure of Study One participants, as 
assessed with the SVS, SSVS and PVQ, as largely representing Schwartz‟s model3.  
  
                                                 
3
 Schwartz‟s model (i.e., Figure 1) is reproduced below all MDS figures for ease of comparison. 
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Figure 2. Value structure of Study One participants studied with the SVS: 
Multidimensional scaling analyses. 
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Figure 3. Value structure of Study One participants studied with the SSVS: 
Multidimensional scaling analyses. 
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Figure 4. Value structure of Study One participants studied with the PVQ: 
Multidimensional scaling analyses. 
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The results of MDS analysis using the SVS, SSVS and PVQ largely indicate 10 
separate value sectors in the proposed theoretical order for each values‟ measure. In 
Figure 2, the bipolar dimensions are not as discrete as in Figure 3, nor are the sections 
as circular; for example, Achievement is pictured towards the centre with distances 
towards its opposing values of Universalism and Benevolence similar to the distances 
to its neighbouring congruent values of Hedonism and Power. Self-Direction is also 
closer to Achievement than Stimulation. In Figure 4 there are minor deviations: the 
order of Power and Achievement is swapped, and the order of Conformity and 
Security is swapped. Thus, for example, Hedonism appears to have an as equal 
relationship with Power as with Achievement, and Security and Power are separated 
by both Achievement and Conformity. Although all three measures largely verify the 
existence of Schwartz‟s model in the data, the pattern of associations produced by the 
SSVS (Figure 3) was visually closest to representing Schwartz‟s value structure, 
meaning the SSVS was most similar at identifying Schwartz‟s model in the data.  
 
In summary, Schwartz‟s model was apparent in the present data with all three 
measures largely verifying the distinctiveness of the 10 value types according to 
Schwartz‟s theory, with the SSVS being slightly more similar than the other two 
measures. All three measures were reliable and reasonably inter-related with regard to 
both the total importance of values as a whole, and the 10 specific value types. On the 
basis of the above analysis, further analysis proceeded with the SSVS. 
 
2.5.3  Depressed mood. 
 126 
 
 
2.5.3.1  Correlation analysis.  
 
The results in this section address hypotheses H1 to H4. Firstly, Pearson 
Product-moment correlations were calculated to look at how depressed mood related 
to total SSVS and total CS-SSVS scores, and also the 10 SSVS and 10 CS-SSVS 
value types. There was no statistically significant correlation (p < .05) between total 
BDI-II scores and total SSVS scores; however there was a moderate negative 
correlation between total BDI-II scores and total CS-SSVS scores, r = -.34, p < .01. 
Thus there was no association between the importance of values as a whole and 
depressed mood (H1); however lower current satisfaction with values as a whole was 
associated with greater depressed mood (H3). 
Table 6 presents Pearson Product-moment correlations between total BDI-II 
scores, and the 10 SSVS and 10 CS-SSVS value types. 
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Table 6 
Pearson Product-moment Correlations relating BDI-II Scores to SSVS and CS-SSVS 
Value Types  
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II. SSVS = Short 
Schwartz Value Survey. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value 
Survey. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
 
As shown in Table 6, analysis of the importance of the 10 value types indicated 
that greater depressed mood was not associated with any of the six hypothesised 
value types: Security, Conformity, Tradition, Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-
Direction (H2). Instead, greater depressed mood was associated with lesser 
importance of both Achievement and Benevolence. Table 6 also shows that greater 
depressed mood was associated with lower current satisfaction with Hedonism, 
Stimulation, Self-Direction as hypothesised, but not with greater current satisfaction 
with Security, Conformity and Tradition as hypothesised (H4). Instead, greater 
depressed mood was associated with lesser current satisfaction with Conformity, 
Benevolence and Achievement. 
Next the analysis looked at the pattern of associations of the SSVS and CS-
SSVS values in relation to depressed mood. The organisation of Schwartz‟s value 
           
 Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
           
BDI-II & 
SSVS 
 
-.036 -.154 -.126  .028 -.236*  .109  .107  .040 -.080  -.233* 
BDI-II & 
CS-SSVS 
-.382** -.228* -.219* -.145 -.240* -.125 -.210* -.165 -.195  -.359** 
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structure means that associations between value priorities can be represented 
graphically against other variables with a sinusoid curve. Such an approach highlights 
patterns of associations, in this case providing insight into the coherence of values in 
relation to depressed mood. Figure 5 shows the expected pattern of associations 
according to the theorising for the relationship between depressed mood and the 10 
Schwartz values (“Schwartz theory”: H2 & H4 - see section 1.4.3). This sinusoid 
curve depicts correlation results from Table 6: the associations between BDI-II scores 
and the 10 SSVS and 10 CS-SSVS Schwartz value types.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sinusoid curve of value associations between BDI-II scores, and SSVS and 
CS-SSVS values. 
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With the exception of Benevolence, the results indicate that the relationships 
between the SSVS value types and depressed mood were in the expected direction 
with the pattern of associations mirroring theorising about the relationship between 
depressed mood and the 10 Schwartz values. However, the relationships between the 
CS-SSVS value types and depressed mood provide a mixed picture. Although the 
direction of associations for Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction are in the 
expected direction and in line with H4, the direction of associations for Tradition, 
Conformity and Security are not. Thus, the pattern of associations according to 
theorising from Schwartz‟s model is apparent for Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-
Direction, but not for Tradition, Conformity and Security. In addition, the pattern is 
also apparent for Power and Achievement, but not for Universalism and Benevolence.  
 
In summary, there was no association between the importance of values as a 
whole and depressed mood (H1); however, lower current satisfaction with values as a 
whole was associated with greater depressed mood (H3). Analysis of the importance 
of the 10 value types indicated that greater depressed mood was associated with lesser 
importance of both Achievement and Benevolence (H2). Greater depressed mood was 
also associated with lower current satisfaction with Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-
Direction, Benevolence, Conformity and Achievement (H4). In addition, the pattern 
of associations between the SSVS value types and depressed mood largely mirrored 
theorising from Schwartz‟s model, but the relationships between the CS-SSVS value 
types and depressed mood provided a mixed picture.  
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2.5.3.2  Regression analysis. 
 
This section presents results from hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
which addressed hypotheses H1 to H4: the relationship between the importance of, 
and satisfaction with, values and with depressed mood. Table 7 shows results of four 
hierarchical multiple regressions: predicting depressed mood from the importance of 
values (H1), the importance of specific values (H2), the current satisfaction with 
values (H3), and the current satisfaction with specific values (H4).   
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Depressed Mood from the 
Importance of Values (H1), the Importance of Specific Values (H2), the Current 
Satisfaction with Values (H3), and the Current Satisfaction with Specific Values (H4).   
      
Variable   R
2
   ΔR2  B SE B β 
  H1 
     
    Step 1 .032 .032    
      Constant   4.966 3.468  
      Age   -.833 1.433 -.059 
      Gender     .091   .059   .157 
    Step 2 .036 .004    
      Constant   7.488 5.257  
      Age     .084   .060   .145 
      Gender   -.875 1.438 -.064 
      SSVS total   -.047   .074 -.064 
      
H2      
    Step 1 .031 .031    
      Constant   5.285 3.561  
      Age   .087 .060 .149 
      Gender   -.925 1.454 -.065 
    Step 2 .188 .157    
      Constant   13.620 5.645  
      Age   .023 .064 .038 
      Gender   -.972 1.452 -.068 
      SSVS Hedonism 
      SSVS Stimulation 
      SSVS Self-Direction 
      SSVS Universalism 
      SSVS Benevolence 
      SSVS Tradition 
      SSVS Conformity 
      SSVS Security 
      SSVS Power 
 .238 .411 .066 
 -.356 .596 -.082 
 .710 .621 .162 
 .827 .459 .206 
 -1.913 .711 -.351**…  
 .131 .491 .034 
 1.414 .655 .384*… 
 -.876 .556 -.227 
 -.359 .451 -.102 
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Note. SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short 
Schwartz Value Survey. 
NB: ΔR2 for H1 and H2 non-significant.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001. 
      SSVS Achievement  -.864 .532 -.219 
      
H3      
    Step 1 .037 .037    
      Constant   5.627 3.374  
      Age   .086 .057 .153 
      Gender   -1.205 1.408 -.088 
    Step 2 .141 .104**. .     
      Constant   13.233 3.912  
      Age   .087 .054 .156 
      Gender   -.511 1.352 -.037 
      CS-SSVS  total   -1.68 .050 -.326***. 
      
H4      
    Step 1 .037 .037    
      Constant   5.697 3.432  
      Age   .085 .058 .151 
      Gender   -1.229 1.427 -.089 
    Step 2 .220 .183*. . .     
      Constant   16.362 4.715  
      Age   .055 .057 .098 
      Gender   -1.001 1.392 -.072 
      CS-SSVS Hedonism 
      CS-SSVS Stimulation 
      CS-SSVS Self-Direction 
      CS-SSVS Universalism 
      CS-SSVS Benevolence 
      CS-SSVS Tradition 
      CS-SSVS Conformity 
      CS-SSVS Security 
      CS-SSVS Power 
      CS-SSVS Achievement 
 -1.094 .663 -.267 
 .299 .537 .081 
 -.114 .629 -.027 
 .250 .458 .064 
 -.553 .560 -.116 
 .400 .586 .092 
 -.354 .602 -.089 
 .143 .471 .041 
 -.090 .132 -.071 
 -.863 .588 -.200 
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As Table 7 shows, all analyses controlled for both age and gender, which 
explained a small amount of the variance in depressed mood. The importance of 
values as a whole (H1) explained a very small amount of the variance in depressed 
mood (0.4%). However the importance of specific values (H2) explained a large 
amount of the variance in depressed mood (15.4%), with greater depressed mood 
associated with lesser importance of Benevolence and greater importance of 
Conformity. This relationship with Conformity and depressed mood was 
hypothesised, but the relationship with Benevolence and depressed mood was not. In 
addition, the hypothesised relationships between depressed mood and Security, 
Tradition, Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction were not statistically significant.  
Current satisfaction with values as a whole (H3) explained a moderate amount 
of the variance in depressed mood (10.7%), with, as hypothesised, greater current 
satisfaction with values associated with lower depressed mood. Current satisfaction 
with specific values (H4) explained a greater amount of the variance in depressed 
mood (18.4%), but no CS-SSVS values were statistically significant. Thus the 
hypothesised relationships between current satisfaction with the values of Security, 
Tradition, Conformity, Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction were not apparent.  
 
In summary, regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as 
a whole explained a very small amount of the variance in depressed mood, while the 
importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the variance. 
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Lesser importance of Benevolence was associated with greater depressed mood, and 
greater importance of Conformity was associated with lower depressed mood.  
Regression analysis also indicated that total current satisfaction with values as a 
whole explained a large amount of variance in depressed mood, with greater current 
satisfaction associated with lower depressed mood. However no individual value 
types were identified as contributing to this relationship (i.e., no individual values 
were statistically significant).  
 
2.5.3.3  Between groups analysis. 
 
The results in this section address hypotheses H1 to H4, and involved t-tests 
comparing individuals with depressed mood (DMG: Depressed Mood Group) against 
individuals without depressed mood (Non-DMG: Non Depressed Mood Group). The 
DMG and Non-DMG were determined on the basis of scores on the BDI-II. Again, 
the BDI-II assesses symptoms over the past two weeks, and an adult score of 14 or 
greater defines „likely depression‟ or „a clinically significant level of depressive 
symptoms‟ (Beck et al., 1996). The DMG were individuals who obtained scores of 14 
or greater on the BDI-II. Fifteen of the 103 participants (15%) in Study One had a 
BDI-II score of 14 or greater. These 15 individuals were designated as the DMG, 
with the remaining participants designated the Non-DMG; demographic profiles of 
the DMG, Non-DMG and all Study One participants are presented in Table 8.  
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Table 8 
Demographic Information of the DMG, Non-DMG and All Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                 N                  .               %                   . 
 All DMG Non- All  DMG Non-  
 DMG DMG 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender  
   Male    45   7 38  44 47 43 
   Female   58   8 50  56 53 57 
 
English as a first language 
   Yes    76 12 64  74 80 73 
   No    27   3 24  26 20 27 
 
NZ university student 
   Yes    33   2 31  32 13 35 
   No    70 13 57  68 87 65 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes    17   4 13  17 27 15 
   No    86 11 75  83 73 85 
 
Medical illness 
   Yes    23   5 18  22  33 20 
   No    80 10 70  78 67 80 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. All = All 103 Participants. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-
Depressed Mood Group.  
 
Ages of all participants in Study One ranged from 19 to 72 years with a mean 
age of 35.63 (SD = 12.13), ages for the DMG ranged from 26 to 72 years with a mean 
age of 41.33 (SD = 13.25), and ages for the Non-DMG ranged from 19 to 67 with a 
mean age of 34.66 (SD = 11.73). The DMG and Non-DMG were relatively similar 
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across the six demographic variables, although the DMG were older, had slightly 
greater rates of psychiatric diagnosis and medical illness, and a lesser proportion were 
a New Zealand university student.  
As a confirmation check that the BDI-II had isolated a group of participants 
with depressed mood, a series of five independent samples t-tests investigated the 
difference between the DMG and Non-DMG on three related measures: the SHS, 
SwLS, and HM. Remember, higher scores on the SHS indicate greater global 
happiness, higher scores on the SwLS indicate greater satisfaction with life, higher 
HM scale scores indicate a greater perceived quality of general happiness, higher HM 
percent time happy scores indicate a greater amount of time happy, and higher HM 
percent time unhappy scores indicate a greater amount of time unhappy. As shown in 
Table 9, there were big differences in all five t-tests.  
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Table 9 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the DMG and Non-DMG Responses on the SHS, 
SwLS and HM 
 
Note. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-Depressed Mood Group. 
SHS = Subjective Happiness Scale. SwLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale. HM = 
Happiness Measures. 
**p ≤ .01, ***p < .001. 
 
As expected, compared to the Non-DMG, the DMG were less globally happy, 
less satisfied with life, rated a lower perceived quality of general happiness, and 
reported a lesser amount of time happy and a greater amount of time unhappy. This 
confirmation check increased confidence that the BDI-II had isolated a group of 
participants with depressed mood. 
To recap the predicted associations, it was expected that participants in the 
DMG would rate values as being less important (H1) and currently satisfied (H3) on 
the whole compared to those in the Non-DMG. In addition it was expected that 
participants in the DMG would rate the importance of (H2), and current satisfaction 
  
           M          . 
 
           SD         . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
 
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
   
        
SHS    3.8   4.9     .9   1.0 -3.957 .001*** 1.16 
SwLS 19.3 24.9   6.6   4.8 -3.693 .001***   .97 
HM scale  
question 
  6.3   7.5   1.8   1.2 -3.261 .010**   .79 
HM % time 
happy  
38.6 59.0 19.6 20.2 -3.515 .002** 1.02 
HM % time 
unhappy 
21.1 13.8 14.4   8.6  2.615 .001***   .61 
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with (H4), Security, Conformity and Tradition greater, and the importance of, and 
current satisfaction with, Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction lower compared 
to the Non-DMG. 
Table 10 presents results of independent samples t-tests between the DMG and 
Non-DMG responses on the SSVS, which address H1 and H2. Although no specific 
predictions were made regarding Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement and 
Power for H2, these value types were also tested. 
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Table 10 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the DMG and Non-DMG Responses on the 
SSVS 
 
Note. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-Depressed Mood Group. 
SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey.  
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
Table 10 indicates that the importance of values as a whole was not associated 
with mood group (H1), and the importance of the six theorised Schwartz values were 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
 
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
   
        
H1         
SSVS  
total 
45.20 46.90 10.23 9.53 -.631 .529   .17 
        
H2        
Hedonism 4.27 4.05 1.87 1.99    .400 .690   .11 
Stimulation 4.13 4.70 2.23 1.51 -1.251 .214   .30 
Self-Direction 5.27 5.85 1.75 1.58 -1.302 .196   .35 
Universalism 5.60 5.59 1.63 1.80    .018 .985   .01 
Benevolence 4.80 5.92 1.08 1.27 -3.219 .002**   .95 
Tradition 4.27 3.70 2.05 1.77  1.108 .271   .30 
Conformity 5.00 4.20 1.55 1.95  1.495 .138   .45 
Security 5.27 4.88 2.05 1.79    .766 .446   .20 
Power 2.60 3.07 2.06 2.00 -8.330 .407   .23 
Achievement 4.00 4.99 1.96 1.74 -1.992 .049*   .53 
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not associated with mood group (H2). However depressed individuals reported lesser 
importance of both Achievement and Benevolence.  
Table 11 presents the results of independent samples t-tests between the DMG 
and Non-DMG responses on the CS-SSVS, which address H3 and H4. Although no 
specific predictions were made regarding Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement 
and Power for H4, these value types were also tested. 
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Table 11 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the DMG and Non-DMG Responses on the CS-
SSVS 
Note. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-Depressed Mood Group. 
CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value Survey. Hed = Hedonism. Sti 
= Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. Ben = Benevolence. Tra = 
Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = Power. Ach = Achievement. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
 
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
   
H1        
CS-SSVS 
total 
44.14 53.20 8.12 13.55 -2.423 .017* .81 
        
H2        
Hedonism 3.86 4.83 1.35 1.70 2.042 .044* .63 
Stimulation 4.21 5.01 1.80 1.85 -1.492 .139 .43 
Self-Direction 4.93 5.64 1.81 1.59 -1.521 .132 .42 
Universalism 4.79 5.39 1.52 1.78 -1.201 .233 .36 
Benevolence 4.93 5.70 1.54 1.41 -1.874 .064 .52 
Tradition 5.07 5.40 1.43 1.60 -.729 .468 .22 
Conformity 4.79 5.42 1.80 1.70 -1.274 .206 .36 
Security 4.14 5.31 2.07 1.89 -2.106 .038* .59 
Power 3.50 5.86 2.68 5.70 -1.513 .134 .53 
Achievement 3.93 5.26 2.68 1.56 -3.016 .003** .61 
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Table 11 indicates that depressed individuals, compared to non-depressed 
individuals, reported lower current satisfaction with values as a whole (H3), and 
lower current satisfaction with Hedonism and greater satisfaction with Security as 
hypothesised, but not with greater Stimulation and Self-Direction, and lower 
Conformity or Tradition (H4). In addition, depressed individuals also reported lower 
current satisfaction with Achievement. 
Following this, multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) (Davison, 1983) was 
performed to verify the distinctiveness of the DMG and Non-DMG 10 value types as 
being similar to Schwartz‟s values structure. This analysis is shown in Figures 6 and 
7
4
.  
  
                                                 
4
 Caution is required in interpreting Figure 6 due to small sample size. Although Glasson 
(2011) notes that MDS is “robust with smaller sample sizes”, Finney (2010) recommends that 
a sample size of 15 (i.e., the DMG) have between 4 (lower limit) to 11 (upper limit) values, 
and the SSVS has towards the upper limit with 10.  
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Figure 6. Value structure of the DMG studied with the SSVS: Multidimensional 
scaling analyses 
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Figure 7. Value structure of the Non-DMG studied with the SSVS: Multidimensional 
scaling analyses 
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Figure 6 shows that the value structure of the DMG does not represent 
Schwartz‟s model. The DMG analysis yielded mixed approximations compared to the 
theoretical structure of values and of their circular order in the data. In particular, the 
value type Universalism was not located near its complementary value types of Self-
Direction and Benevolence. In contrast, Figure 7 shows that the value structure of the 
Non-DMG largely represents Schwartz‟s model. The Non-DMG analysis yielded 
good approximations to the theoretical structure of 10 basic values and of their 
circular order in the data, with no major deviations. Thus MDS analysis identified 
that the DMG values were not as coherent as those of the Non-DMG. 
 
2.5.4  Subjective wellbeing. 
 
2.5.4.1  Correlation analysis.  
 
The results in this section address hypotheses H5 to H8. Firstly, Pearson 
Product-moment correlations were calculated to look at how SWB related to total 
SSVS and CS-SSVS scores, and the 10 SSVS and 10 CS-SSVS value types. There 
were no statistically significant correlations (p < .05) between total SSVS scores and 
the SwLS total, the HM scale question, or the SHS total. However there were 
moderate correlations between total CS-SSVS scores and total SwLS scores (r = .25, 
p < .05), and between total SHS scores and total CS-SSVS scores (r = .33, p < .01). 
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There was no statistically significant correlation (p < .05) between total CS-SSVS 
scores and HM scale scores.  
Thus there were no associations between the importance of values as a whole 
and the three measures of SWB (H5); however, greater current satisfaction with 
values as a whole (H7) was associated with both greater life satisfaction (SwLS) and 
greater global happiness (SHS). Table 12 presents Pearson Product-moment 
correlations between the 10 SSVS and 10 CS-SSVS value types and with the three 
measures of SWB: the SwLS, HM scale and SHS.  
 
Table 12 
 Pearson Product-moment Correlations relating the SSVS and CS-SSVS Value Types 
with the SwLS, HM and SHS 
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. SwLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale. SSVS = Short 
Schwartz Value Survey. HM = Happiness Measures. SHS = Subjective Happiness 
Scale. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value Survey. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
           
 Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
           
SwLS & 
SSVS 
 
-.251* .062 .126 .095 .204 .097 -.033 -.014 -.050 .067 
HM scale 
& SSVS 
 
-.003 .258* .059 .012 .169 .233* .127 -.048 -.008 -.132 
SHS & 
SSVS 
 
-.061 .265** .080 .020 .275** .083 -.013 -.188 -.088 .219* 
SwLS & 
CS-SSVS 
.226* .138 .240* .055 .386** .186 .132 .191 .135 .268* 
HMscale& 
CS-SSVS 
.140 .192 .042 .042 .323** -.105 .034 .090 .049 .137 
SHS & 
CS-SSVS 
.374** .312** .238* .150 .310** .107 .161 .231* .126 .355* 
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As shown in Table 12, analysis of the importance of the 10 value types (H6) 
indicated that greater life satisfaction (SwLS) was associated with lesser importance 
of Hedonism and greater current satisfaction with Hedonism, Self-Direction, 
Benevolence and Achievement. Greater emotional wellbeing (HM scale) was 
associated with greater importance of Stimulation and Tradition, and greater current 
satisfaction with Benevolence. Greater global happiness (SHS) was associated with 
greater Stimulation, Benevolence and Achievement, and greater current satisfaction 
with Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Benevolence, Security and 
Achievement. 
Next the analysis used two sinusoid curves to look at the pattern of associations 
of the SSVS and CS-SSVS values in relation to the three measures of wellbeing: the 
SwLS, HM scale, and SHS. Figure 8 shows the expected pattern of associations 
according to the theorising for the relationship between SWB and the 10 Schwartz 
values (“Schwartz theory”: H6 - see section 1.5.3), and the SSVS correlation results 
from Table 12: the associations between the 10 SSVS values and the SwLS, HM 
scale, and SHS scores.  
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Figure 8. Sinusoid curve of value associations between SwLS, HM scale and SHS 
scores, and SSVS values 
 
Figure 9 shows the expected pattern of associations according to the theorising 
for the relationship between SWB and the 10 Schwartz values (H8), and the CS-
SSVS correlation results from Table 12: the associations between the 10 CS-SSVS 
values and the SwLS, HM scale, and SHS scores. 
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Figure 9. Sinusoid curve of value associations between SwLS, HM scale and SHS 
scores, and CS-SSVS values 
 
The results indicate that the relationships between the SSVS value types and 
SWB (Figure 8) provide a mixed picture. Although the direction of associations for 
Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Security are in the expected direction and in line 
with H6, the direction of associations for Hedonism, Tradition, and Conformity are 
not. Thus, the pattern of associations according to theorising from Schwartz‟s model 
is apparent for Stimulation and Self-Direction, but not for Hedonism. It is also 
apparent for Security, but not for Conformity or Tradition. In addition, the pattern is 
also apparent for Universalism and Power, but not for Benevolence or Achievement.   
The relationships between the CS-SSVS value types and SWB (Figure 9) also 
provides a mixed picture. Although the direction of associations for Hedonism, 
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direction of associations for Tradition, Conformity and Security are not. Thus, the 
pattern of associations according to theorising from Schwartz‟s model is apparent for 
Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction, but not for Tradition, Conformity and 
Security. In addition, the pattern is also apparent for Power, Achievement and 
Universalism, but not for Benevolence.  
 
In summary, there were no associations between the importance of values as a 
whole and the three measures of SWB (H5), however greater current satisfaction with 
values as a whole (H7) was associated with both greater life satisfaction and greater 
global happiness. Analysis of the importance of the 10 value types (H6) indicated that 
greater life satisfaction was associated with lesser importance of Hedonism, that 
greater emotional wellbeing was associated with greater importance of Stimulation 
and Tradition, and that greater global happiness was associated with greater 
Stimulation, Benevolence and Achievement. Analysis of the current satisfaction with 
the 10 value types (H8) also indicated that greater life satisfaction was associated 
with greater current satisfaction with Hedonism, Self-Direction, Benevolence and 
Achievement; that greater emotional wellbeing was associated with greater current 
satisfaction with Benevolence; and that greater global happiness was associated with 
greater current satisfaction with Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Benevolence, 
Security and Achievement. In addition, the relationships between the SSVS and CS-
SSVS value types and SWB provided a mixed picture with neither the SSVS nor CS-
SSVS profile aligning with the theorised pattern of associations from Schwartz‟s 
model.  
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2.5.4.2  Regression analysis. 
 
This section presents results from hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
which addressed hypotheses H5 to H8: the relationship between SWB (SwLS, HM 
scale, SHS), and the importance of, and satisfaction with, values. Table 13 shows 
results of four hierarchical multiple regressions: predicting life satisfaction (SwLS) 
from the importance of values (H5), the importance of specific values (H6), the 
current satisfaction with values (H7), and the current satisfaction with specific values 
(H8). Tables 14 and 15 show similar analysis to that of the SwLS, but for the HM 
scale (Table 14) and SHS (Table 15).  
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Table 13 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Satisfaction with Life (SwLS) 
from the Importance of Values (H5), the Importance of Specific Values (H6), the 
Current Satisfaction with Values (H7), and the Current Satisfaction with Specific 
Values (H8).   
      
Variable R
2
 ΔR2 B SE B β 
  H5      
    Step 1  .009 .009    
      Constant   26.268 2.958  
      Age   -.044 .050 -.097 
      Gender     -.398 1.221 -.036 
    Step 2 .009 .000    
      Constant   25.645 4.585  
      Age     -.042 .051 -.093 
      Gender   -.387 1.229 -.035 
      SSVS total   .012 .066 .020 
      
      
H6      
    Step 1 .008 .008    
      Constant   26.136 3.056  
      Age   -.042 .051 -.092 
      Gender   -.359 1.245 -.032 
    Step 2 .181 .173    
      Constant   20.607 4.996  
      Age   -.040 .057 -.087 
      Gender   -.270 1.256 -.024 
      SSVS Hedonism 
      SSVS Stimulation 
      SSVS Self-Direction 
      SSVS Universalism 
      SSVS Benevolence 
      SSVS Tradition 
      SSVS Conformity 
      SSVS Security 
      SSVS Power 
 -1.065 .350 -.382*** 
 .014 .531 .004 
 .287 .526 .082 
 .031 .394 .010 
 .617 .599 .147 
 .621 .456 .194 
 -.755 .546 -.259 
 .473 .481 .152 
 .055 .406 .020 
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Note. SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short 
Schwartz Value Survey. 
NB: ΔR2 for H5, H6 and H7 non-significant.  
**p < .01, *** p < .001.  
      SSVS Achievement  .527 .439 .173 
      
H7      
    Step 1 .008 .008    
      Constant   25.756 2.982  
      Age   -.040 .051 -.090 
      Gender   -.193 1.244 -.018 
    Step 2 .073 .065    
      Constant   21.010 3.528  
      Age   -.047 .049 -.105 
      Gender   -.645 1.225 -.059 
      CS-SSVS  total   .107 .045 .258**. . 
      
H8      
    Step 1 .007 .007    
      Constant   25.411 3.037  
      Age   -.037 .051  
      Gender   -.068 1.262  
    Step 2 .258 .251*. . .     
      Constant   13.641 4.102  
      Age   -.032 .049 -.072 
      Gender   -.492 1.191 -.045 
      CS-SSVS Hedonism 
      CS-SSVS Stimulation 
      CS-SSVS Self-Direction 
      CS-SSVS Universalism 
      CS-SSVS Benevolence 
      CS-SSVS Tradition 
      CS-SSVS Conformity 
      CS-SSVS Security 
      CS-SSVS Power 
      CS-SSVS Achievement 
 -.123 .569 -.035 
 -.026 .444 -.008 
 .616 .548 .172 
 -.726 .388 -.233 
 1.624 .479 .439*** 
 .707 .525 .198 
 -.538 .509 -.168 
 -.269 .435 -.092 
 .066 .105 .071 
 .825 .502 .216 
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Table 14 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Emotional Wellbeing (HM) 
from the Importance of Values (H5), the Importance of Specific Values (H6), the 
Current Satisfaction with Values (H7), and the Current Satisfaction with Specific 
Values (H8).   
      
Variable R
2
 ΔR2 B SE B β 
  H5      
    Step 1  .007 .007    
      Constant   7.832 .716  
      Age   -.010 .012 -.087 
      Gender   -.120 .293 -.043 
    Step 2 .031 .023    
      Constant   6.598 1.086  
      Age   -.006 .012 -.054 
      Gender   -.113 .291 -.040 
      SSVS total   .023 .016 .115 
      
H6      
    Step 1 .006 .006    
      Constant   7.775 .737  
      Age   -.009 .012 -.080 
      Gender   -.103 .298 -.037 
    Step 2 .141 .135    
      Constant   6.331 1.192  
      Age   -.001 .013 -.010 
      Gender   .009 .304 .003 
      SSVS Hedonism 
      SSVS Stimulation 
      SSVS Self-Direction 
      SSVS Universalism 
      SSVS Benevolence 
      SSVS Tradition 
      SSVS Conformity 
      SSVS Security 
      SSVS Power 
 -.049 .084 -.071 
 .257 .122 .298*. . . 
 -.114 .131 -.128 
 -.044 .096 -.054 
 .077 .145 .072 
 .119 .101 .152 
 .081 .134 .109 
 -.093 .113 -.122 
 -.023 .093 -.034 
      SSVS Achievement  .038 .111 .050 
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Note. SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short 
Schwartz Value Survey. 
NB: ΔR2 for H5, H6, H7 and H8 non-significant.  
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
H7      
    Step 1 .006 .006    
      Constant   7.746 .723  
      Age   -.009 .012 -.080 
      Gender   -.081 .298 -.029 
    Step 2 .013 .007    
      Constant   7.332 .885  
      Age   -.009 .012 -.082 
      Gender   -.119 .303 -.043 
      CS-SSVS  total   .009 .011 .086 
      
H8      
    Step 1 .005 .005    
      Constant   7.612 .730  
      Age   -.008 .012 -.070 
      Gender   -.034 .301 -.012 
    Step 2 .191 .186    
      Constant   6.491 1.022  
      Age   -.004 .012 -.037 
      Gender   -.016 .295 -.006 
      CS-SSVS Hedonism 
      CS-SSVS Stimulation 
      CS-SSVS Self-Direction 
      CS-SSVS Universalism 
      CS-SSVS Benevolence 
      CS-SSVS Tradition 
      CS-SSVS Conformity 
      CS-SSVS Security 
      CS-SSVS Power 
      CS-SSVS Achievement 
 .069 .137 .083 
 .188 .111 .253 
 -.160 .134 -.187 
 -.067 .095 -.085 
 .347 .116 .360**. . 
 -.171 .125 -.180 
 -.056 .125 -.066 
 .028 .097 .039 
 -.007 .027 -.029 
 .030 .121 .034 
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Table 15 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Global Happiness (SHS) from 
the Importance of Values (H5), the Importance of Specific Values (H6), the Current 
Satisfaction with Values (H7), and the Current Satisfaction with Specific Values (H8).   
      
Variable R
2
 ΔR2 B SE B β 
   
H5      
    Step 1  .012 .012    
      Constant   5.160 .551  
      Age   -.010 .009 -.133 
      Gender   -.017 .225 -.008 
    Step 2 .016 .004    
      Constant   4.787 .832  
      Age   -.009 .009 -.100 
      Gender   -.012 .226 -.006 
      SSVS total   .007 .012 .062 
      
H6      
    Step 1 .009 .009    
      Constant   5.006 .563  
      Age   -.008 .009 -.091 
      Gender   .029 .227 .013 
    Step 2 .227 .218*. . .     
      Constant   4.032 .851  
      Age   .002 .010 .022 
      Gender   .094 .221 .044 
      SSVS Hedonism 
      SSVS Stimulation 
      SSVS Self-Direction 
      SSVS Universalism 
      SSVS Benevolence 
      SSVS Tradition 
      SSVS Conformity 
      SSVS Security 
      SSVS Power 
      SSVS Achievement 
 -.064 .061 -.121 
 .173 .091 .269 
 -.173 .092 -.266 
 -.050 .068 -.084 
 .178 .106 .222 
 .043 .073 .072 
 -.015 .096 -.027 
 -.088 .082 -.152 
 -.076 .067 -.145 
 .163 .079 .280* …  
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Note. SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short 
Schwartz Value Survey. 
NB: ΔR2 for H5 non-significant.  
*p < .05, *** p < .001. 
 
As Tables 13, 14 and 15 show, analyses controlled for both age and gender, 
which in all cases explained a small amount of the variance in SWB. The importance 
H7      
    Step 1 .011 .011    
      Constant   5.009 .554  
      Age   -.009 .009 -.102 
      Gender   .008 .228 .004 
    Step 2 .118 .108**. .    
      Constant   3.890 .639  
      Age   -.009 .009 -.105 
      Gender   -.106 .219 -.050 
      CS-SSVS  total   .027 .008 .332***. 
      
H8      
    Step 1 .010 .010    
      Constant   5.086 .565  
      Age   -.009 .009 -.101 
      Gender   .012 .232 .006 
    Step 2 .225 .214*. . .    
      Constant   3.305 .765  
      Age   -.005 .009 -.057 
      Gender   -.015 .223 -.007 
      CS-SSVS Hedonism 
      CS-SSVS Stimulation 
      CS-SSVS Self-Direction 
      CS-SSVS Universalism 
      CS-SSVS Benevolence 
      CS-SSVS Tradition 
      CS-SSVS Conformity 
      CS-SSVS Security 
      CS-SSVS Power 
      CS-SSVS Achievement 
 .143 .103 .226 
 .068 .084 .120 
 -.049 .102 -.074 
 -.048 .072 -.080 
 .161 .087 .221 
 -.036 .094 -.051 
 -.053 .095 -.082 
 .048 .073 .087 
 .003 .020 .013 
 .103 .092 .155 
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of values as a whole (H5) explained no amount of the variance (0%) in life 
satisfaction, a small amount of variance (2.3%) in emotional wellbeing, and a very 
small amount of variance (0.4%) in global happiness.  
The importance of specific values (H6) explained a larger amount of the 
variance (16.4%) in life satisfaction, with greater importance of Hedonism associated 
with lower life satisfaction. This relationship with Hedonism and SWB is opposite to 
that hypothesised; it was hypothesised that greater importance of Hedonism would be 
associated with greater life satisfaction. Moreover, life satisfaction was not associated 
with Stimulation, Self-Direction, Security, Tradition, or Conformity, as hypothesised.  
The importance of specific values (H6) also explained a large amount of the 
variance (13.5%) in emotional wellbeing, with greater importance of Stimulation 
associated with greater emotional wellbeing. This relationship between greater 
importance of Stimulation and greater SWB was hypothesised; however emotional 
wellbeing was not associated with Hedonism, Self-Direction, Security, Tradition, or 
Conformity, as hypothesised. 
Lastly, the importance of specific values (H6) explained a large amount of the 
variance (21.8%) in global happiness, with greater importance of Achievement 
associated with greater global happiness. This relationship between greater 
importance of Achievement and greater SWB was hypothesised; however global 
happiness was not associated with Hedonism, Self-Direction, Security, Tradition, or 
Conformity, as hypothesised. 
Current satisfaction with values as a whole (H7) explained a small amount of 
the variance (6.5%) in life satisfaction, a very small amount of variance (0.7%) in 
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emotional wellbeing, and a moderate amount of variance (10.8%) in global 
happiness. As hypothesised, greater current satisfaction with values was associated 
with greater life satisfaction and global happiness, however emotional wellbeing was 
not associated with current satisfaction with values. 
Current satisfaction with specific values (H8) explained a large amount of the 
variance in life satisfaction (25.1%), with greater importance of Benevolence 
associated with greater life satisfaction. However, life satisfaction was not associated 
with Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Security, Tradition, or Conformity, as 
hypothesised. 
The current satisfaction with specific values (H8) also explained a large amount 
of the variance (18.6%) in emotional wellbeing, with greater current satisfaction with 
Benevolence associated with greater emotional wellbeing. However, emotional 
wellbeing was not associated with Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Security, 
Tradition, or Conformity as hypothesised. 
Lastly, current satisfaction with specific values (H8) explained a large amount 
of the variance (21.4%) in global happiness. However, global happiness was not 
associated with Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Security, Tradition, or 
Conformity, as hypothesised. 
 
In summary, regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as 
a whole explained a very small amount of the variance in SWB (H5); however the 
importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the variance 
(H6). Greater life satisfaction was associated with lesser importance of Hedonism, 
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greater emotional wellbeing was associated with greater importance of Stimulation, 
and greater global happiness was associated with greater importance of Achievement. 
Regression analysis also indicated that current satisfaction with values as a whole 
explained a small to moderate amount of the variance in SWB (H7), with greater 
current satisfaction with values associated with greater life satisfaction and global 
happiness, but not emotional wellbeing. Current satisfaction with specific values (H8) 
explained a large amount of the variance in life satisfaction, with greater life 
satisfaction and emotional wellbeing associated with greater current satisfaction with 
Benevolence. 
 
2.5.4.3  Between groups analysis.  
 
The results in this section address hypotheses H5 to H8 and involve t-tests 
comparing individuals with high SWB (SWBG: Subjective Wellbeing Group) against 
individuals without high SWB (Non-SWBG: Non Subjective Wellbeing Group). The 
SWBG was determined on the basis of scores on two measures of SWB: the SwLS 
and HM. Again, SWB consists of a cognitive and an affective component; the SwLS 
measures the cognitive component and the HM scale question measures the affective 
component of SWB.  
With regard to the SwLS, adult scores from 26 to 30 define individuals 
„satisfied‟ with life, and scores from 30 to 35 define individuals „extremely satisfied‟ 
with life. Remember that reported SwLS mean scores for adults are between 23.0 and 
24.9 (i.e., “slightly satisfied”). Forty two of the 103 participants in Study One had a 
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SwLS score of 26 or greater. With regard to the HM scale, an adult score of eight 
denotes a person „Pretty happy (spirits high, feeling good)‟, nine denotes „Very happy 
(feeling really good, elated)‟, and 10 denotes „Extremely happy (feeling ecstatic, 
joyous, fantastic)‟. Remember that Fordyce (1988) reported a mean scale score of 
6.92 (SD = 1.75) for young adults. Fifty two of the 103 participants in Study One had 
a HM scale score of eight or greater. In combination, these scores for the SwLS and 
HM scale question resulted in 32 of the 103 participants (31%) having both a SwLS 
score of 26 or greater, and a HM scale score of eight or greater. In other words, these 
32 individuals were „satisfied‟ with life (or better) and „pretty happy - spirits high, 
feeling good‟ (or better). These 32 individuals formed the SWBG; demographic 
profiles of the SWBG, Non-SWBG and all Study One participants are presented in 
Table 16. 
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Table 16 
Demographic Information of the SWBG, Non-SWBG and All Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                N                  .               %                   . 
  All SWBG Non- All  SWBG Non- 
   SWBG    SWBG 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender  
   Male    45 16 29  44 50 41 
   Female   58 16 42  56 50 59 
 
English as a first language 
   Yes    76 28 48  74 87 68 
   No    27   4 23  26 13 32 
 
Current New Zealand  
university student 
   Yes    33 12 21  32 37 30 
   No    70 20 50  68 63 70 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes    17   6 11  17 19 15 
   No    86 26 60  83 81 85 
 
Medical illness 
   Yes    23   4 19  22  13 27 
   No    80 28 52  78 87 73 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Note. All = All 103 Participants. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG 
= Non-Subjective Wellbeing Group.  
 
Ages of all participants in Study One ranged from 19 to 72 years with a mean 
age of 35.63 (SD = 12.13), the ages for the SWBG ranged from 19 to 59 years with a 
mean age of 34.28 (SD = 11.33), and ages for the Non-SWBG ranged from 20 to 72 
with a mean age of 36.24 (SD = 12.51). 
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The SWBG and Non-SWBG were relatively similar across the six demographic 
variables, although a greater proportion of the SWBG group had English as their first 
language, and a lesser proportion reported a medical illness.  
As a confirmation check that the SwLS and HM scale question had isolated a 
group of participants with high SWB, a series of four independent samples t-tests 
investigated the differences between the SWBG and Non-SWBG on three related 
measures: the BDI-II, SHS and HM. Remember, the BDI-II is a measure of depressed 
mood, the SHS is a measure of global subjective happiness, higher HM percent time 
happy percentages indicate a greater amount of time happy, and higher HM percent 
time unhappy percentages indicate a greater amount of time unhappy. As shown in 
Table 17, there were big differences in all four independent samples t-tests.  
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Table 17 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the SWBG and Non-SWBG Responses on the 
BDI-II, SHS and HM 
 
Note. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG = Non-Subjective 
Wellbeing Group. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory-II. SHS = Subjective 
Happiness Scale. HM = Happiness Measures. 
**p ≤ .01, ***p < .001. 
 
As expected, compared to the Non-SWBG, the SWBG reported less depressed 
mood, greater global subjective happiness, and a greater amount of time happy and a 
lesser amount of time unhappy. This confirmation check increased confidence that 
the SwLS and HM scale question had isolated a group of participants with high SWB. 
To recap the predicted associations, it was expected that participants in the 
SWBG would rate values as being more important (H5) and currently satisfied (H7) 
on the whole compared to those in the Non-SWBG. In addition, it was expected that 
participants in the SWBG would rate the importance of (H6), and current satisfaction 
with (H8), Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction greater, and the importance of, 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
 
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
   
        
BDI-II    4.2   8.1   4.5   7.7 -2.641 .010**   .61 
SHS   5.5   4.4     .8   1.0   5.373 .001*** 1.20 
HM % time 
happy 
69.6 49.7 17.7 19.9 -4.832 .001*** 1.37 
HM % time  
unhappy 
  9.9 17.2   6.8 10.3   3.644 .001***   .84 
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and current satisfaction with, Security, Conformity and Tradition lower, compared to 
the Non-SWBG. 
Table 18 presents results of independent samples t-tests between the SWBG 
and Non-SWBG responses on the SSVS, which address H5 and H6. Although no 
specific predictions were made regarding Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement 
and Power for H6, these value types were also tested. 
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Table 18 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the SWBG and Non-SWBG Responses on the 
SSVS 
 
Note. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG = Non-Subjective 
Wellbeing Group. SSVS = Short Schwartz Value Survey.  
*p < .05. 
 
 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
 
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
   
        
H5         
SSVS  
total 
47.81 46.13 9.76 9.55 .823 .412 .17 
        
H6        
Hedonism 3.53 4.32 1.97 1.94 -1.911 .059 .40 
Stimulation 4.97 4.46 1.40 1.72 1.451 .150 .32 
Self-Direction 5.97 5.68 1.36 1.72 .849 .398 .19 
Universalism 5.91 5.45 1.77 1.77 1.209 .229 .26 
Benevolence 6.19 5.56 1.28 1.27 2.298 .024* .49 
Tradition 3.91 3.73 1.63 1.90 .447 .656 .10 
Conformity 4.31 4.32 1.89 1.94 -.028 .978 .01 
Security 4.81 4.99 1.65 1.91 -.444 .658 .10 
Power 3.03 2.99 2.09 1.99 .105 .916 .02 
Achievement 5.35 4.62 2.01 1.67 1.922 .058 .39 
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Table 18 indicates that both the importance of values as a whole (H5) and the 
importance of the six theorised Schwartz values (H6) were not associated with SWB. 
However individuals in the SWBG reported greater importance of Benevolence. 
Table 19 presents results of independent samples t-tests between the SWBG 
and Non-SWBG responses on the CS-SSVS, which address H7 and H8. Although no 
specific predictions were made regarding Universalism, Benevolence, Achievement 
and Power for H8, these value types were also tested. 
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Table 19 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the SWBG and Non-SWBG Responses on the 
CS-SSVS 
 
Note. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG = Non-Subjective 
Wellbeing Group. CS-SSVS = Current Satisfaction-Short Schwartz Value Survey.  
*p < .05. 
 
 
Table 19 indicates that both current satisfaction with values as a whole (H7) and 
current satisfaction with the six theorised Schwartz values (H8) were not associated 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
 
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
   
H7         
CS-SSVS 
total 
53.17 51.40 14.07 13.00   .603 .548 .13 
        
H8        
Hedonism 5.04 4.56 1.57 1.72 1.276 .205 .29 
Stimulation 5.39 4.70 1.64 1.92 1.678 .097 .39 
Self-Direction 5.82 5.43 1.56 1.66 1.073 .286 .24 
Universalism 5.32 5.30 1.98 1.67   .054 .957 .01 
Benevolence 6.11 5.39 1.13 1.52 2.274 .025* .54 
Tradition 5.29 5.39 1.56 1.60 -.281 .779 .06 
Conformity 5.57 5.23 1.53 1.80   .890 .376 .20 
Security 5.54 4.99 1.64 2.05 1.263 .210 .30 
Power 5.43 5.56 1.87 6.34 -.105 .916 .03 
Achievement 5.57 4.87 1.32 1.66 1.994 .049* .47 
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with SWB. However the SWBG reported greater current satisfaction with 
Achievement and Benevolence.  
Following this, multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) was performed to 
verify the distinctiveness of the SWBG and Non-SWBG 10 value types as being 
similar to Schwartz‟s values structure. This analysis is shown in Figures 10 and 11.  
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Figure 10. Value structure of the SWBG studied with the SSVS: Multidimensional 
scaling analyses 
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Figure 11. Value structure of the Non-SWBG studied with the SSVS: 
Multidimensional scaling analyses 
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Figure 10 shows that the value structure of the SWBG does not represent 
Schwartz‟s model. The SWBG analysis yielded mixed approximations compared to 
the theoretical structure of values and of their circular order in the data. In particular, 
the value type Achievement was not located near its complementary value type of 
Power, and Universalism was not located near Self-Direction. Figure 11 shows that 
the value structure of the Non-SWBG also does not represent Schwartz‟s model, 
yielding mixed approximations. In particular, the value types of Stimulation and Self-
Direction were swapped, and many values were not located near their complementary 
value types (e.g., the large distances between Benevolence and Tradition, and 
between Security and Power).   
 
2.6 Results summary 
 
2.6.1  Overview. 
 
Schwartz‟s model was apparent in the present data, verifying the distinctiveness 
of the 10 value types according to Schwartz‟s theory with all three measures; with the 
SSVS slightly more similar. In addition, all three measures were reliable and largely 
inter-correlated. Analysis on the six demographic variables indicated that age, gender, 
language, or student status were not associated with values, depressed mood or SWB. 
However, as would be expected, participants with a psychiatric diagnosis reported 
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greater depressed mood and lower emotional wellbeing, and participants with a 
medical illness reported lower life satisfaction. 
When analysing the links between values and depressed mood, correlation 
analysis indicated that there were no associations between the importance of values as 
a whole and depressed mood; however greater current satisfaction with values as a 
whole was associated with lower depressed mood. Analysis of the importance of the 
10 value types indicated that greater depressed mood was associated with lesser 
importance of Achievement and Benevolence. Analysis of the current satisfaction 
with the 10 value types indicated that greater depressed mood was associated with 
lower current satisfaction with Benevolence, Achievement, Conformity, Hedonism, 
Stimulation, and Self-Direction. In addition, patterns of the relationship between the 
SSVS value types and depressed mood were in the expected direction and closely 
mirrored theorising from Schwartz‟s model. However, the relationship between the 
CS-SSVS value types and depressed mood provided a mixed picture.  
Regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as a whole 
explained a very small amount of the variance in depressed mood, while the 
importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the variance. 
Lesser importance of the value type Benevolence was associated with more depressed 
mood, and greater importance of Conformity was associated with less depressed 
mood. The total current satisfaction with values as a whole explained a large amount 
of variance in depressed mood, with greater current satisfaction with values 
associated with less depressed mood. The current satisfaction with the 10 value types 
 174 
 
also explained a large amount of variance in depressed mood; however no individual 
value types were identified as contributing to this relationship.  
When comparing individuals with depressed mood against individuals without 
depressed mood, a greater proportion of depressed individuals were female, had 
English as their first language, had a psychiatric diagnosis or medical illness, and a 
lesser proportion were a New Zealand university student. Analysis using t-tests 
indicated that the importance of values as a whole and the six theorised Schwartz 
values were not associated with mood group. However individuals with depressed 
mood reported lesser importance of both Achievement and Benevolence. Depressed 
individuals also reported lower current satisfaction with values as a whole, and with 
Hedonism, Security and Achievement.  
When analysing the links between values and SWB, correlation analysis 
indicated that there were no associations between the importance of values as a whole 
and the three measures of SWB, however greater current satisfaction with values as a 
whole was associated with both greater life satisfaction and greater global happiness. 
Analysis of the importance of the 10 value types indicated that greater life satisfaction 
was associated with lesser importance of Hedonism, that greater emotional wellbeing 
was associated with greater importance of Stimulation and Tradition, and that greater 
global happiness was associated with greater Stimulation, Benevolence and 
Achievement. Analysis of the current satisfaction with the 10 value types indicated 
that greater life satisfaction was associated with greater current satisfaction with 
Hedonism, Self-Direction, Benevolence and Achievement, that greater emotional 
wellbeing was associated with greater current satisfaction with Benevolence, and that 
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greater global happiness was associated with greater Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-
Direction, Benevolence, Security and Achievement. In addition, patterns of the 
relationships between the SSVS and CS-SSVS value types and SWB provided a 
mixed picture and did not mirror theorising from Schwartz‟s model.  
Regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as a whole 
explained a very small amount of the variance in SWB; however the importance of 
the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the variance. Greater life 
satisfaction was associated with lesser importance of Hedonism, greater emotional 
wellbeing was associated with greater importance of Stimulation, and greater global 
happiness was associated with greater importance of Achievement. Regression 
analysis also indicated that current satisfaction with values as a whole explained a 
small to moderate amount of the variance in SWB, with greater current satisfaction 
with values associated with greater life satisfaction and global happiness, but not 
emotional wellbeing. Current satisfaction with specific values explained a large 
amount of the variance in life satisfaction, with greater life satisfaction and emotional 
wellbeing associated with greater current satisfaction with Benevolence. 
When comparing individuals with high SWB against individuals without high 
SWB, a greater proportion of individuals with high SWB were male, had English as 
their first language, were a current New Zealand university student, and reported 
higher rates of psychiatric diagnoses, and a lesser proportion had a medical illness. 
Analysis using t-tests indicated that the importance of values as a whole was not 
associated with wellbeing group; however greater importance of Benevolence was 
associated with individuals with greater SWB. Greater current satisfaction with 
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values as a whole was not associated with wellbeing group, however greater current 
satisfaction with Achievement and Benevolence was associated with individuals with 
greater SWB.  
 
2.6.2  Themes. 
 
Taking the results together, two main themes emerged between values and 
depressed mood. Firstly, the importance of values as a whole, when assessed with 
correlations, regressions, and t-tests, was not associated with depressed mood. 
Instead, current satisfaction with values as a whole was associated with depressed 
mood. Correlation and regression analysis both indicated that greater current 
satisfaction with values as a whole was associated with less depressed mood, and t-
tests indicated that participants in the DMG reported lower current satisfaction with 
values as a whole. 
Secondly, the overall pattern highlights the importance of Achievement and 
Benevolence in relation to depressed mood. Correlation analysis indicated that greater 
depressed mood was associated with both lesser importance of, and current 
satisfaction with, Achievement and Benevolence. Regression analysis indicated that 
greater depressed mood was associated with lesser importance of Benevolence. 
Analysis using t-tests indicated that participants in the DMG reported less importance 
of both Achievement and Benevolence, and less current satisfaction with 
Achievement. Relating these findings to those hypothesised, neither Achievement nor 
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Benevolence is congruent with those hypothesised; Benevolence and Achievement 
were not hypothesised to relate to depressed mood
5
.  
Regarding values and SWB, similar themes emerged. The importance of values 
as a whole, when assessed with correlations, regressions, and t-tests, was not 
associated with SWB. Instead, current satisfaction with values as a whole was 
associated with SWB. Correlation and regression analysis both indicated that greater 
current satisfaction with values was associated with greater life satisfaction and 
global happiness.  
Secondly, Achievement and Benevolence are important in relation to SWB. 
Correlation analysis indicated that greater global happiness was associated with 
greater importance of, and current satisfaction with, both Achievement and 
Benevolence. Regression analysis indicated that greater global happiness was 
associated with greater importance of Achievement, and greater current satisfaction 
with Benevolence was associated with both greater life satisfaction and emotional 
wellbeing. Analysis using t-tests indicated that participants in the SWBG reported 
greater importance of Benevolence, and greater current satisfaction with 
Achievement and Benevolence.  
Thirdly, values nearer to Openness-to-Change are related to SWB. Correlation 
and regression analysis indicated that lesser importance of Hedonism was associated 
                                                 
5
 Although the analysis indicated additional results (e.g., that greater current satisfaction with 
Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction was associated with greater depressed mood, that greater 
importance of Conformity was associated with greater depressed mood, that DMG participants 
reported lower current satisfaction with Hedonism and Security, or that the DMG‟s values were not as 
coherent as the Non-DMG‟s), these did not highlight the same theme as Achievement and 
Benevolence did.  
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with greater life satisfaction, and correlation analysis also indicated that greater 
current satisfaction with Hedonism was associated with greater life satisfaction and 
global happiness. Correlation and regression analysis indicated that greater 
importance of Stimulation was associated with greater emotional wellbeing, and 
correlation analysis indicated that greater importance of Stimulation was associated 
with greater global happiness. Greater current satisfaction with Stimulation was also 
associated with greater global happiness. In addition, correlation analysis indicated 
that greater current satisfaction of Self-Direction was associated with greater life 
satisfaction and global happiness
6
.  
Additionally, these results from Study One should be viewed in light of the high 
proportion of students and participants with English with a second language, and 
slightly lower reliability coefficients than in the reported literature. In particular, the 
small sample and group sizes alone mean that caution is required in interpreting these 
results due to the possibility of Type 1 error; observed differences may be a result of 
poor specificity due to the low sample size.  
                                                 
6
 Although the analysis indicated additional results (e.g., greater current satisfaction with 
Security was associated with greater global happiness, or that greater importance of Tradition was 
associated with greater emotional wellbeing), these did not highlight the same theme as other values.  
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CHAPTER 3: STUDY TWO 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
Study One revealed links between people‟s values, and their depressed mood 
and SWB. This third chapter outlines the second study of this thesis which replicated 
aspects of Study One and extended the investigation into the links between people‟s 
depressed mood and SWB by investigating the degree to which people know their 
values and live in alignment with their values. In investigating these relationships, 
participants completed four measures: one of personal values, one of depressed mood, 
and two of SWB. This third chapter is similar in structure to the previous chapter and 
has four main sections. The first section outlines the hypotheses investigated, the 
second outlines the method, and the third reports the results. The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the results of this study. 
 
3.2  Aims 
 
The first aim was to further investigate the relationships between the importance 
of values, and depressed mood and SWB. Results from Study One relating to the 
importance of values were mixed and unexpected with regard to the literature, 
whereas the results relating to current satisfaction with values were more conclusive. 
Thus, the objective was to replicate findings from Study One related to the 
importance of values with a larger and more representative sample and thus reduce 
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the risk of Type 1 error, and to utilise more specific measures to further describe 
different associations between values, and depressed mood and SWB. The second 
aim was to extend the scope and investigate previously unexplored relationships 
between depressed mood and SWB, and with individuals‟ knowledge of their values, 
the extent to which they live in alignment with their values, and also their placements 
along Schwartz‟s higher order bipolar continua (Self-Enhancement vs. Self-
Transcendence, and Openness-to-Change vs. Conservation). The overarching goal 
was again to increase understanding of the relationships between personal values, and 
mood and wellbeing. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses  
 
Six hypotheses (H9 to H14) concerned the relationship between values and 
depressed mood, and six (H15 to H20) the relationship between values and SWB. 
Based on theorising from Schwartz‟s model and results from Study One, it was 
expected that greater depressed mood would be associated with lesser importance of 
values as a whole, and with lesser importance of Benevolence and Achievement. In 
line with theorising from Schwartz‟s model, it was expected that greater depressed 
mood would be associated with greater Self-Transcendence and Conservation, and 
lower Self-Enhancement and Openness-to-Change. It was also expected that greater 
depressed mood would be associated with lower knowledge of values and lower 
living in alignment with values. 
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Conversely, it was expected that greater SWB would be associated with greater 
importance of values as a whole, and with greater importance of Stimulation, 
Achievement, Benevolence and lesser importance of Hedonism. In line with 
theorising from Schwartz‟s model, it was expected that greater SWB would be 
associated with greater Self-Enhancement and Openness-to-Change, and that lower 
SWB would be associated with greater Self-Transcendence and Conservation. It was 
also expected that greater SWB would be associated with greater knowledge of 
values and greater living in alignment with values. These hypotheses are outlined in 
Table 20. 
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Table 20 
Hypotheses Tested in Study Two 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Label Actual Hypothesis    
____________________________________________________________________ 
H9 The importance of 
values as a whole 
and depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be negatively related 
with importance of values as a whole.  
H10 The importance of 
specific values and 
depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be negatively related 
with importance ratings of Benevolence and 
Achievement. 
H11 The importance of 
Self-Enhancement 
and Self-
Transcendence, and 
depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be positively related with 
importance ratings of Self-Transcendence, and 
negatively with importance ratings of Self-
Enhancement. 
H12 The importance of 
Openness-to-Change 
and Conservation, 
and depressed mood. 
 
Depressed mood would be positively related with 
importance ratings of Conservation, and 
negatively with importance ratings of Openness-
to-Change. 
H13 Knowledge of values 
and depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be negatively related 
with ratings of knowledge of values.  
H14 Living in alignment 
with values and 
depressed mood. 
Depressed mood would be negatively related 
with ratings of living in alignment with values.  
H15 The importance of 
values as a whole 
and SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with 
importance of values as a whole.  
H16 The importance of 
specific values and 
SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with 
importance ratings with Stimulation, 
Achievement, and Benevolence, and negatively 
related with importance ratings of Hedonism.   
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____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.4  Method 
 
3.4.1 Design.  
 
A battery of psychometric instruments was selected to measure the variables of 
interest via an internet survey. These instruments comprised the primary source of 
data for this study (labelled The Values Study - see Appendix B). This battery 
consisted of four standardised self-report questionnaires, and five questions regarding 
personal values (values questions).  
The design of Study Two was influenced by the results and informal feedback 
from Study One. Thus, some measures in Study Two were different to those used in 
Study One. The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-DS) 
(Radloff, 1977) replaced the BDI-II, and the SVS, SSVS, CS-SSVS, and SHS were 
H17 The importance of 
Self-Enhancement 
and Self-
Transcendence, and 
SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with 
importance ratings of Self-Enhancement, and 
negatively with importance ratings of Self-
Transcendence. 
H18 The importance of 
Openness-to-Change 
and Conservation, 
and depressed mood. 
SWB would be positively related with 
importance ratings of Openness-to-Change, and 
negatively with importance ratings of 
Conservation.  
H19 Knowledge of values 
and SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with ratings of 
knowledge of values.  
H20 Living in alignment 
with values and 
SWB. 
SWB would be positively related with ratings of 
living in alignment with values.  
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not used in Study Two. These changes were motivated by participant feedback, 
research practicalities (such as cost or questionnaire length), the use of more specific 
measures, or to build further on the results from Study One. For example, many noted 
that the SVS was difficult to answer, with one participant describing the SVS as 
“mentally draining”. Other researchers have subsequently acknowledged that the SVS 
demands a high level of abstract thought (Koivula & Verkasalo, 2006). With regard 
to research practicalities, some tests were not available to use online due to copyright 
or required supervision for ethical reasons. The suicide screening questions two and 
nine of the BDI-II needed present monitoring. With regard to cost, the BDI-II was too 
costly for larger samples (NZ$5 per participant). The 40 item PVQ was chosen in 
preference to the 10 item SSVS because others have commented that neither the SVS 
nor the SSVS are well suited for online surveys (e.g., Littrell, 2008), and there was 
little difference between all three measures in Study One. These changes in measures 
were considered to make Study Two more robust, and allowed an increased sample 
size. The selected measures were considered suitable to further investigate both the 
breadth and depth of the relationships between values, and depressed mood and 
SWB.  
Conducting Study Two as an internet study also had many advantages. Most 
notably, internet studies are less expensive, quicker to execute, have improved data 
accuracy, and higher response rates (Reips, 2002). An Auckland University of 
Technology survey (Bell et al., 2007) reported that 81% of New Zealanders use the 
Internet, with usage rising slightly with wealth and urban location, and falling slightly 
with age. International usage data in similar western countries mirrors these findings 
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(e.g., Reips, 2006). In addition, research suggests no significant differences in the 
psychometric properties of psychological measures completed online, compared to 
paper-based versions (Riva, Teruzzi, & Anolli, 2003). For example, Lewis, Watson 
and White (2009) reported that measures completed via the internet yield equivalent 
scores to measures completed in person, whilst also allowing for more diverse 
demographic samples. The use of web-based research methods in psychology is also 
increasing (Reips, 2006). Moreover, Arnett (2008) argued that psychological research 
focuses too narrowly on Americans, resulting in an incomplete understanding that 
ignores cultural context and does not adequately represent humanity.  
 
3.4.2 Participants. 
 
Participants for this study were an international convenience sample. 
Participants were invited to participate via e-mail newsletters, postings on various 
websites, and snowballing through friends and family (in person, phone, e-mail). 
Four hundred and ninety two participants volunteered and completed Study Two. 
These participants were individuals who were over 18 years of age, and for whom 
English was their first language. Twenty-eight individuals indicated that they were 
either under 18 or that English was not their first language; these 28 individuals were 
thanked for their time and excluded. 
 
3.4.2.1 Demographics. 
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Participants were asked to provide information regarding five variables of 
interest: their gender, age, country, psychiatric diagnosis, and medication usage. This 
information is displayed in Table 21.  
 
Table 21 
Demographic Information for All 492 Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
N   %  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender  
   Male        143  29 
   Female       349  71 
 
Country 
   New Zealand      274  56 
   United Kingdom      110  22 
   Canada           42    9 
   United States of America       32    6 
   Australia           30    6 
   Other               4    1 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes          89  18 
   No        403  82 
 
Medication use 
   Yes        107  22 
   No        385  78 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Participants‟ ages ranged from 18 to 75 years, with a mean age of 33.32 (SD = 
12.31). In addition, 362 of the 492 participants (74%) provided their e-mail address in 
order to be entered into a prize draw for one of three US$100 Amazon.com vouchers 
for participating. Participants who supplied their e-mail address were also offered an 
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e-mail summary of the results once the research was complete. Further description of 
the collection of this demographic and additional information is included below in 
section 3.4.4.  
 
3.4.3 Materials. 
 
Some standardised measures included in Study Two had also been used in 
Study One. These included the PVQ, SwLS, and HM (see section 2.4.3). The new 
measure and questions included in Study Two were the Centre for Epidemiological 
Studies Depression Scale (CES-DS) (Radloff, 1977), which is a measure of depressed 
mood, and five questions regarding different aspects of values (importance of values, 
knowledge of values, living in alignment with values, and one question for each of 
the two Schwartz continua). All of the measures used were suitable for the intended 
participants of this research in that they met age, language and user qualification 
requirements. The measures were also freely available or available with permission. 
Taken as a whole, these measures focused on values, depressed mood, and SWB. The 
new measure and values questions included in Study Two are presented in Appendix 
B and reviewed in detail below. 
 
3.4.3.1 Values’ measures. 
 
3.4.3.1.1 Values questions. 
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Five questions were designed to further assess different aspects of personal 
values. The first question asked participants to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how much 
they knew what their values were (knowledge of values). The second question asked 
participants to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how much they were living their life in 
alignment with their values (living in alignment with values). The third question 
asked participants to rate on a scale from 0 to 10 how important values were 
(importance of values). The fourth question asked participants to mark on a 10 point 
unnumbered continuum where they saw themselves, ranging from „Open-to-Change‟ 
at one end, to „Conservative‟ at the other (Openness-to-Change vs. Conservation 
continuum). Each point was then assigned a value, ranging from (1) indicating 
„Open-to-Change‟, to (10) indicating „Conservative‟. The fifth question was similar 
to the fourth, and asked participants where they saw themselves ranging from (1) 
„Interested-in-Self‟ at one end, to (10) „Interested-in-Others‟ at the other (Self-
Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence continuum).  
Given the findings from Study One, the importance of values question allowed 
further direct investigation of the importance of values in addition to the current 
values measure, the PVQ, which also assesses the importance of values. Ratings of 
knowledge of values and living in alignment with values allowed for measurements 
of aspects of values considered important, yet not quantifiable by currently developed 
measures. The inclusion of Schwartz‟s continua placement questions allowed the 
investigation of Schwartz‟s two higher order bi-polar dimensions.  
 
3.4.3.2 Mood measure. 
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3.4.3.2.1 Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale. 
 
The Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-DS) (Radloff, 
1977) is a short 20 item measure that assesses the frequency and severity of 
depressive symptomatology over the past week in a general population. The CES-DS 
measures “current level of depressive symptomatology, with emphasis on the 
affective component, depressed mood” (Radloff, 1977, p. 285). Participants rate how 
frequently each of 20 depressive symptoms has been experienced on a 4 point scale, 
ranging from (0) „rarely or none of the time – less than 1 day‟, to (1) „some or a little 
of the time – 1 to 2 days‟, to (2) „occasionally or a moderate amount of the time – 3 to 
4 days‟, to (3) „most or all of the time – 5 to 7 days‟. The 20 items represent all major 
components of depressive symptomatology including depressed mood, guilt and 
worthlessness, helplessness and hopelessness, loss of appetite, sleep disturbance, and 
psychomotor retardation. Four of the 20 items are positively phrased („I enjoyed life‟, 
„I was happy‟, „I felt hopeful about the future‟, „I felt I was just as good as other 
people‟) and are reverse scored (items 4, 8, 12, & 16). Total scores range from 0 
(indicating no depressive symptoms) to 60 (indicating more depressive 
symptomatology). In adults, a score of 16 or greater is used to define “likely 
depression” (Radloff, 1977, p. 394), or “a clinically significant level of depressive 
symptoms” (Roberts, 1980, p. 130), with a score of 30 or greater reflecting severe 
depression (Bergin & Garfield, 2003). The psychometric properties of the CES-DS 
have been thoroughly investigated in both clinical and non-clinical samples over the 
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past 30 years. Various authors (e.g., Roberts, 1980; Spielberger et al., 2003) cite the 
CES-DS as a widely used depression measure (see Ensel, 1986, for an overview of 
the CES-DS). The average reliability of the CES-DS is reported as .85 (Radloff, 
1977); in Study Two the CES-DS Cronbach Alpha was .92. 
In addition, the four positively phrased items in the CES-DS (i.e., items 4, 8, 12, 
and 16) measure positive affect (Joseph, 2007) and thus comprise a positive affect 
subscale. As Thorson and Powell commented, “this subcomponent of the CES-DS 
has been shown to be a valid instrument for measuring positive affect, and it has been 
taken as interchangeable with the concept of happiness” which “could be treated as 
additive measures of a single „happiness‟ scale” (1993, p. 590). 
 
The PVQ, SwLS, HM, CES-DS and additional values questions were important 
in providing a comprehensive assessment of the domains of interest. In combination 
they provided more depth and focus in the assessment of personal values, depressed 
mood, and SWB. In Study Two the Cronbach Alpha of the SwLS was .89, and the 
Cronbach Alpha of the PVQ was .67, with individual value reliabilities ranging from 
.25 to .44. 
 
3.4.4 Procedure. 
 
The Values Study was advertised through e-mail, e-newsletters, and website 
postings. Regarding e-mail and e-newsletters, participants were identified via 
snowballing through friends and family, and through various e-mail lists. These 
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included e-mail lists and newsletters from a range of university departments (e.g., 
computing departments, psychology departments, biology departments), government 
departments (e.g., Ministry of Research, Science, and Technology, Ministry of 
Education), private companies listed through the Yellow Pages website (e.g., 
plumbers, car dealers), and charitable organisations (e.g., Depression.org, Red Cross). 
Regarding website postings, notices of this study were posted on various notable 
websites (e.g., www.livingbipolar.co.nz, www.lifeline.org.nz, 
www.positivepsychology.org.nz) requesting participants. In selecting lists and 
websites the rationale was to capture a wide and representative sample.  
The Values Study was hosted at www.surveymonkey.com. In order to reach 
The Values Study, participants either clicked on the link www.valuesstudy.com 
which arrived via an e-mail or e-newsletter, or were asked to type 
www.valuesstudy.com into a web browser. They were then redirected to The Values 
Study hosted at Survey Monkey. When participants were presented with the 
questionnaires, they firstly read a short information sheet which described the study 
and eligibility requirements (see Appendix B). To be eligible to participate, 
participants needed to be 18 years of age or older, and have English as their first 
language. Participants then entered information for five demographic variables of 
interest. After demographic questions were completed, the measures in Study Two 
were randomly presented. At the completion of the study, participants were thanked 
and their data was submitted. They were also encouraged to forward the link 
www.valuesstudy.com to others they thought might wish to participate.  
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The raw data from the questionnaires was downloaded from Survey Monkey in 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet format, and analysis of the data was conducted using 
SPSS 17 (Field, 2005; Miller et al., 2009; Pallant, 2007). As the online survey 
required an answer for each question in order to proceed, data accuracy was 100%, 
making cross checking for accuracy unnecessary. Five-hundred-and-seventeen 
participants completed in total, however five percent of the completed data was not 
used (n = 25 questionnaires). This included firstly participants who completed the 
survey in less than 5 minutes (n = 12), and secondly participants who scored 
erratically (n = 13). For example, pilot testing on 10 participants indicated that this 
battery would take between 15 to 20 minutes to complete, but 12 participants 
completed in less than five minutes. The 13 who scored erratically indicated that they 
were highly depressed on a depression measure, yet very happy on a positive affect 
measure. These 25 participants may have been interested in the content of the study 
questions rather than in answering the questions, or in entering the draw for vouchers. 
This meant 492 completed participant data were used for analysis. The Values Study 
ran for 49 days, beginning on the 18 December 2007 and ending on 4 February 2008. 
Again, no data is available on how many people were reached via the recruitment e-
mails, e-newsletters or website postings, so response rates cannot be calculated. 
 
3.5 Results  
 
This section presents analyses of the data from Study Two. Firstly, a 
preliminary analysis compared the five demographic variables for all participants 
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(age, gender, country, psychiatric diagnosis, and medication usage) against the 12 
main outcome variables provided by the study measures (importance of values 
question, knowledge of values, living in alignment with values, Self-
Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum, Openness-to-Change/Conservation 
continuum, total PVQ score, total CES-DS score, CES-DS four item happiness score, 
total SwLS score, HM scale score, HM percent happy score, and HM percent 
unhappy score). The first six of these outcome variables relate to values, and the latter 
six to mood and wellbeing. The Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence and 
Openness-to-Change/Conservation continua questions were also related (correlations) 
to the 10 PVQ value types to confirm that these questions assessed Schwartz‟s two 
higher-order bipolar continua. Following this, analysis focused on the two main 
research questions: the relationship between values and depressed mood, and between 
values and SWB. Similarly to Study One, each of these two sections begins with 
within groups analysis (correlations, sinusoid curves, and regression analyses) 
followed by between groups analysis (t-tests, multidimensional scaling). 
 
3.5.1  Demographic variables and main outcome variables. 
 
Pearson Product-moment correlations were calculated to look at how age related 
to the 12 main outcome variables. Age positively related with the importance of 
values question (r = .22, p < .01), knowledge of values (r = .21, p < .01), living in 
alignment with values (r = .12, p < .01), the CES-DS-4IH (r = .12, p < .01), and 
negatively related with the CES-DS total (r = -.17, p < .01).  
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Next, 12 one-way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests were 
conducted to explore the impact of participant country (New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Canada, Australia, Other) on the 12 main 
outcome variables. There was a statistically significant difference at the p < .05 level 
in importance of values question scores for country: F (5, 486) = 2.957, p = .012, d = 
.03. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score on 
the importance of values question for participants in the United Kingdom (M = 8.33, 
SD = 1.40) was significantly different from participants in New Zealand (M = 8.76, 
SD = 1.29) and the United States of America (M = 9.09, SD = 0.89), although 
differences in mean scores between these countries was quite small. Nonetheless, 
participants in the United Kingdom rated the importance of values lower compared to 
participants from New Zealand and the United States of America.  
A series of 36 (312) independent samples t-tests was then performed to 
investigate if there were statistically significant effects of each of the remaining three 
demographic variables (gender, psychiatric diagnosis, and medication use) on the 12 
main outcome variables. Values were rated as less important by males (M = 8.36, SD 
= 1.43) compared to females (M = 8.76, SD = 1.25), t(490) = 3.104, p = .002, d = .30; 
males reported lower knowledge of values (M = 7.72, SD = 1.47) compared to 
females (M = 8.18, SD = 1.22), t(490) = 3.594, p = .001, d = .34; and males reported 
less depressed mood on the CES-DS (M = 10.54, SD = 9.33) compared to females (M 
= 12.54, SD = 10.35), t(490) = 2.007, p = .045, d = .20. In addition, males reported 
greater Self-Enhancement (M = 5.66, SD = 1.85) and females greater Self-
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Transcendence (M = 6.16, SD = 1.68), t(490) = -2.896, p = .004, d = .28, on the Self-
Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum.  
As shown in Table 22, there were statistically significant differences for 
participants with a psychiatric diagnosis (n = 89) in ratings of six of the 12 main 
outcome variables; all six variables relating to mood and wellbeing. 
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Table 22 
Independent Samples t-tests Between Participants With and Without a Psychiatric 
Diagnosis, and Responses on the 12 Main Outcome Variables 
 
Note. PD = Psychiatric diagnosis. VImport = Importance of values. VKnow = 
Knowledge of values. VLive = Living in alignment with values. VOPvsCO = 
Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum. VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-
Transcendence continuum. PVQtot = Portrait Values Questionnaire total. CES-DStot 
= Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale total. CES-DS-4IH = Centre 
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale four item happiness. SwLStot = 
Satisfaction with Life Scale total. HM = Happiness Measures. HM%hap = Happiness 
Measures percent happy. HM%unhap = Happiness Measures percent unhappy.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
           M          . 
 
           SD         . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
With 
PD 
 
Without 
PD 
 
With 
PD 
 
Without 
PD 
   
 
        
VImport     8.88     8.59   1.05   1.37   1.856 .064 .24 
VKnow     7.94     8.07   1.52   1.27 - .833 .405 .09 
VLive      7.24     7.54   1.91   1.49 -1.653 .099 .20 
VOPvsCO      3.76     4.02   2.00   2.06 -1.077 .282 .13 
VSEvsST     5.79     6.07   1.66   1.76 -1.383 .167 .16 
PVQtot 116.30 117.58 16.39 19.04 - .586 .558 .07 
CES-DStot   16.25   11.01 12.92   9.11   4.511 .001*** .47 
CES-DS-4IH     8.37     9.27   3.37   2.79 -2.677 .008** .29 
SwLStot   21.62   23.61   7.97   6.64 -2.470 .014* .27 
HM scale     6.34     7.15   2.21   1.68 -3.892 .001*** .41 
HM%hap   49.55   59.24 25.47 23.56 -3.460 .001*** .39 
HM%unhap   23.60   15.37 20.32 13.77   4.633 .001*** .47 
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As shown in Table 23, there were statistically significant differences for 
participants taking medications (n = 107) in ratings of five of the 12 main outcome 
variables; five variables relating to mood and wellbeing. 
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Table 23 
Independent Samples t-tests Between Participants Currently Taking Medication and 
Those Not Currently Taking Medication, and Responses on the 12 Main Outcome 
Variables 
 
Note. Meds = Medications. VImport = Importance of values. VKnow = Knowledge 
of values. VLive = Living in alignment with values. VOPvsCO = Openness-to-
Change/Conservation continuum. VSEvsOT = Self-Enhancement/Self-
Transcendence continuum. PVQtot = Portrait Values Questionnaire total. CES-DStot 
= Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale total. CES-DS-4IH = Centre 
for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale four item happiness. SwLStot = 
Satisfaction with Life Scale total. HM = Happiness Measures. HM%hap = Happiness 
Measures percent happy. HM%unhap = Happiness Measures percent unhappy.  
**p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
 
 
  
             M            . 
 
            SD           . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
Meds 
 
Without  
Meds 
 
Meds 
 
Without  
Meds 
   
VImport     8.81     8.59   1.16   1.36   1.517 .130 .17 
VKnow     8.08     8.04   1.44   1.28     .314 .753 .03 
VLive      7.40     7.51   1.80   1.51    -.621 .535 .07 
VOPvsCO      4.11     3.94   2.08   2.04     .779 .436 .08 
VSEvsST     5.91     6.05   1.63   1.78    -.747 .455 .08 
PVQtot 115.09 117.97 18.39 18.61 -1.420 .156 .16 
CES-DStot   14.63   11.22 11.96   9.40   3.114 .002** .32 
CES-DS-4IH     8.38     9.30   3.15   2.76 -2.957 .003** .31 
SwLStot   22.73   23.40   7.36   6.81   -.882 .378 .09 
HM scale     6.48     7.15   2.09   1.70 -3.441 .001*** .35 
HM%hap   50.37   59.47 24.43 23.78 -3.480 .001*** .38 
HM%unhap   20.65   15.81 17.87 14.58   2.890 .004** .30 
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Preceding analysis on depressed mood and SWB, the Schwartz continua 
questions were compared against the PVQ value types to ensure that the continua 
questions assessed Schwartz‟s two higher order bipolar continua. Pearson Product-
moment correlations were calculated to look at how the Self-Enhancement/Self-
Transcendence and Openness-to-Change/Conservation continua questions related to 
the 10 PVQ value types. Remember, on these 10-point scale questions, (1) indicated 
„Interested-in-Self‟ and (10) „Interested-in-Others‟, and (1) indicated „Openness-to-
Change‟ and (10) „Conservation‟, respectively. 
As shown in Table 24, and as would be expected, Open-to-Change was most 
strongly associated with Stimulation, Conservation with Conformity, Self-
Enhancement with Power, and Self-Transcendence with Benevolence.  
 
Table 24 
Pearson Product-moment Correlations Relating Schwartz Continua Scores to PVQ 
Value Types   
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence 
continuum. PVQ = Portrait Values Questionnaire.VOPvsCO = Openness-to-
Change/Conservation continuum.  
**p < .01.  
 Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
           
VOPvsCO 
& PVQ 
 
-.169** -.267** -.247** -.160** -.073 .172** .232** .120** -.059 -.169** 
VSEvsST 
& PVQ 
-.148** -.012 -.086 .198** .332** .282** .226** -.002 -.231** -.197** 
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Next the value structure of the PVQ was investigated with multidimensional 
scaling analysis to verify the distinctiveness of the 10 value types in the data as being 
similar to Schwartz‟s values structure. Figure 12 confirms the value structure of 
Study Two participants, assessed with the PVQ, as largely representing Schwartz‟s 
model.  
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Figure 12. Value structure of Study Two participants studied with the PVQ: 
Multidimensional scaling analyses. 
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The results of MDS analysis using the PVQ largely indicate 10 separate and 
discrete value sectors, in the proposed theoretical order, and that the model is circular. 
The exception is that the positions of Power and Achievement are swapped.  
 
In summary, as participant age increased participants reported less depressed 
mood and greater importance of values, knowledge of their values, living in 
alignment with their values, and greater general happiness. Participants in the United 
Kingdom rated the importance of values lower compared to participants from New 
Zealand and the United States of America. Females rated values as more important, 
reported greater knowledge of their values, reported greater depressed mood, and 
rated Self-Transcendence as more important than Self-Enhancement compared to 
males. Participants with a psychiatric diagnosis reported greater depressed mood, 
lower satisfaction with life, emotional wellbeing, and happiness, and that they were 
happy less of the time and unhappy more of the time compared to those without a 
psychiatric diagnosis. Participants taking medications reported greater depressed 
mood, lower emotional wellbeing and happiness, and that they were happy less of the 
time and unhappy more of the time compared to those not taking medications.  
 
3.5.2  Depressed mood. 
 
3.5.2.1  Correlation analysis.  
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The results in this section address hypotheses H9 to H14. Firstly, Pearson 
Product-moment correlations were calculated to look at how depressed mood related 
to the importance of values question, knowledge of values, living in alignment with 
values, Schwartz continua placements, total PVQ scores, and the 10 PVQ value types. 
There were no statistically significant correlations (p < .05) between total CES-DS 
scores, and the importance of values question, total PVQ score, or Schwartz‟s 
continua scores. However there were moderate and strong negative correlations 
between total CES-DS scores, and knowledge of values scores (r = -.21, p < .01) and 
living in alignment with values scores (r = -.45, p < .01). Thus there were no 
associations between depressed mood and the importance of values question or the 
PVQ total (H9), or with the Schwartz continua placements of Self-Enhancement/Self-
Transcendence or Openness-to-Change/Conservation (H11 and H12). However, 
greater depressed mood was moderately associated with lower knowledge of values 
ratings (H13) and strongly associated with lower ratings of living in alignment with 
values (H14). 
Table 25 presents Pearson Product-moment correlations between total CES-DS 
scores and the 10 PVQ value types. 
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Table 25 
 Pearson Product-moment Correlations Relating CES-DS Scores to PVQ Value Types   
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. CES-DS = Centre for Epidemiological Studies 
Depression Scale. PVQ = Portrait Values Questionnaire. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
 
 
As shown in Table 25, analysis of the importance of the 10 value types 
indicated that greater depressed mood was not, as hypothesised, associated with lesser 
importance of Benevolence and Achievement (H10). Instead, and in line with original 
theorising (Section 1.4.3), greater depressed mood was associated with lesser 
importance of Stimulation, Self-Direction and Hedonism.  
Next the analysis used a sinusoid curve to look at the pattern of associations of 
the 10 PVQ value types in relation to depressed mood. Figure 13 shows the expected 
pattern of associations according to the original theorising for depressed mood 
(“Schwartz theory”), and the PVQ correlation results from Table 25; the associations 
between the 10 PVQ values and CES-DS scores.  
 
 
 
 
 
Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
           
CES-DS 
& PVQ 
 
-.104* -.141** -.191**  .031 -.023  .003  .007  -.031 -.005  .057 
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Figure 13. Sinusoid curve of value associations between CES-DS scores and PVQ 
values. 
 
Figure 13 indicates that the pattern of relationships between the 10 PVQ values 
and depressed mood are mixed, with only five of the 10 values (Hedonism, 
Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Power) mirroring theorising from 
Schwartz‟s model. Depressed mood is not associated with lesser importance of 
Benevolence and Achievement as was hypothesised (H10). In addition, with the 
exception of Benevolence and Achievement, this pattern of associations between the 
10 PVQ value types and depressed mood is similar to that found in Study One (i.e., 
Figure 5).  
 
In summary, there were no associations between depressed mood and the 
importance of values (H9), or with the Schwartz continua placements (H11 and H12). 
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However, greater depressed mood was moderately associated with lower knowledge 
of values ratings (H13) and strongly associated with lower ratings of living in 
alignment with values (H14). In addition, greater depressed mood was associated 
with lesser importance of Stimulation, Self-Direction and Hedonism (H10). 
 
3.5.2.2  Regression analysis. 
 
This section presents results from hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
which addressed hypotheses H9 to H14: the relationship between the importance of 
values, knowledge of values, living in alignment with values, two Schwartz continua 
placements, and depressed mood. Table 26 shows results of seven hierarchical 
multiple regressions: predicting depressed mood from the importance of values (H9), 
the importance of specific values (H10), Schwartz continua placements (H11 and 
H12), knowledge of values (H13), and living in alignment with values (H14).  
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Table 26 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Depressed Mood from the 
Importance of Values (H9), the Importance of Specific Values (H10), Schwartz 
Continua Placements (H11 and H12), Knowledge of Values (H13), and Living in 
Alignment with Values (H14) 
      
Variable R
2
 ΔR2 B SE B β 
  H9      
    Step 1 .035 .035***.    
      Constant   13.686 2.235  
      Age   -.135 .037 -.165***. 
      Gender   1.626 .992 .073 
    Step 2  (ImpVQ)   .037 .002***.    
      Constant   16.438 3.335  
      Age   -.125 .038 -.153***. 
      Gender   1.812 1.006 .082 
      ImpVQ   -.393 .353 -.051 
    Step 2 (PVQtot) .040 .005***.    
      Constant   18.119 3.615  
      Age   -.137 .037 -.167***. 
      Gender   1.659 .991 .075 
      PVQtot   -.038 .024 -.069 
      
H10      
    Step 1 .035 .035***.    
      Constant   13.686 2.235  
      Age   -.135 .037 -.165***. 
      Gender   1.626 .992 .073 
    Step 2 .097 .061***.    
      Constant   21.241 3.882  
      Age   -.129 .042 -.157**. . 
      Gender   1.236 .994 .056 
      PVQ Hedonism 
      PVQ Stimulation 
 -.801 .505 -.085 
 -.817 .540 -.085 
      PVQ Self-Direction 
      PVQ Universalism 
      PVQ Benevolence 
 -2.293 .743 -.168**. . 
 2.102 .679 .168**. . 
 -.466 .693 -.036 
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      PVQ Tradition 
      PVQ Conformity 
      PVQ Security 
      PVQ Power 
      PVQ Achievement 
 .399 .656 .036 
 -.718 .635 -.069 
 -.398 .642 -.034 
 .330 .581 .033 
 .786 .554 .086 
      
H11 & H12      
    Step 1 .035 .035***.    
      Constant   13.686 2.235  
      Age   -.135 .037 -.165***. 
      Gender   1.626 .992 .073 
    Step 2 (H11) .035 .001***.    
      Constant   14.104 2.556  
      Age   -.134 .037 -.164***. 
      Gender   1.673 1.002 .075 
       VSEvsST   -.088 .260 -.015 
    Step 2 (H12) .040 .005***.    
      Constant   12.236 2.398  
      Age   -.134 .037 -.163***. 
      Gender   1.610 .990 .072 
       VOPvsCO   .361 .219 .073 
      
H13      
    Step 1 .035 .035***.    
      Constant   13.686 2.235  
      Age   -.135 .037 -.165***. 
      Gender   1.626 .992 .073 
    Step 2 .073 .038***.    
      Constant   23.571 3.108  
      Age   -.096 .037 -.117**. . 
      Gender   2.461 .991 .111**. . 
      VKnow   -1.566 .349 -.204***. 
      
      
H14      
    Step 1 .035 .035***.    
      Constant   13.686 2.235  
      Age   -.135 .037 -.165***. 
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Note. ImpVQ = Importance of Values Question. PVQtot = Portrait Values 
Questionnaire total. VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum. 
VOPvsCO = Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum. VKnow = Knowledge of 
values. VLive = Living in alignment with values.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
As Table 26 shows, all analyses controlled for both age and gender with gender 
explaining a small amount of the variance in depressed mood and age a greater 
amount. The importance of values as a whole (H9) explained a very small amount of 
the variance in depressed mood (0.2% and 0.5%). However the importance of specific 
values (H10) explained a larger amount of the variance in depressed mood (7.4%), 
with greater depressed mood associated with lesser importance of Self-Direction and 
greater importance of Universalism. This result is different to that hypothesised; it 
was expected that depressed mood would be negatively related with importance 
ratings of Benevolence and Achievement. Both the Schwartz continua questions 
explained very little variance in depressed mood (0% and 0.5%), however knowledge 
of values explained a small amount of the variance in depressed mood (3.8%), with 
greater depressed mood associated with lower knowledge of values. In addition, 
living in alignment with values explained a large amount of the variance in depressed 
      Gender   1.626 .992 .073 
    Step 2 .225 .190***.    
      Constant   32.560 2.644  
      Age   -.091 .033 -.111**. . 
      Gender   2.040 .891 .092*…. 
      VLive   -2.813 .257 -.440***. 
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mood (19.0%), with greater depressed mood associated with lower living in 
alignment with values.  
 
In summary, regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as 
a whole explained a very small amount of the variance in depressed mood; however 
the importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the 
variance with greater depressed mood associated with lesser importance of Self-
Direction and greater importance of Universalism. Schwartz continua placements 
explained very little variance in depressed mood; however a small amount of the 
variance in depressed mood was associated with lower knowledge of values ratings, 
and a large amount of the variance in depressed mood was associated with lower 
living in alignment with values ratings.  
 
3.5.2.3  Between groups analysis 
 
The results in this section address hypotheses H9 to H14, and involved t-tests 
comparing individuals with depressed mood (DMG: Depressed Mood Group) against 
individuals without depressed mood (Non-DMG: Non Depressed Mood Group). The 
DMG and Non-DMG was determined on the basis of scores on the CES-DS. Again, 
the CES-DS measures symptoms over the past week, and an adult score of 16 or 
greater defines „likely depression‟ (Radloff, 1977), or “a clinically significant level of 
depressive symptoms” (Roberts, 1980, p. 130). The DMG were individuals who 
obtained scores of 16 or greater on CES-DS. One hundred and twenty four of the 492 
 211 
 
participants (25%) in Study Two had a CES-DS score of 16 or greater. These 124 
individuals were designated the DMG with the remaining participants designated the 
Non-DMG; demographic profiles of the DMG, Non-DMG and all Study Two 
participants are presented in Table 27.  
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Table 27  
Demographic Information of the DMG, Non-DMG and All 492 Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                 N                  .               %                       . 
 All DMG Non- All  DMG Non-  
 DMG DMG 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender  
   Male    143   26 117  29 21 32 
   Female   349   98 251  71 79 68 
 
Country 
   New Zealand  274   60 214  56 48 58 
   United Kingdom  110   36   74  22 29 20 
   Canada     42   12   30    9 10   8 
   United States of America   32     4   28    6   3   8 
   Australia     30   12   18    6 10   5 
   Other       4     0     4    1   0   1 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes      89   34   55  18 27 15 
   No    403   90 313  82 73 85 
 
Medication use 
   Yes    107   38   69  22 31 19 
   No    385   86 299  78 69 81 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. All = All Participants. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-
Depressed Mood Group. Other = Finland, Germany, Spain, and South Africa.  
 
Ages of all participants in Study Two ranged from 18 to 75 years with a mean 
age of 33.32 years (SD = 12.31); the ages for the DMG ranged from 18 to 68 years 
with a mean age of 29.81 years (SD = 9.89); and ages for the Non-DMG ranged from 
18 to 75 with a mean age of 34.50 years (SD = 12.82). Therefore, the DMG and Non-
DMG were relatively similar across the five demographic variables, although the 
 213 
 
DMG were younger, a greater proportion were female, foreign, and reported higher 
rates of psychiatric diagnosis and medication use than the Non-DMG. 
As a confirmation check that the CES-DS had isolated a group of participants 
with depressed mood, a series of four independent samples t-tests investigated the 
difference between the DMG and Non-DMG on two related measures: the SwLS and 
HM. Remember, higher scores on the SwLS indicate greater satisfaction with life, 
higher scores on the HM scale question indicate a greater perceived quality of general 
happiness, higher percentages on the HM percent time happy question indicate a 
greater amount of time happy, and higher percentages on the HM percent time 
unhappy question indicate a greater amount of time unhappy. As shown in Table 28, 
there were big differences in all four t-tests. 
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Table 28 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the DMG and Non-DMG Responses on the 
SwLS and HM 
 
Note. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-Depressed Mood Group. 
SwLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale. HM = Happiness Measures.  
***p < .001. 
 
 
As expected, compared to the Non-DMG, the DMG were less satisfied with 
life, reported a lower perceived quality of general happiness, a less amount of time 
happy, and a greater amount of time unhappy. This confirmation check increased 
confidence that the CES-DS had isolated a group of participants with depressed 
mood. 
To recap the predicted associations, it was expected that, compared to those in 
the Non-DMG, participants in the DMG would rate values as being less important 
(H9), rate the importance of Benevolence and Achievement lower (H10), rate Self-
Transcendence (H11) and Conservation (H12) greater and Self-Enhancement and 
  
          M           . 
 
           SD         . 
 
       t 
  
       p 
 
       d 
  
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
 
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
   
        
SwLS 16.83 25.42   7.58 5.14 -14.135 .001*** 1.33 
HM scale 
question 
  5.20   7.61   2.22 1.26 -15.680 .001*** 1.26 
HM % time 
happy  
38.31 63.95 22.97 20.96 -11.498 .001*** 1.17 
HM % time 
unhappy 
32.62 11.55 21.74 7.04 16.264 .001*** 1.30 
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Openness-to-Change lower, and report less knowledge of their values (H13) and 
lower living in alignment with their values (H14).  
Table 29 presents the results of independent samples t-tests between the DMG 
and Non-DMG responses on the importance of values question (H9), PVQ (H9 and 
H10), Schwartz continua questions (H11 and H12), knowledge of values question 
(H13), and living in alignment with values question (H14). Although no specific 
predictions were made regarding Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, 
Universalism, Tradition, Security, Power or Conformity for H10, these value types 
were also tested.  
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Table 29 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the DMG and Non-DMG Responses on the PVQ 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
 
DMG 
 
Non-
DMG 
   
H9         
PVQ total 114.81 118.20 18.65 18.50 -1.759 .079 .18 
ImpVQ 8.56 8.67   1.30   1.32   -.838 .402 .08 
        
H10        
Hedonism 2.86 3.13 1.13 1.04 -2.383 .018** .25 
Stimulation 2.61 2.98 1.10 1.02 -3.355 .001*** .35 
Self-Direction 3.59 3.91   .84   .68 -4.137 .001*** .41 
Universalism 3.47 3.50   .82   .80 -.395 .693 .04 
Benevolence 3.58 3.66   .84   .77 -.939 .348 .10 
Tradition 2.04 2.00   .92   .91 .482 .630 .04 
Conformity 2.46 2.48 1.00   .96 -.197 .844 .02 
Security 2.64 2.73   .79   .87 -.917 .359 .11 
Power 1.88 1.91 1.05   .98 -.335 .738 .03 
Achievement 3.01 2.84 1.13 1.09 1.452 .147 .15 
        
H11 & 12        
VSEvsST 5.89 6.06 1.92 1.69 -.966 .334 .09 
VOPvsCO 4.19 3.90 2.02 2.03 1.320 .187 .14 
        
H13 & 14        
VKnow 7.65 8.18 1.60 1.17 -3.935 .001*** .38 
Vlive 6.62 7.78 2.06 1.25 -7.435 .001*** .68 
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Note. DMG = Depressed Mood Group. Non-DMG = Non-Depressed Mood Group. 
PVQ = Portrait Values Questionnaire. ImpVQ = Importance of Values Question. 
VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum. VOPvsCO = 
Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum. VKnow = Knowledge of values 
question. VLive = Living in alignment with values question.  
**p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
Table 29 indicates that the importance of values as a whole was not associated 
with depressed mood (H9), and the importance of Achievement or Benevolence were 
not associated with depressed mood (H10) as hypothesised. However individuals 
with greater depressed mood reported lesser importance of Self-Direction, 
Stimulation, and Hedonism; in alignment with original theorising from Schwartz‟s 
model (Section 1.4.3). There were no associations with depressed mood and ratings 
on either of the Schwartz continua questions (H11 & H12), but individuals with 
greater depressed mood reported less knowledge of their values (H13), and that they 
were living in alignment with their values less as hypothesised (H14). The Cohen‟s d 
effect size of .68 between DMG and Non-DMG individuals living in alignment with 
values was particularly large.  
Following this, multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) (Davison, 1983) was 
performed to verify the distinctiveness of the DMG and Non-DMG 10 value types as 
being similar to Schwartz‟s values structure. This analysis is shown in Figures 14 and 
15.  
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Figure 14. Value structure of the DMG studied with the PVQ: Multidimensional 
scaling analyses 
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Figure 15. Value structure of the Non-DMG studied with the PVQ: Multidimensional 
scaling analyses 
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Figures 14 and 15 shows that the value structure of the DMG and Non-DMG 
largely represents Schwartz‟s model, and is similar to Figure 12 (the values structure 
of all Study Two participants assessed with the PVQ), including having the values of 
Power and Achievement swapped. Thus this analysis did not identify any difference 
between mood groups; MDS analysis identified that the DMG and Non-DMG values 
were equally coherent. Where in Study One the value type Universalism was not 
located near its complementary value types of Self-Direction and Benevolence for the 
DMG, this variation was not apparent in Study Two data.  
 
3.5.3  Subjective wellbeing. 
 
3.5.3.1  Correlation analysis.  
 
The results in this section address hypotheses H15 to H20. Firstly, Pearson 
Product-moment correlations were calculated to look at how SWB variables related to 
the importance of values question, total PVQ scores and the 10 PVQ value types, 
Schwartz continua placements, knowledge of values, and living in alignment with 
values variables.  
There was no statistically significant correlation (p < .05) between total SwLS 
scores, and Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum scores. However, there 
were small, moderate, and large positive correlations between total SwLS scores, and 
the importance of values question scores (r = .11, p < .05), knowledge of values 
scores (r = .26, p < .01), total PVQ scores (r = .26, p < .01), and living in alignment 
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with values scores (r = .48, p < .01). There was also a small negative correlation 
between total SwLS scores and Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum scores 
(r = -.11, p < .05).  
There were no statistically significant correlations (p < .05) between HM scale 
scores, and the importance of values question or Self-Enhancement/Self-
Transcendence continuum scores. However, there were small and moderate positive 
correlations between HM scale scores, and knowledge of values scores (r = .17, p < 
.01), total PVQ scores (r = .20, p < .01), and living in alignment with values scores (r 
= .41, p < .01). There was also a small negative correlation between HM scale scores 
and Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum scores (r = -.12, p < .01).  
Thus greater satisfaction with life was associated with greater importance of 
values as a whole (importance of values question & PVQ total), knowledge of values, 
living in alignment with values, and Openness-to-Change, and with lower 
Conservation. There were no associations between life satisfaction and the Self-
Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum. Greater emotional wellbeing was 
associated with greater importance of values (PVQ total), knowledge of values, living 
in alignment with values, and Openness-to-Change, and with lower Conservation. 
There were no associations between emotional wellbeing and the importance of 
values question or the Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum question 
scores.  
Table 30 presents Pearson Product-moment correlations between total SwLS 
scores and HM scale scores, and the 10 PVQ value types. 
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Table 30 
 Pearson Product-moment Correlations Relating SwLS and HM Scale Scores to PVQ 
Value Types  
 
Note. Hed = Hedonism. Sti = Stimulation. Sel = Self Direction. Uni = Universalism. 
Ben = Benevolence. Tra = Tradition. Con = Conformity. Sec = Security. Pow = 
Power. Ach = Achievement. SwLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale total. PVQ = 
Portrait Values Questionnaire. HM = Happiness Measures. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
 
As shown in Table 30, analysis of the importance of the 10 value types (PVQ) 
indicated that greater life satisfaction was associated with greater importance of 
Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and 
Security. Greater emotional wellbeing was associated with greater importance of 
Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Benevolence. Remember it was 
hypothesised that SWB would be positively related with importance ratings of 
Stimulation, Achievement, and Benevolence, and negatively related with importance 
ratings of Hedonism. Thus, as hypothesised, greater importance of Stimulation and 
Benevolence were associated with greater SWB. However greater importance of Self-
Direction was also associated with both greater life satisfaction and emotional 
wellbeing, and greater importance of Tradition, Conformity, and Security were also 
associated with greater life satisfaction. In addition, Achievement was not related to 
 Hed Sti Sel Uni Ben Tra Con Sec Pow Ach 
SwLS & 
PVQ 
 
.167** .195** .159** .060 .193** .101* .092* .092* .057 .044 
HM scale 
& PVQ  
.239** .224** .174** .023 .159**   .061   .071 .044 .025 .085 
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SWB as hypothesised, and greater Hedonism was associated with both greater life 
satisfaction and emotional wellbeing, and not less, as hypothesised.  
Next the analysis used a sinusoid curve to look at the pattern of associations of 
the 10 PVQ values in relation to SWB. Figure 16 shows the expected pattern of 
associations according to the original theorising for SWB (“Schwartz Theory”) and 
the PVQ correlations from Table 30; the associations between SwLS and HM scale 
scores and the 10 PVQ value types.  
 
 
Figure 16. Sinusoid curve of value associations between SwLS and HM scale scores, 
and PVQ values. 
 
Figures 16 indicates that the relationships between the 10 PVQ value types and 
SWB are mixed with five (Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, 
Power) of the 10 values mirroring original theorising from Schwartz‟s model. In 
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addition, this pattern of associations between the 10 PVQ value types and SWB is 
similar to that found in Study One (i.e., Figure 8). 
 
In summary, greater life satisfaction was associated with greater importance of 
values as a whole (H15), greater importance of Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-
Direction, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security (H16), greater 
knowledge of values (H19) and living in alignment with values (H20), and with more 
Openness-to-Change and less Conservation (H18). Greater emotional wellbeing was 
associated with greater importance of values (H15) (when assessed with the PVQ, but 
not when assessed with the importance of values question), greater importance of 
Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, and Benevolence (H16), greater knowledge 
of values (H19) and living in alignment with values (H20), and with more Openness-
to-Change and less Conservation (H18). The associations between SWB and living in 
alignment with values were particularly strong (r = .48 and r = .41).   
 
3.5.3.2  Regression analysis. 
 
This section presents results from hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
which addressed hypotheses H15 to H20: the relationship between the importance of 
values, knowledge of values, living in alignment with values, two Schwartz continua 
placements and with SWB. Table 31 shows results of seven hierarchical multiple 
regressions: predicting life satisfaction from the importance of values (H15), the 
 225 
 
importance of specific values (H16), Schwartz continua placements (H17 and H18), 
knowledge of values (H19), and living in alignment with values (H20).  
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Table 31 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Life Satisfaction from the 
Importance of Values (H15), the Importance of Specific Values (H16), Schwartz 
Continua Placements (H17 and H18), Knowledge of Values (H19), and Living in 
Alignment with Values (H20) 
      
Variable R
2
 ΔR2 B SE B β 
  H15      
    Step 1 .009 .009    
      Constant   20.451 1.555  
      Age   .051 .025 .091*... . 
      Gender   .638 .690 .042 
    Step 2  (ImpVQ)   .017 .008*. . .    
      Constant   16.994 2.314  
      Age   .039 .026 .069 
      Gender   .405 .698 .027 
      ImpVQ   .493 .245 .094*..... 
    Step 2 (PVQtot) .057 .048***.    
      Constant   10.805 2.460  
      Age   .056 .025 .100 
      Gender   .566 .674 .037 
      PVQtot   .082 .016 .219***. 
      
H16      
    Step 1 .009 .009    
      Constant   20.451 1.555  
      Age   .051 .025 .091*..... 
      Gender   .638 .690 .042 
    Step 2 .098 .089***.    
      Constant   9.166 2.663  
      Age   .068 .029 .120*. . . 
      Gender   .629 .678 .049 
      PVQ Hedonism 
      PVQ Stimulation 
 .625 .346 .097 
 .792 .370 .120*... . 
      PVQ Self-Direction 
      PVQ Universalism 
      PVQ Benevolence 
      PVQ Tradition 
 .712 .509 .076 
 -.884 .466 -.103 
 1.480 .476 .169**... 
 .048 .450 .006 
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      PVQ Conformity 
      PVQ Security 
      PVQ Power 
      PVQ Achievement 
 .496 .436 .069 
 .094 .440 .012 
 .122 .398 .018 
 -.065 .380 -.010 
      
H17 & H18      
    Step 1 .009 .009    
      Constant   20.451 1.555  
      Age   .051 .025 .091*... . 
      Gender   .638 .690 .042 
    Step 2 (H17) .013 .004    
      Constant   19.235 1.773  
      Age   .048 .026 .086 
      Gender   .501 .696 .033 
       VSEvsST   .257 .180 .065 
    Step 2 (H18) .021 .012**. .    
      Constant   21.918 1.663  
      Age   .050 .025 .089*. . .  
      Gender   .654 .687 .043 
       VOPvsCO   -.366 .152 -.108*. . .  
      
H19      
    Step 1 .009 .009    
      Constant   20.451 1.555  
      Age   .051 .025 .091*... .  
      Gender   .638 .690 .042 
    Step 2 .066 .057***.    
      Constant   12.147 2.142  
      Age   .019 .025 .033 
      Gender   -.064 .683 -.004 
      VKnow   1.316 .241 .249***. 
      
      
H20      
    Step 1 .009 .009    
      Constant   20.451 1.555  
      Age   .051 .025 .091*. . .  
      Gender   .638 .690 .042 
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Note. ImpVQ = Importance of values question. PVQtot = Portrait Values 
Questionnaire total. VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum. 
VOPvsCO = Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum. VKnow = Knowledge of 
values. VLive = Living in alignment with values.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001.  
 
Table 32 shows results of seven hierarchical multiple regressions: predicting 
emotional wellbeing (positive affect) from the importance of values (H15), the 
importance of specific values (H16), Schwartz continua placements (H17 and H18), 
knowledge of values (H19), and living in alignment with values (H20).  
 
  
    Step 2 .232 .223***.    
      Constant   6.434 1.808  
      Age   .019 .023 .033 
      Gender   .330 .609 .022 
      VLive   2.089 .176 .475***. 
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Table 32 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Emotional Wellbeing from the 
Importance of Values (H15), the Importance of Specific Values (H16), Schwartz 
Continua Placements (H17 and H18), Knowledge of Values (H19), and Living in 
Alignment with Values (H20) 
      
Variable R
2
 ΔR2 B SE B β 
  H15      
    Step 1 .001 .001    
      Constant   7.200 .408  
      Age   .001 .007 .005 
      Gender   -.130 .181 -.033 
    Step 2  (ImpVQ)   .006 .005    
      Constant   6.495 .608  
      Age   -.002 .007 -.012 
      Gender   -.178 .183 -.045 
      ImpVQ   .101 .064 .073 
    Step 2 (PVQtot) .042 .041***.    
      Constant   4.872 .648  
      Age   .002 .007 .013 
      Gender   -.147 .178 -.037 
      PVQtot   .020 .004 .203***. 
      
H16      
    Step 1 .001 .001    
      Constant   7.200 .408  
      Age   .001 .007 .005 
      Gender   -.130 .181 -.033 
    Step 2 .113 .111***.    
      Constant   4.075 .691  
      Age   .010 .007 .066 
      Gender   -.120 .177 -.030 
      PVQ Hedonism 
      PVQ Stimulation 
 .293 .090 .173***. 
 .183 .096 .106 
      PVQ Self-Direction 
      PVQ Universalism 
      PVQ Benevolence 
 .275 .132 .113*. . .  
 -.284 .121 -.127*. . .  
 .306 .123 .133*. . .  
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      PVQ Tradition 
      PVQ Conformity 
      PVQ Security 
      PVQ Power 
      PVQ Achievement 
 -.019 .117 -.010 
 .171 .113 .091 
 -.052 .114 -.025 
 -.175 .103 -.097 
 .104 .098 .063 
      
H17 & H18      
    Step 1 .001 .001    
      Constant   7.200 .408  
      Age   .001 .007 .005 
      Gender   -.130 .181 -.033 
    Step 2 (H17) .003 .001    
      Constant   7.016 .466  
      Age   .000 .007 .002 
      Gender   -.130 .181 -.033 
       VSEvsST   .039 .047 .038 
    Step 2 (H18) .016 .015*. . .    
      Constant   7.631 .436  
      Age   .000 .007 .003 
      Gender   -.125 .180 -.031 
       VOPvsCO   -.107 .040 -.121*. . .  
      
H19      
    Step 1 .001 .001    
      Constant   7.200 .408  
      Age   .001 .007 .005 
      Gender   -.130 .181 -.033 
    Step 2 .030 .029**. .    
      Constant   5.649 .571  
      Age   -.005 .007 -.036 
      Gender   -.261 .182 -.065 
      VKnow   .246 .064 .178***. 
      
      
H20      
    Step 1 .001 .001    
      Constant   7.200 .408  
      Age   .001 .007 .005 
      Gender   -.130 .181 -.033 
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Note. ImpVQ = Importance of values question. PVQtot = Portrait Values 
Questionnaire total. VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum. 
VOPvsCO = Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum. VKnow = Knowledge of 
values. VLive = Living in alignment with values.  
*p < .05, *** p < .001.  
 
As Tables 31 and 32 show, all analyses controlled for both age and gender, with 
age and gender explaining a small amount of the variance in SWB. The importance of 
values as a whole (H15) explained a very small amount of the variance in life 
satisfaction (0.8% and 4.8%) and emotional wellbeing (0.5% and 4.1%). However the 
importance of specific values (H16) explained a larger amount of the variance in life 
satisfaction (8.9%) and emotional wellbeing (11.1%). As hypothesised, greater life 
satisfaction was associated with greater importance of Stimulation and Benevolence. 
However, it was also expected that greater SWB would be associated with greater 
Achievement and lower Hedonism, and this result was not apparent for life 
satisfaction. As hypothesised, greater emotional wellbeing was associated with 
greater Benevolence, but not with greater Stimulation and Achievement, or with 
lower Hedonism. Instead greater emotional wellbeing was associated with greater 
Hedonism, Self-Direction and lower Universalism.  
Both Schwartz continua questions explained very little variance in depressed 
mood; the Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence question explained 0.4% of life 
    Step 2 .169 .168***.    
      Constant   4.020 .492  
      Age   -.007 .006 -.045 
      Gender   -.200 .166 -.050 
      VLive   .474 .048 .413***. 
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satisfaction and 0.5% of emotional wellbeing, and the Openness-to-
Change/Conservation question explained 1.2% of life satisfaction and 4.1% of 
emotional wellbeing. As hypothesised, SWB was associated with greater Openness-
to-Change and lower Conservation, but greater Self-Enhancement and lower Self-
Transcendence was not associated with SWB as hypothesised.  
Knowledge of values explained a small amount of the variance in life 
satisfaction (5.7%) and emotional wellbeing (2.9%), with, as hypothesised, greater 
life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing associated with greater knowledge of values. 
In addition, living in alignment with values explained a large amount of the variance 
in life satisfaction (22.3%) and emotional wellbeing (16.8%), with, as hypothesised, 
greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing associated with greater living in 
alignment with values.  
 
In summary, regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as 
a whole explained a very small amount of the variance in SWB, however the 
importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the variance. 
Greater importance of the value types Stimulation, Self-Direction, Hedonism and 
Benevolence, and lesser importance of Universalism, were associated with greater 
SWB. Greater SWB was also associated with greater knowledge of values, living in 
alignment with values, and Openness-to-Change, and with lower Conservation.   
 
3.5.3.3  Between groups analysis. 
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The results in this section address hypotheses H15 to H20 and involve t-tests 
comparing individuals with high SWB (SWBG: Subjective Wellbeing Group) against 
individuals without high SWB (Non-SWBG: Non Subjective Wellbeing Group). The 
SWBG was determined on the basis of scores on two measures of SWB: the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SwLS) and the Happiness Measures (HM). Again, SWB 
consists of a cognitive and an affective component; the SwLS measures the cognitive 
component and the HM scale question measures the affective component.  
Adult scores between 26 to 30 on the SwLS define individuals „satisfied‟ with 
life, and scores between 30 to 35 those who are „extremely satisfied‟ with life. 
Remember that reported SwLS mean adult scores are between 23.0 and 24.9 (i.e., 
“slightly satisfied”). Two hundred and twenty two of the 492 participants in Study 
Two had a SwLS score of 26 or greater.  
A score of eight on the HM scale question denotes a person „Pretty happy 
(spirits high, feeling good)‟, nine denotes „Very happy (feeling really good, elated)‟, 
and 10 denotes „Extremely happy (feeling ecstatic, joyous, fantastic)‟. Remember that 
a mean adult scale score is 6.92 (SD = 1.75). Two hundred and fifty eight of the 492 
participants in Study Two had a HM scale score of 8 or greater. 
In combination, these scores for both the SwLS and HM scale question resulted 
in 171 of the 492 participants (34%) having both a SwLS score of 26 or greater, and a 
HM scale score of eight or greater. In other words, these 171 individuals were 
„satisfied‟ with life (or better) and „pretty happy - spirits high, feeling good‟ (or 
better). These 171 individuals were designated the SWBG; demographic profiles of 
the SWBG, Non-SWBG and all Study Two participants are presented in Table 33. 
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Table 33 
Demographic Information of the SWBG, Non-SWBG and All Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                 N                  .               %                   . 
 All SWBG Non- All  SWBG Non-  
 SWBG SWBG 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Gender  
   Male    143   52   91  29 30 28 
   Female   349 119 230  71 70 72 
 
Country 
   New Zealand  274 100 174  56 58 54 
   United Kingdom  110   32   78  22 19 24 
   Canada     42   14   28    9   8   9 
   United States of America   32   15   17    6   9   5 
   Australia     30     9   21    6   5   7 
   Other       4     1     3    1   1   1 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes      89   23   66  18 13 21 
   No    403 148 255  82 87 79 
 
Medication use 
   Yes    107   34   73  22 20 23 
   No    385 137 248  78 80 77 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Note. All = All 492 Participants. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG 
= Non-Subjective Wellbeing Group. Other = Finland, Germany, Spain, and South 
Africa.  
 
Ages of all participants in Study Two ranged from 18 to 75 years, with a mean 
age of 33.32 (SD = 12.31), the ages for the SWBG ranged from 18 to 75 years with a 
mean age of 35.09 (SD = 13.15), and ages for the Non-SWBG ranged from 18 to 70 
with a mean age of 32.38 (SD = 11.74).  
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Therefore, the SWBG and Non-SWBG were relatively similar across the five 
demographic variables, although a greater proportion of the SWBG group were male, 
older, from New Zealand, and were lower in rates of psychiatric diagnosis and 
medication use. 
As a confirmation check that the SwLS and HM scale question had isolated a 
group of participants with high SWB, a series of four independent samples t-tests 
investigated the difference between the SWBG and Non-SWBG on two related 
measures: the CES-DS and HM. Remember, the CES-DS is a measure of depressed 
mood, the CES-DS-4IH a measure of global happiness, higher HM percent time 
happy percentages indicate a greater amount of time happy, and higher HM percent 
time unhappy percentages indicate a greater amount of time unhappy. As shown in 
Table 34, there were big differences in all four t-tests.  
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Table 34 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the SWBG and Non-SWBG Responses on the 
CES-DS and HM 
 
Note. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG = Non-Subjective 
Wellbeing Group. CES-DStot = Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale 
total. CES-DS-4IH = Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale four item 
happiness. HM = Happiness Measures. 
***p < .001. 
 
 
As expected, compared to the Non-SWBG, the SWBG reported lower 
depressed mood, greater global happiness, and reported a greater amount of time 
happy and a lesser amount of time unhappy. This confirmation check increased 
confidence that the SwLS and HM scale question had isolated a group of participants 
with high SWB. 
To recap the predicted associations, it was expected that compared to those in 
the Non-SWBG, participants in the SWBG would rate values as being more 
important (H15), have more knowledge of their values (H19), report living in 
alignment with their values more (H20), and rate Self-Enhancement (H17) and 
  
           M              .  
 
           SD             .     
 
     t 
  
      p 
 
      d 
  
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
 
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
   
        
CES-DStot 6.98 14.62 5.88 10.85 -8.562 .001***   .87 
CES-DS-4IH 10.61 8.30 1.74 3.03 9.171 .001***   .93 
HM % time 
happy  
74.30 48.54 13.93 23.72 13.049 .001*** 1.32 
HM % time 
unhappy 
9.27 20.90 6.06 17.33 -8.502 .001***  .90 
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Openness-to-Change (H18) higher, and Self-Transcendence and Conservation lower. 
In addition, it was also expected that compared to those in the Non-SWBG, 
participants in the SWBG would rate the importance of Stimulation, Achievement, 
and Benevolence higher, and the importance Hedonism lower (H16). 
Table 35 presents the results of independent samples t-test between the SWBG 
and Non-SWBG responses on the PVQ (H15 & H16), importance of values question 
(H15), knowledge of values question (H19), living in alignment with values question 
(H20), and Schwartz continua questions (H17 and H18).  Although no specific 
predictions were made regarding Self-Direction, Universalism, Conformity, 
Tradition, Security or Power for H16, these value types were also tested.  
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Table 35 
Independent Samples t-tests Between the SWBG and Non-SWBG Responses on the 
PVQ 
  
            M            . 
 
           SD            . 
 
   t 
  
   p 
 
   d 
  
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
 
SWBG 
 
Non-
SWBG 
   
H15         
PVQ total 121.35 115.21 18.67 18.20 3.529 .001*** .33 
ImpVQ 8.91 8.50 1.15 1.38 3.276 .001*** .32 
H16        
Hedonism 3.28 2.95 1.03 1.08 3.274 .001*** .31 
Stimulation 3.17 2.74 1.04 1.03 4.411 .001*** .41 
Self-Direction 3.96 3.76 .67 .77 2.950 .003** .28 
Universalism 3.56 3.45 .77 .82 1.456 .146 .14 
Benevolence 3.80 3.56 .64 .85 3.303 .001*** .32 
Tradition 2.11 1.96 .89 .92 1.743 .082 .17 
Conformity 2.52 2.44 .88 1.02 .858 .391 .08 
Security 2.73 2.69 .81 .88 .391 .696 .05 
Power 1.95 1.88 .97 1.02 .695 .488 .07 
Achievement 2.90 2.88 1.13 1.09 .276 .782 .02 
        
H17 & 18        
VSEvsST 6.23 5.91 1.60 1.81 1.948 .052 .24 
VOPvsCO 3.59 4.18 1.89 2.10 -3.069 .002** .29 
        
H19 & 20        
VKnow 8.40 7.86 1.16 1.35 4.456 .001*** .43 
Vlive 8.08 7.17 1.09 1.70 6.288 .001*** .64 
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Note. SWBG = Subjective Wellbeing Group. Non-SWBG = Non-Subjective 
Wellbeing Group. PVQ = Portrait Values Questionnaire. ImpVQ = Importance of 
Values Question. VSEvsST = Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum. 
VOPvsCO = Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum. VKnow = Knowledge of 
values question. VLive = Living in alignment with values question.  
**p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
Table 35 indicates that, as hypothesised, the SWBG, compared to the Non-
SWBG, rated values as more important (H15), Openness-to-Change as more 
important and Conservation as less important (H18), and reported more knowledge of 
their values (H19), and that they were living in alignment with their values more 
(H20). The SWBG did not differ from the Non-SWBG in ratings of the Self-
Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum (H17). In addition, and as hypothesised, 
the SWBG reported greater importance of Stimulation and Benevolence (H16), but 
not Achievement. The SWBG also reported greater importance of Self-Direction and 
Hedonism; the relationship with Self-Direction was not hypothesised, and it was 
expected that the SWBG would report lower, rather than greater, Hedonism. The 
Cohen‟s d effect size of .64 between SWBG and Non-SWBG individuals living in 
alignment with values was particularly large. 
Following this, multidimensional scaling analysis (MDS) (Davison, 1983) was 
performed to verify the distinctiveness of the SWBG and Non-SWBG 10 value types 
as being similar to Schwartz‟s model. This analysis is shown in Figures 17 and 18.  
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Figure 17. Value structure of the SWBG studied with the PVQ: Multidimensional 
scaling analyses 
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Figure 18. Value structure of the Non-SWBG studied with the PVQ: 
Multidimensional scaling analyses 
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Figures 17 and 18 show that the value structure of the SWBG and Non-SWBG 
largely represents Schwartz‟s model, and is similar to Figure 12 (the values structure 
of all Study Two participants assessed with the PVQ), including having the values of 
Power and Achievement swapped. Thus this analysis did not identify any difference 
between wellbeing groups; MDS analysis identified that the SWBG and Non-SWBG 
values were equally coherent. Where in Study One Figures 10 and 11 show 
differences in the coherence of values between the SWBG and Non-SWBG, that 
difference was not apparent in Study Two data.  
  
3.6  Results summary 
 
3.6.1  Overview. 
 
Schwartz‟s model was apparent in the present data, with the PVQ verifying the 
distinctiveness of the 10 value types according to Schwartz‟s theory, and the two 
Schwartz continua questions assessing Schwartz‟s two higher order bipolar continua. 
Analysis on the five demographic variables indicated that age was positively related 
with the importance of values, knowledge of their values, living in alignment with 
their values, and greater general happiness, and negatively related with depressed 
mood. Participants in the United Kingdom rated the importance of values lower 
compared to participants from New Zealand and the United States of America. 
Females rated values as more important, reported greater knowledge of their values 
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and greater depressed mood, and rated Self-Transcendence as more important than 
Self-Enhancement compared to males. Participants with a psychiatric diagnosis 
reported greater depressed mood, lower life satisfaction, emotional wellbeing, and 
happiness, and that they were happy less of the time and unhappy more of the time 
compared to those without a psychiatric diagnosis. Participants taking medications 
reported greater depressed mood, lower emotional wellbeing and happiness, and that 
they were happy less of the time and unhappy more of the time compared to those not 
taking medications. 
When analysing the links between values and depressed mood, correlation 
analysis indicated that there were no associations between depressed mood and the 
importance of values as a whole, or with the Schwartz continua placements, and that 
the relationships between the PVQ value types and depressed mood provided a mixed 
picture. However, analysis of the importance of the 10 value types indicated that 
greater depressed mood was associated with lesser importance of Hedonism, 
Stimulation and Self-Direction. In addition, greater depressed mood was moderately 
associated with lower knowledge of values and strongly associated with lower ratings 
of living in alignment with values. 
Regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as a whole 
explained a very small amount of the variance in depressed mood; however the 
importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater amount of the variance. 
Lesser importance of Self-Direction, and greater importance of Universalism, was 
associated with greater depressed mood. The Schwartz continua placements 
explained very little variance in depressed mood, however a small amount of the 
 244 
 
variance in depressed mood was associated with lower knowledge of values, and a 
large amount of the variance in depressed mood with living less in alignment with 
values. 
When comparing individuals with depressed mood with individuals without 
depressed mood, a greater proportion of depressed individuals were younger, female, 
foreign, and reported higher rates of psychiatric diagnosis and medication use. 
Analysis using t-tests indicated that the importance of values as a whole was not 
associated with mood group, and the two values of Achievement and Benevolence 
were not associated with mood group as hypothesised. However individuals with 
depressed mood reported lesser importance of Self-Direction, Stimulation, and 
Hedonism. The Schwartz continua placements were not associated with mood group, 
but individuals with greater depressed mood reported lesser knowledge of their values 
and that they were living in alignment with their values less. Analysis using MDS 
also indicated that the mood groups‟ values were equally coherent. 
In the analysis of the links between values and SWB, correlation analysis 
indicated that greater importance of values as a whole was associated with greater life 
satisfaction and with greater emotional wellbeing when assessed with the PVQ, but 
not when assessed with the importance of values question. Greater life satisfaction 
was associated with greater importance of Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, 
Benevolence, Tradition, Conservatism, and Security, and greater emotional wellbeing 
was associated with greater importance of Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, 
and Benevolence. Greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing were also 
associated with greater Openness-to-Change and with lower Conservation. In 
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addition, both greater knowledge of values and living in alignment with values were 
associated with both greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing. In addition, the 
relationships between the PVQ value types and SWB provided a mixed picture and 
did not mirror original theorising from Schwartz‟s model.  
Regression analysis indicated that the total importance of values as a whole 
explained a very small amount of the variance in life satisfaction and emotional 
wellbeing, however the importance of the 10 specific value types explained a greater 
amount of the variance. Greater importance of Stimulation and Benevolence were 
associated with greater life satisfaction, and greater emotional wellbeing was 
associated with greater importance of Benevolence, Hedonism, and Self-Direction, 
and lesser importance of Universalism. Both Schwartz continua questions explained 
very little variance in depressed mood, with greater Openness-to-Change and lower 
Conservation associated with greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing. 
Knowledge of values explained a small amount of the variance in life satisfaction and 
emotional wellbeing, with greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing associated 
with greater knowledge of values. In addition, living in alignment with values 
explained a large amount of the variance in life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing, 
with greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing associated with greater living in 
alignment with values.  
A comparison of individuals with high SWB against individuals without high 
SWB showed that a greater proportion of individuals with high SWB were male, 
older, from New Zealand, and had lower rates of psychiatric diagnosis and of 
medication use. Analysis using t-tests indicated that the SWBG reported less 
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Conservation and greater Openness-to-Change, importance of values as a whole, 
knowledge of their values, and that they were living in alignment with their values 
more than the Non-SWBG. The SWBG also reported greater importance of 
Stimulation, Benevolence, Self-Direction and Hedonism compared to the Non-
SWBG. 
 
3.6.2  Themes. 
 
Taking the results together, five main themes emerged between values, and 
depressed mood and SWB. Firstly, in line with Study One, the importance of values 
as a whole, when assessed with correlations, regressions, and t-tests, was not 
associated with depressed mood. However, correlation analysis indicated that the 
importance of values was associated with greater life satisfaction and emotional 
wellbeing, and t-tests indicated that participants in the SWBG reported greater 
importance of values as a whole.  
Secondly, the overall pattern highlights the importance of Stimulation, Self-
Direction and Hedonism in relation to both depressed mood and SWB. Correlation 
analysis indicated that greater depressed mood was associated with lesser importance 
of Stimulation, Self-Direction and Hedonism; regression analysis indicated that 
greater depressed mood was associated with lesser importance of Self-Direction; and 
analysis using t-tests indicated that participants in the DMG reported less importance 
of Stimulation, Self-Direction and Hedonism. Relating these findings for depressed 
mood to those hypothesised, these three value types fall between the two 
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hypothesised values of Achievement and Benevolence on Schwartz‟s model; nearer 
to Openness-to-Change. Regarding SWB, similar results were apparent. Correlation 
analysis indicated that greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing were 
associated with greater importance of Stimulation, Self-Direction and Hedonism; 
regression analysis indicated that greater life satisfaction was associated with greater 
Stimulation, and greater emotional wellbeing was associated with greater Self-
Direction and Hedonism; and analysis using t-tests indicated that participants in the 
SWBG reported greater importance of Stimulation, Self-Direction and Hedonism. 
Relating these findings for SWB to those hypothesised, greater Stimulation was 
hypothesised to be associated with greater SWB and this was confirmed. However it 
was expected that lesser Hedonism would be associated with greater SWB whereas 
greater Hedonism was, and the relationship between Self-Direction and SWB was not 
hypothesised. However, these results for both depressed mood and SWB are in 
alignment with original theorising from Schwartz‟s model.  
Thirdly, the overall pattern highlights the importance of Benevolence in relation 
to SWB, but not to depressed mood. Correlation analysis indicated that greater 
importance of Benevolence was associated with greater life satisfaction and 
emotional wellbeing; regression analysis indicated that greater Benevolence was 
associated with greater life satisfaction; and analysis using t-tests indicated that 
participants in the SWBG reported greater importance of Benevolence
7
. 
                                                 
7
 Although the analysis indicated additional results (e.g., that greater depressed mood was 
associated with greater Universalism, that greater life satisfaction was also associated with greater 
importance of Tradition, Conformity, and Security, and that lesser importance of Universalism was 
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Fourthly, the Schwartz continua placements showed little relationship to 
depressed mood and SWB. The Self-Enhancement/Self-Transcendence continuum 
showed no relationship with depressed mood or SWB; however the Openness-to-
Change/Conservation continuum showed a larger association. In particular, the 
Openness-to-Change/Conservation continuum was not associated with depressed 
mood, but it was associated with SWB. Greater Openness-to-Change and lower 
Conservation was associated with greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing 
when assessed with correlation, regression, and t-tests analysis.  
Lastly, analysis using correlation, regression and t-tests analysis all indicated 
that greater knowledge of values and greater living in alignment with values were 
associated with lower depressed mood and greater SWB. In particular, large effect 
sizes indicated that greater living in alignment with values was associated with much 
lower depressed mood and much greater SWB.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                           
associated with greater emotional wellbeing), these did not highlight the same theme that Stimulation, 
Self-Direction, Hedonism and Benevolence did.  
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CHAPTER 4: STUDY THREE 
4.1  Introduction 
 
Studies One and Two revealed new and strong links between people‟s values, 
and their depressed mood and SWB. This fourth chapter outlines the third and last 
study of this thesis, which extended the investigation into the links between personal 
values, depressed mood, and SWB. In particular, this study explores how relational 
aspects of values (knowledge of values, living in alignment with values) relate to 
changes in depressed mood and SWB over time. This study consisted of a sub-sample 
of the 173 participants from Study Two who completed a subset of Study Two 
assessment measures six months after the completion of Study Two. In investigating 
these relationships, participants completed five measures: two measures of values, 
two of SWB, and one of depressed mood. 
This fourth chapter comprises four main sections. The first section outlines the 
hypotheses investigated, the second outlines the method, and the third reports the 
results. The chapter concludes with a summary of the results of this study. 
 
4.2 Aims 
 
The main objective of Study Three was to investigate how peoples‟ depressed 
mood and SWB changed over time in relation to their relationships with their values. 
Specifically the focus was on the links identified as being strong in Study Two: firstly 
the relationships between knowledge of values and depressed mood and SWB, and 
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secondly with living in alignment with values with depressed mood and SWB. The 
aim was also to investigate these relational values variables in combination rather 
than in isolation.  
 
4.3 Hypotheses  
 
Four hypotheses (H21 to H24) concerned relationships between relational 
aspects of personal values and with changes in depressed mood and SWB over time. 
It was predicted that lower knowledge of values and lower living in alignment with 
values at time one (baseline) would be associated with greater depressed mood at 
time two (six months) (H21 and H22), and conversely that greater knowledge of 
values and greater living in alignment with values at time one would be associated 
with greater life satisfaction and emotional wellbeing at time two (H23 and H24). 
These hypotheses are outlined in Table 36.  
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Table 36 
Hypotheses Tested in Study Three 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Label Actual Hypothesis    
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.4 Method  
 
4.4.1 Design.  
 
Study Three was an internet study that used five measures from Study Two: the 
PVQ, CES-DS, SwLS, HM, and the five values questions. These instruments 
comprised the primary source of data for Study Three (labelled “The Values Study – 
Follow Up”, see Appendix C), and were chosen because they allowed the 
investigation of how values, depressed mood and SWB had changed over six months 
for a sub-sample of participants from Study Two.  
H21 Knowledge of values 
and depressed mood. 
 
Knowledge of values at time one would be 
negatively related with depressed mood at time 
two. 
H22 Living in alignment 
with values and 
depressed mood. 
Living in alignment with values at time one 
would be negatively related with depressed mood 
at time two. 
H23 Knowledge of values 
and SWB. 
Knowledge of values at time one would be 
positively related with SWB at time two. 
H24 Living in alignment 
with values and 
SWB. 
Living in alignment with values at time one 
would be positively related with SWB at time 
two. 
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4.4.2 Participants. 
 
Participants for this study were a sub-sample of participants who had previously 
completed Study Two, and who were invited to participate via e-mail six months after 
the completion of Study Two. Of the 492 participants in Study Two, 348 indicated at 
the completion of Study Two that they could be contacted for a future study. One-
hundred-and-seventy-three of those 348 participants (50%) from Study Two who had 
previously supplied a valid e-mail address volunteered and completed Study Three. 
Again, all participants had previously indicated that they were over 18 years of age, 
and that English was their first language.  
 
4.4.2.1 Demographics. 
 
Participants were asked to provide information regarding the same five 
variables of interest as in Study Two: their gender, age, country, psychiatric 
diagnosis, and medication usage. This information was requested in order to match 
data over time, and to assess for changes in country, psychiatric diagnosis and 
medication use in the previous six months. This information is displayed in Table 37. 
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Table 37 
Demographic Information comparing All 492 Study Two Participants and 173 Study 
Three Participants 
____________________________________________________________________ 
                    N                  .                 %                     . 
 492 Study 173 Study  492 Study 173 Study
 Two   Three     Two   Three                 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gender  
   Male    143    54  29  31 
   Female   349  119  71  69 
 
Country 
   New Zealand  274  106  56  61 
   United Kingdom  110    27  22  16 
   Canada       42    16    9    9 
   United States of America   32      11      6    6 
   Australia       30    12    6    7 
   Other          4      1    1    1 
 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
   Yes       89    30  18  17 
   No    403  143  82  83 
     
Medication use 
   Yes    107    37   22  21 
   No    385  136   78  79 
____________________________________________________________________  
 
Study Three participants‟ ages ranged from 19 to 76 years, with a mean age of 
34.54 (SD = 12.14). In Study Two participants‟ ages ranged from 18 to 75 years, with 
a mean age of 33.32 (SD = 12.31). Further description of how this demographic and 
additional information was collected is included below in section 4.4.4.  
 
4.4.3 Materials. 
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The measures in Study Three included the PVQ, CES-DS, SwLS, HM, and five 
values questions. These measures were outlined in Study One (Section 2.4.3) and 
Study Two (Section 3.4.3). For Study Three, the PVQ‟s Cronbach Alpha was .60, the 
CES-DS Cronbach Alpha was .91, and the SwLS Cronbach Alpha was .86. 
 
4.4.4 Procedure. 
 
The Values Study – Follow Up was advertised through previously supplied e-
mail addresses. Similarly to Study Two, Study Three was hosted at 
www.surveymonkey.com. In order to reach The Values Study – Follow Up, 
participants clicked on the link www.valuesstudy.com which arrived via an e-mail. 
They were then redirected to The Values Study – Follow Up hosted at Survey 
Monkey.  
When participants were presented with The Values Study – Follow Up, they 
firstly read a short information sheet which described the study and their eligibility as 
a previous participant of Study Two. Similar to Study Two, participants entered 
information for the same five demographic variables of interest: gender, age, country, 
psychiatric diagnosis, and medication use. After demographic questions were 
completed, the measures in Study Three were randomly presented. At the completion 
of the study, participants were thanked and their data was submitted. 
The raw data from the questionnaires was downloaded from Survey Monkey in 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet format, and analysis of the data was conducted using the 
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Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS 17) (Field, 2005; Miller et al., 
2009) and Analysis of Moment Structures software (AMOS) (Blunch, 2008). As the 
online survey required an answer for each question in order to proceed, data accuracy 
was 100%, making cross checking for accuracy unnecessary. Unlike Study Two in 
which five percent of the completed data (n = 25 questionnaires) was not used due to 
speedy and erratic responding, none of the data in Study Three displayed speedy or 
erratic responding (e.g., average time taken to complete Study Three was 16 minutes 
and 4 seconds, SD = 8.12). 
The Values Study – Follow Up ran for 49 days, the same length as Study Two, 
starting on 15 June 2008 and ending on 2 August 2008. No data is available on how 
many Study Two participants were reached via the recruitment e-mails, so response 
rates cannot be calculated. However 14 of the 348 e-mail addresses returned invalid 
or undeliverable notices, making the potential total contacted 362 (96%).  
 
4.5 Results  
 
This section presents analyses of the data from Study Three. A preliminary 
analysis of the participants followed the same format as in section 3.5.1, with the 
purpose being to determine if the 173 participants in Study Three differed 
substantially from the 492 participants in Study Two. These results are not presented 
here, but showed that Study Three participants did not differ substantially from 
participants in Study Two as a whole. In other words, the subset of participants from 
Study Two who volunteered for Study Three were representative of Study Two 
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participants. Following this, analysis focused on how peoples‟ depressed mood and 
SWB changed over time in relation to their relationships with their values. A 
structural model is used to investigate changes in these variables over time (six 
months).  
 
4.5.1 Structural model. 
 
To identify possible causal relationships an exploratory structural model was 
used to test the direction of effect between relational values‟ variables (knowledge of 
values, living in alignment with values), and depressed mood (CES-DS) and SWB 
(HM, SwLS). Preceding this analysis, five paired samples t-tests were performed to 
investigate the effects of time (Time 1 and Time 2) on the five main outcome 
variables that would be used in the structural model. As shown in Table 38, there 
were no statistically significant differences in all five t-tests. 
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Table 38 
Paired Samples t-tests Between T1 and T2 Participant Responses on the CES-DS, 
SwLS, HM, Knowledge of Values, and Living in Alignment with Values Questions 
 
Note. HM scale = Happiness Measures scale question. SwLS = Satisfaction with Life 
Scale. CES-DS = Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale. Vknow = 
Knowledge of Values. Vlive = Living in Alignment with Values.  
 
Following this, an exploratory approach was adopted where initially all path 
stabilities and cross-lag paths were included in the structural model, and then non-
significant paths were pruned (Kline, 2005). An exploratory approach was adopted 
for two reasons. Firstly, a longer time frame (six months) was expected to enable 
additional significant cross-lag paths to be identified; and secondly, different causal 
relationships may exist between values, mood and wellbeing when relational aspects 
of values are considered separately. A direction of effect model was thus conducted 
involving relational values‟ variables, depressed mood, and SWB in an attempt to 
identify possible causal relationships.  
The initial exploratory model included five observed variables (HM scale, 
SwLS total, CES-DS total, knowledge of values, and living in alignment with values) 
  
            M              . 
 
           SD            . 
 
        t 
  
        p 
 
        d 
  
    T1 
 
    T2 
 
     T1 
 
     T2 
   
        
HM scale 7.06 7.08 1.70 1.61 .862 .778   -.01 
SwLS 23.82 24.02 6.30 6.13 -.603 .548   -.03 
CES-DS 11.08 11.16 9.35 9.04 -.132 .895   -.01 
VKnow 8.05 7.97 1.25 1.38 .862 .390    .06 
VLive 7.57 7.49 1.48 1.42 .779 .437    .05 
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at two time points: baseline and six months later. All observed variables were allowed 
to correlate concurrently at both baseline and follow up. Regarding the structural 
pathways, five stability pathways (one for each observed variable) were estimated. 
Each baseline observed variable was also allowed to predict the remaining four 
observed variables at follow up. In total 25 structural pathways were stipulated.  
Results of this base model indicated that all stability coefficients (i.e., 
correlations between two measurements of the same variable at two different points 
in time) were significant (β = .45 to .64, p < .001). One cross-lag path was significant: 
baseline living in alignment with values to later life satisfaction (β = .14, p < .02). 
The cross-lag path from baseline knowledge of values to later living in alignment 
with values was marginal (β = .14, p = .05), as was the cross-lag path from baseline 
living in alignment with values to later knowledge of values (β = .14, p = .05). 
However, the unpruned model did not fit these data well. 
Next, the model was pruned with each non-significant path removed 
individually, beginning with the least significant first to the most significant last, until 
all remaining paths were significant at the p < .05 level. At each stage of the model 
pruning process, fluctuations in beta weights, phis, and error terms were assessed to 
ensure multicollinearity was not a large problem. The pruning process took 14 steps, 
and the pruned model fitted the data well, X²/ df = .491, p = .943, CFI = 1.00, SRMR 
= .02, RMSEA = .001. The pruned model is shown in Figure 19.  
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Figure 19. Pruned direction of effect model across six months.  
Standardised stability coefficients are indicated by dashed lines, remaining lines are 
standardised regression coefficients (betas). 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
The direction of effect model showed that the five observed variables are 
relatively stable over time and that reciprocal relationships were observed between 
living in alignment with values and knowledge of values, and between living in 
alignment with values and life satisfaction (H24). In addition, emotional wellbeing 
was predicted by both living in alignment with values (H24) and life satisfaction. 
Knowledge of values at time one did not predict either life satisfaction or emotional 
wellbeing at time two (H23). Depressed mood at time two was not predicted by either 
knowledge of values (H21) or living in alignment with values (H22) at time one.  
 
Emotional Wellbeing 
T1 
 
Life Satisfaction T1 
 
Depressed Mood T1 
 
Knowledge of 
Values T1 
 
Living in Alignment 
with Values T1 
 
Emotional Wellbeing 
T2 
 
 
Life Satisfaction T2 
 
Depressed Mood T2 
 
Knowledge of 
Values T2 
 
Living in Alignment 
with Values T2 
 
.64** 
.65** 
.65** 
.55** 
.45** 
.15** 
.14** 
.08* 
.19** 
.12** 
.12** 
.63 
.35 
.56 
.43 
.41 
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4.6  Results summary 
 
Study Three participants did not differ substantially from Study Two 
participants, and were relatively representative of Study Two participants as a whole. 
Structural equation modelling suggested that when relational aspects of values are 
considered separately and at the same time, there exist causal relationships between 
living in alignment with values and life satisfaction, and although this relationship is 
reciprocal, the stronger direction of effect between variables was from values to later 
SWB. There was also a weaker causal relationship between living in alignment with 
values and emotional wellbeing, with the direction of effect leading from values to 
later SWB, but not vice versa. In addition, relational values variables at time one were 
not related to depressed mood at time two as hypothesised.   
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 
5.1  Overview  
 
This chapter discusses findings from this research in relation to the literature on 
depressed mood and SWB. Initially, a summary of the research (questions, methods) 
is presented, followed by discussion of the results. Next, strengths of this research are 
highlighted, and implications for the areas of clinical and positive psychology are 
considered. Following this, limitations are outlined and directions for future research 
are suggested. This chapter ends with an overall summary.  
 
5.2  Research summary  
 
The current research investigated relationships between the types and coherence 
of people‟s values, and their depressed mood and SWB. It also examined relational 
aspects of values (the degree to which people view values as important, are satisfied 
with their values, know what their values are, and live their life in alignment with 
their values) and their association with depressed mood and SWB. In a series of three 
studies, one smaller New Zealand paper-based study and two larger international 
internet based studies, the variables of personal values, depressed mood and SWB 
were assessed through a range of psychometric measures (BDI-II, CES-DS, CES-DS-
4IH, HM, SwLS, SHS, SVS, SSVS, CS-SSVS, PVQ and values questions). Analysis 
indicated strong links between both the importance of particular value types and 
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depressed mood and SWB, and with people‟s relationships with their values and with 
depressed mood and SWB.  
 
5.3 Discussion of findings 
 
Cumulatively the results from these studies re-orientate our thinking towards an 
increased utility for the notion of values in the areas of clinical and positive 
psychology. The results indicate that both the content and relational aspects of values 
are related in varying strengths to depressed mood and SWB
8
. This knowledge offers 
a distinctive and fruitful contribution to our understanding of these phenomena, and a 
potential path for both treating depression and increasing SWB.   
The following section integrates key findings from these studies in discussing 
firstly the content of values in relation to depressed mood, and secondly relational 
aspects of values in relation to depressed mood. Following this, the content of values 
in relation to SWB, and then relational aspects of values in relation to SWB, is 
discussed.  
 
5.3.1   Values and mood.  
 
5.3.1.1  Values’ types and depressed mood.  
 
                                                 
8
 Although not a focus on this research, the curious reader may be interested the relationships 
between depressed mood and SWB, and thus correlations between these variable are 
presented in Appendix D.  
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Study Two results found that greater depressed mood was associated with lesser 
importance of Self-Direction, Stimulation and Hedonism, and these results fit 
theorising from Schwartz‟s model well. This was different from Study One which 
found that greater depressed mood was associated with lesser importance of 
Achievement and Benevolence, which contradicted theorising from Schwartz‟s 
model. The unexpected Study One result may have been because of the small sample 
size (n = 103), because value reliability coefficients were slightly lower than the 
reported literature (i.e., Study One SSVS = .24 to .54), or because a larger than 
expected proportion of Study One participants had English as their second language 
(26%) and may have struggled with the assessment measures. The small sample and 
group sizes (e.g., n = 15 in the DMG in Study One) alone means that caution is 
required in interpreting the results due to the possibility of Type 1 error. For that 
reason more confidence is placed in the results from Study Two which had a much 
larger and more representative sample.  
Researchers have tentatively identified that the value types of Self-Direction, 
Benevolence, Universalism, Achievement and Stimulation contribute positively to 
mental health, whereas the value types of Conformity, Tradition, Security and Power 
are detrimental and considered unhealthy - although “data to support these 
speculations is sparse” (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000, p. 180). The current research 
confirms the association between the two value types of Self-Direction and 
Stimulation with less depressed mood, and also includes the value of Hedonism. 
However, it did not find that Universalism, Benevolence or Achievement were 
associated with less depressed mood.  
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It was also interesting that values located towards Conservation (Security, 
Tradition, Conformity) did not relate to depressed mood as hypothesised. According 
to Schwartz‟s theory, associations of values with depressed mood should have 
decreased monotonically in both directions around Schwartz‟s circular model from 
the most positively (Tradition) to the most negatively associated value (Stimulation). 
This was not the case. Only values located toward Openness-to-Change displayed this 
pattern; i.e., it did not appear that depressed individuals were subordinating 
themselves in favour of social expectations. In addition, analysis also indicated that 
there were no major deviations in the coherence of values between individuals with 
and without depressed mood, meaning coherence per se was not of major 
significance.  
According to Schwartz‟s theory (1992), more important values meet more 
pressing needs. Schwartz and Bardi (1997) argued that people adapt their values to 
their life circumstances; people upgrade the importance they attribute to values they 
can readily attain, and downgrade the importance of values they cannot. Putting the 
current results into a clinical context, it is possible that individuals with depressed 
mood may be downgrading the importance of Self-Direction, Stimulation and 
Hedonism (especially females: see Feather, 1984, or Schwartz & Rubel, 2005) 
believing that they cannot readily attain them. Thus, individuals with depressed mood 
may need and benefit more from assistance that allows them more autonomy, choice 
and control, creativity, and exploration (Self-Direction), more excitement, novelty, 
variety, and challenge (Stimulation), and more pleasure and sensuous gratification 
(Hedonism). The more central, predominant and currently popular psychotherapies 
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(e.g., CBT, Behavioural Activation, IPT) provide activities that are most in line with 
the value of Self-Direction (e.g., activity scheduling, goal setting, behavioural 
experiments), but not with Stimulation or Hedonism values. Targeting the realisation 
of these three Openness-to-Change type values (Self-Direction, Stimulation, 
Hedonism) through providing different life experiences may be clinically valuable in 
ameliorating depressed mood, whereas targeting Self-Enhancement, Self-
Transcendence or Conservation type values may not be as valuable in reducing 
depressed mood.  
 
5.3.1.2  Relational aspects of values and depressed mood. 
 
Of the four relational aspects investigated (importance of values, satisfaction 
with values, knowledge of values, living in alignment with values), results suggested 
that importance of values was not associated with depressed mood. In other words, 
people with and without depressed mood attributed similar importance to their values. 
Thus, getting depressed individuals to view their values as important, as is the case 
with „values clarification‟, may be a necessary, but not sufficient, approach for 
decreasing depressed mood. Instead, the results indicate that being satisfied, knowing 
values, and living in alignment with values were associated with less depressed 
mood. The association between living in alignment with values and depressed mood 
was particularly strong (i.e., in Study Two, r = -.45, p < .01). This is consistent with 
researchers such as Wilson and Murrell, who described individuals with a high 
discrepancy between rated importance and rated consistency of values as expressing a 
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“lot of distress” (2004, p. 136). In addition, many of the postulated causes of 
depression (e.g., negative life events and traumas, poor coping resources and skills 
deficits, low engagement in pleasant activities, avoidant coping mechanisms) seem to 
prevent an individual from living in alignment with their values.  
Previously, it was uncertain if it is necessary for a person to first know their 
values, attribute importance to them or be satisfied with them, before they can live 
their life in alignment with them. Study One established a clear link between greater 
current satisfaction with values and less depressed mood. Study Two established clear 
links between greater knowledge of values and living in alignment with values, and 
with less depressed mood. However, Study Three found that depressed mood at time 
two was not predicted by either knowledge of values or living in alignment with 
values at time one. This finding is surprising in light of the findings from Study Two 
linking depressed mood with both knowledge of values and living in alignment with 
values. This finding may be due to the small sample size (i.e., Type 1 error) or of the 
ability to detect effects over a six month time period.  
Putting these results into a clinical context, it is noted the literature has focused 
mostly on „values clarification‟, whilst giving little weight to actualising values once 
clarified. Henderson (2003) has pointed out that it is an assumption that priority 
values have a significant impact on behaviour. Results suggest that this assumption is 
flawed; importance of values does not significantly impact on mood or wellbeing. 
Instead, knowledge of values, and to a greater extent, and living in alignment with 
values, does. Although the main therapeutic approaches do not focus on values, the 
contemporary approach of ACT focuses specifically on this relation aspect (Hayes et 
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al., 1999); assisting clients to live in alignment with their values. These results further 
corroborate and substantiate ACT‟s focus and approach in assisting clients to live in 
alignment with their values. 
 
5.3.2   Values and wellbeing. 
 
5.3.2.1  Values’ types and subjective wellbeing.  
 
Study Two results found that greater SWB was associated with greater 
importance of Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, and also greater Benevolence. 
With the exception of Benevolence, these results both mirror findings regarding 
depressed mood, and fit theorising from Schwartz‟s model well. The overall pattern 
highlighted the importance of Benevolence in relation to SWB, but not in relation to 
depressed mood. If Benevolence values derive from the need for affiliation and 
smooth group functioning, then social contact is important for obtaining increased 
SWB. Indeed, social contact has recently been related to greater SWB (Christakis & 
Fowler, 2009). This finding also sits well with Fredrickson‟s (2001) „Broaden and 
Build‟ theory of positive emotions, which postulates that depression promotes 
survival orientated behaviour, whereas positive emotions (SWB) broaden awareness 
and build skills. The survival orientated behaviour of individuals with greater 
depressed mood may be Self-Enhancing, whereas the behaviour of individuals with 
high SWB may be more Self-Transcendent, and in particular, Benevolent. Put in a 
positive psychology context, one route to increased SWB may be through increased 
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personal contact that focuses on the preservation and enhancement of the welfare of 
people one knows (e.g., family, friends, colleagues). This could be though avenues 
such as being helpful, honest, and loyal in relationships, or by embracing forgiveness. 
Lack of Benevolence (i.e., personal connection) may also explain why some groups 
have very low SWB (e.g., prison inmates, divorced individuals, sex workers, and 
individuals with various health concerns).  
Interestingly results were contrary when SWB was assessed via cognitive and 
affective components. Although there is scant research, findings in the literature to 
date have indicated that Achievement, Self-Direction, Stimulation, Tradition, 
Conformity and Security values are correlated with the affective component of SWB, 
but not with the cognitive component (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). However, life 
satisfaction tends to be generally stable since it reflects a summary of judgements 
about feelings (Diener, 2000). The current research indicated that Self-Direction and 
Stimulation were positively correlated with the affective component of SWB, but also 
that greater Hedonism and Benevolence and lesser Universalism also were. However, 
contrary to existing literature, Tradition, Conformity, Achievement and Security were 
not associated with the affective component of SWB. More importantly, more 
associations were found between the cognitive component of SWB and values than 
for the affective component; greater life satisfaction was associated with greater Self-
Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security. 
This is important because people vary more in their ability to experience positive 
emotion compared to life satisfaction. For example, introverts are much less likely to 
experience positive emotion compared to extroverts (Hills & Argyle, 2001). 
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5.3.2.2  Relational aspects of values and subjective wellbeing.  
 
Of the four relational aspects investigated (importance of values, satisfaction 
with values, knowledge of values, living in alignment with values), results suggest 
that importance of values is not associated with SWB. In other words, similar to 
people with and without depressed mood, people with high SWB do not attribute 
more importance to their values compared to people without high SWB. Instead, the 
results suggest that being satisfied, knowing values, and living in alignment with 
values is associated with greater SWB. The association between living in alignment 
with values more and greater SWB was particularly strong (i.e., in Study Two, r = 
.48, p < .01, for life satisfaction, and r = .41, p < .01, for emotional wellbeing). Study 
One established a clear link between greater current satisfaction with values and 
greater SWB. Study Two established clear links between greater knowledge of values 
and living in alignment with values, and with greater SWB. Study Three established a 
causal and reciprocal relationship between living in alignment with values and life 
satisfaction, with the stronger direction of effect being from living in alignment with 
values to life satisfaction. There was also a causal relationship between living in 
alignment with values and emotional wellbeing, with the direction of effect leading 
from living in alignment with values to later emotional wellbeing, but not vice versa. 
This finding, that emotional wellbeing does not lead to living in alignment with 
values, has implications for creating values interventions. In addition, there was no 
causal relationship between knowledge of values and SWB. This finding is surprising 
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in light of the findings from Study Two linking SWB with knowledge of values, and 
may be due to the small sample size (i.e., Type 1 error) or of the ability to detect 
effects over a six month time period.  
In the context of positive psychology, current interventions such as using 
psychological strengths, being curious, finding flow, and being connected, do not 
focus on actualising values. The two interventions which come closest are the two 
known to be most strongly related to greater SWB (discovering meaning in life and 
expressing gratitude); it is possible that these interventions may be implicitly 
assisting individuals to live in alignment with their values. The current research has 
several implications for positive psychology interventions, and wholesale approaches 
(e.g., Quality of Life Therapy) that aim to increase SWB. These interventions may be 
more effective if combined with assisting people to live their lives in alignment with 
their values because this component in particular accounts for a large effect on SWB.  
 
5.4 Strengths and implications of this research  
 
5.4.1 Strengths.  
 
Importantly, this research was based on the most theoretical and empirically 
supported model of values (Schwartz‟s model). In doing so, these findings add to, and 
are comparable against, this developing values literature. These studies also 
controlled for a number of potentially confounding variables (e.g., age, gender) 
identified as important in the literature, and used both national and international 
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samples, and student and general population samples. In addition, psychometric 
measures utilised are well recognised scales with well established validity and 
reliability. These aspects in combination allowed for a comprehensive test of the 
associations between values, mood and wellbeing variables.   
 
5.4.2 Implications. 
 
Few studies of values have been conducted in the areas of clinical and positive 
psychology. The current thesis provides valuable new insights into the dynamics of 
values in these fields, and the mechanisms by which they may be useful. Knowing 
that depressed mood is associated with lesser Self-Direction, Stimulation and 
Hedonism, and with less satisfaction, knowledge, and living in alignment with values, 
provides the opportunity to develop and test new values based assessments and 
interventions in psychotherapy. Current assessments and treatments for depression 
are expensive; short-term values-based interventions may be a more cost effective 
alternative or adjunct treatment to current psychological treatments or medications. 
Short-term values-based interventions may also improve treatment efficacy rates for 
depression, and thus improve important individual and social outcomes. The results 
support the various contemporary psychotherapies (e.g., ACT, MI, SDT) in their 
drive to incorporate and use the notion of values. These findings may also lead to the 
development of a new conceptualisation of depression that incorporates the 
importance of the notion of values. However, given that psychologists often employ 
cursory understandings of personal values (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Rohan, 2000), 
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coupled with the general lack of focus on values, in order to make these findings 
practical helping professionals will need psycho-education about values; in particular, 
how values relate to mood and wellbeing. This thesis is a valuable resource in aiding 
understanding of these associations. 
These findings also have implications for the new and developing field of 
positive psychology; perhaps more so than for the field of clinical psychology. In 
comparison to the field of clinical psychology where more is known about the 
differences between depressed and non-depressed people, much less is known in the 
field of positive psychology about the differences between people who are thriving 
and flourishing compared to those who are not. Knowing the importance of Self-
Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, and Benevolence values, and the importance of 
having values satisfied, knowing values and living in alignment with values, provides 
the potential for new values-based assessment and interventions to increase SWB.  
 
5.5  Limitations of this research 
 
Firstly, all studies relied on self-report measures. Self-report measurement is 
subject to the same biases as other self-report methods (e.g., memory biases: 
Schuman, 1995), and are not necessarily valid indicators of an underlying 
phenomenon. Further verification of the self-report data through adjunct methods was 
not undertaken. Although considerable evidence exists to support both the use of such 
measures and their high correlation with objective measures (e.g., Sandvik, Diener, & 
Seidlitz, 1993), the use of friends or family members‟ ratings or reports would have 
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further supplemented the present findings. Investigating the basis on which 
respondents made their judgements would also have been beneficial. These 
approaches would have provided additional validity of the self-report measures used, 
but was not possible within the scope of this research.  
Secondly, the design of the studies did not account for context. Hiltin and 
Piliavin (2004) have noted the importance of the social context of values, and 
Schwartz‟s model highlights the difficulty in concurrently following values which 
can be in conflict depending on the situation. However the context of values was not 
assessed in the current studies
9
.  
Thirdly, most scholars assume values to be relatively stable across the life 
course after being shaped through late adolescence (Rokeach, 1973). However this is 
an empirical question and it is unclear how stable values are. Structural equation 
modelling (i.e., Figure 19) indicated that relational aspects are relatively stable, 
however it unclear if value types are or if six months is an appropriate time frame to 
detect effects for values, limiting generalisation.  
Lastly, there were a range of methodological limitations. In particular, Study 
One had small sample and group sizes. Due to convenience sampling Study One also 
had a large number of students and participants with English as a second language. 
Study Two, on the other hand, had a large proportion of females (71%) and New 
                                                 
9
 Many additional aspects of values could have also been a focus of this thesis, but were excluded from 
consideration. These include questions regarding the origins of values (see Peterson, 2006); the 
mechanisms though which values are acquired (see Hechter, 1993); the possible choice of values 
(Rohan, 2000); if and how value change is possible and with what effects (see Rokeach, 1973); and 
which values lead to which behaviours and to what degree they are congruent (see Bardi & Schwartz, 
2003). These important questions were excluded as they were not central to this thesis‟s research aims.  
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Zealand participants (56%). The studies did not have a large number of older 
participants, and excluded individuals under the age of 18. A stratified sampling 
procedure would have been preferable. In addition, relational aspects of values were 
mostly assessed using one item measures, which are problematic in that any response 
to a single question contains some amount error (Field, 2005). These aspects make 
the generalisation of values difficult.  
 
5.6 Future research directions 
 
Several exciting directions for future research are feasible: 
 
1. More thorough ways to assess relational aspects of values are needed. Given 
that values play a role in depressed mood and SWB, there is a potential to 
develop a contemporary, clinically relevant, culturally specific, and practical 
assessment measure for reliably and validly assessing relational aspects of 
values (i.e., satisfaction with, knowledge of, living in alignment with). Whilst 
current measures, such as the 40 item PVQ, may be appropriate for clinical 
settings, they do not assess relational aspects of values.  
 
2. Further research investigating the relationship between the importance of 
particular value types and relational aspects of values is advisable. For example, 
is living in alignment with values as a whole important, or is living in alignment 
with particular values (such as Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism or 
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Benevolence) more important for ameliorating depressed mood and increasing 
SWB? Given that Verplanken and Holland (2002) have demonstrated that 
priming values impacts on subsequent behavioural decisions, the effect of 
actualising these four values in particular ought to be assessed.  
 
3. A randomised control trial comparing CBT, ACT, values clarification, assisting 
individuals to live in alignment with their current values, and assisting 
individuals to live in alignment with values known to be important for greater 
wellbeing and less depressed mood (Self-Direction, Stimulation, Hedonism) 
would be useful. This trial could also use individuals diagnosed with depression 
rather than individuals with high depressed mood, and also more representative 
cross-cultural samples. The aim here would be to investigate the overall 
efficacy of these approaches in alleviating depressed mood through the use of 
values. This type of investigation may well lead to developing a values-based 
intervention, or indeed a values-based therapy, for treating depressed mood
10
.  
 
4. Important conceptual relationships between values and other common notions, 
such as beliefs or thoughts, remain unclear; for example, do values influence 
beliefs or vice versa? Although the current study focuses on a different type of 
individual difference variable (personal values), further research could 
                                                 
10
 In addition, the evidence regarding the prevention of depression is not conclusive, with only a few 
isolated studies showing that interventions for the prevention of depression are effective (WHO, 2005). 
Values-based assessments and interventions may also provide a preventive measure protecting against 
the development of depressed mood.  
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investigate how values relate to more central concepts in the fields of clinical 
and positive psychology. For example, values seem conceptually similar to the 
notion of a schema, defined as “well-organised structure(s) of cognitions about 
some social entity such as a person, group, role or event” (Michener, 
DeLamater, & Myers, 2004, p. 107). The exact differences, however, are 
unclear.  
 
5. How people view the future satisfaction of their values may also be important. 
Depressed individuals typically have a negative view of the future (Beck, 
1995). They view their future as hopeless and believe that their efforts will be 
inadequate in changing their future (Beck, 1976). It is possible that people with 
depressed mood may anticipate having less of their important values satisfied or 
actualised in the future compared to people without depressed mood. Thus, 
research investigating whether depressed mood may be the result of 
anticipating having few important values satisfied in the future is theoretically 
important.  
 
5.7 Overall summary 
 
As Bergin et al. noted, “despite the increased recognition of the importance of 
values…the profession still has much room for progress in this domain” (1996, p. 
300) and that “it is the work of the next decade to more clearly specify the impact of 
given values” (1996, p. 317). This research took up this challenge by beginning this 
 277 
 
process in relation to depressed mood and SWB. The advances in understanding of 
these aspects offer the potential for reincorporation of the notion of values into the 
fields of clinical and positive psychology. The key messages are that particular 
values, and people‟s relationships with their values, have important effects on their 
mood and wellbeing. This research serves as a solid foundation upon which to base 
future research in these lucrative areas. This research provides important new 
knowledge surrounding the relationship between personal values, and depressed 
mood and SWB.  
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APPENDICES 
A – Study One: The Important Values Study 
 
                    p. 1 
Information Sheet – The Important Values Study. 
 
Psychology Department: University of Canterbury 
 
Aaron Jarden,  
PhD candidate, Department of Psychology 
Psychology Building, Office 474, Private Bag 4800 Christchurch 
Ph. 03 366 7001 (ext 8083), aaron@jarden.co.nz 
 
 
Important Values 
 
 
You are invited to take part in a study on values. The aim of this study is to learn more 
about which values are important to people, and just how important they are.  
 
If you are involved in this study, you will be asked to answer a series of short 
questionnaires on various topics, including values, mood and general mental health. 
These tasks should take approximately 20 to 25 minutes.   
 
It is anticipated that there are no harmful effects or resulting discomfort from doing any of 
these tasks. There are also no correct answers as we are simply interested in your 
opinions.  
 
Please note that taking part in this study is voluntary, and that you can withdraw at any 
stage and withhold any information you have provided. The results of this study may be 
published, but only in a form that ensures that you cannot be identified, assuring strict 
confidentiality.  
 
In return for your participation, you will receive an Instant Kiwi ticket. 
 
If you would like to participate in this study, please contact Aaron Jarden by either 
office, phone or e-mail: Office 474 Psychology Department, aaron@jarden.co.nz, or 366 
7001 extension 8083. 
 
This study is conducted by Aaron Jarden (PhD candidate), under the supervision of 
Professor Simon Kemp. Professor Kemp can also be contacted at: 
simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. Both Aaron and Professor Kemp are happy to discuss any 
concerns you may have regarding this study.  
 
This project has been approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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                 p. 2 
Consent Form – Important Values Study. 
Research copy 
 
 
I have read and I understand the information sheet provided for volunteers participating in 
this study on „important values‟. The nature and purpose of this study has been explained 
to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss and ask questions about this study, and I 
am happy with the answers given to me. 
 
I understand that I have the right to know what will happen to the data from this study, and 
I have the right to request information about the outcome of the study. I recognise that my 
participation in this study and the information I provide is confidential and that no material 
that could identify me will be used in any reports on this study. 
 
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any stage. 
 
I ______________________________________(full name) herby agree to take part in 
this study on „important values‟. 
 
Signature:_____________________________________   
 
Date:_________________________________________ 
 
This study is conducted by Aaron Jarden (PhD candidate), under the supervision of 
Professor Simon Kemp. Aaron Jarden can be contacted at aaron@jarden.co.nz, or on (03) 
366 7001, extension 8083. Professor Kemp can also be contacted at: 
simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. Both Aaron and Professor Kemp are happy to discuss any 
concerns you may have regarding this study.  
 
If you need to talk further to a mental health professional: 
 
For immediate assistance:   Psychiatric Emergency Services (0800 930092) 
For non-immediate assistance:  The Psychology Centre (03 3439627) 
 
This project has been approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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                        p. 3 
Consent Form – Important Values. 
Participant copy 
 
 
I have read and I understand the information sheet provided for volunteers participating in 
this study on „important values‟. The nature and purpose of this study has been explained 
to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss and ask questions about this study, and I 
am happy with the answers given to me. 
 
I understand that I have the right to know what will happen to the data from this study, and 
I have the right to request information about the outcome of the study. I recognise that my 
participation in this study and the information I provide is confidential and that no material 
that could identify me will be used in any reports on this study. 
 
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and that I can withdraw at any stage. 
 
I ______________________________________(full name) herby agree to take part in 
this study on „important values‟. 
 
Signature:_____________________________________   
 
Date:_________________________________________ 
 
This study is conducted by Aaron Jarden (PhD candidate), under the supervision of 
Professor Simon Kemp. Aaron Jarden can be contacted at aaron@jarden.co.nz, or on (03) 
366 7001, extension 8083. Professor Kemp can also be contacted at: 
simon.kemp@canterbury.ac.nz. Both Aaron and Professor Kemp are happy to discuss any 
concerns you may have regarding this study.  
 
If you need to talk further to a mental health professional: 
 
For immediate assistance:   Psychiatric Emergency Services (0800 930092) 
For non-immediate assistance:  The Psychology Centre (03 3439627) 
 
This project has been approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee. 
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                    p. 4 
Demographic and Other Information 
 
This sheet mainly asks about your background. This information will help us determine 
how representative our sample is relative to the population that we are sampling from and, 
as a result, highlight potential limitations of our research. Your individual information will be 
kept strictly confidential.  
 
Our demographic sheet also asks about any medications you might be taking. As a 
number of medications may influence questionnaire responses, it would be useful for us to 
know whether you are taking medications that may have such an effect. 
 
 
Gender (tick one): ______ Male  ______ Female 
 
Age: ______ 
 
Language: Is English your first language?   
 
Yes     No    
 
New Zealand University Student: Are you currently a New Zealand university student? 
 
Yes     No    
 
Psychiatric history: Please give brief details of any previous psychiatric diagnosis: 
 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
Also, have you ever received a diagnosis of a mood disorder?   
 
Yes    No    
 
Medical Issues: Are you currently suffering from or experiencing any medical illness? 
 
Yes    If Yes, please specify: __________________________ 
No    
 
OTHER: 
 
Once this study is completed, would you like to receive information about the results of the 
study? 
 
Yes    If Yes, please specify an e-mail address: _________ 
No    
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SVS 
 
In this questionnaire you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME as guiding 
principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?". There are two lists of 
values below. These values come from different cultures. In the parentheses following 
each value is an explanation that may help you to understand its meaning. 
 
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in your life. 
Use the rating scale below: 
 
0--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for you. 
3--means the value is important. 
6--means the value is very important. 
 
The higher the number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), the more important the value is as a guiding 
principle in YOUR life. 
 
-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you. 
 7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your life; ordinarily 
there are no more than two such values. 
 
In the box before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates the 
importance of that value for you, personally. Try to distinguish as much as possible 
between the values by using all the numbers. You will, of course, need to use numbers 
more than once. 
 
AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                           of 
to my             not                                                                        very            supreme 
values         important                      important                       important    importance 
-1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                 7 
 
 
Before you begin, read the values in List 1, choose the one that is most important to you 
and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values and 
rate it -1. If there is no such value, choose the value least important to you and rate it 0 or 
1, according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values in List 1. 
 
 
VALUES LIST 1 
 
 
 Equality (equal opportunity for all) 
 Inner harmony (at peace with myself) 
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AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                           of 
to my             not                                                                        very            supreme 
values         important                      important                       important    importance 
-1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                 7 
 
 Social power (control over others, dominance) 
 Pleasure (gratification of desires) 
 Freedom (freedom of action and thought) 
 A spiritual life (emphasis on spiritual not material matters) 
 Sense of belonging (feeling that others care about me) 
 Social order (stability of society) 
 An exciting life (stimulating experiences) 
 Meaning in life (a purpose in life) 
 Politeness (courtesy, good manners) 
 Wealth (material possessions, money) 
 National security (protection of my nation from enemies) 
 Self-respect (belief in one‟s own worth) 
 Reciprocation of favors (avoidance of indebtedness) 
 Creativity (uniqueness, imagination) 
 A world at peace (free of war and conflict) 
 Respect for tradition (preservation of time-honored customs) 
 Mature love (deep emotional and spiritual intimacy) 
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AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                           of 
to my             not                                                                        very            supreme 
values         important                      important                       important    importance 
-1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                 7 
 
 
 Self-discipline (self-restraint, resistance to temptation) 
 Detachment (from worldly concerns) 
 Family security (safety for loved ones) 
 Social recognition (respect, approval by others) 
 Unity with nature (fitting into nature) 
 A varied life (filled with challenge, novelty, and change) 
 Wisdom (a mature understanding of life) 
 Authority (the right to lead or command) 
 True friendship (close, supportive friends) 
 A world of beauty (beauty of nature and the arts) 
 Social justice (correcting injustice, care for the weak) 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
 
VALUES LIST 2 
 
Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as a guiding principle in 
YOUR life. These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be more or less 
important for you. Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible between the values 
by using all the numbers. 
   
Before you begin, read the values in List 2, choose the one that is most important to you 
and rate its importance. Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your values, or if 
there is no such value, choose the value least important to you, and rate it -1, 0, or 1, 
according to its importance. Then rate the rest of the values.  
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AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                           of 
to my             not                                                                        very            supreme 
values         important                      important                       important    importance 
-1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                 7 
 
 Independent (self-reliant, self-sufficient) 
 Moderate (avoiding extremes of feeling and action) 
 Loyal (faithful to my friends, group) 
 Ambitious (hardworking, aspiring) 
 Broad-minded (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs) 
 Humble (modest, self-effacing) 
 Daring (seeking adventure, risk) 
 Protecting the environment (preserving nature) 
 Influential (having an impact on people and events) 
 Honoring of parents and elders (showing respect) 
 Choosing own goals (selecting own purposes) 
 Healthy (not being sick physically or mentally 
 Capable (competent, effective, efficient) 
 Accepting my portion in life (submitting to life‟s circumstances) 
 Honest (genuine, sincere) 
 Preserving my public image (protecting my “face”) 
 Obedient (dutiful, meeting obligations) 
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AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                           of 
to my             not                                                                        very            supreme 
values         important                      important                       important    importance 
-1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                 7 
 
 Intelligent (logical, thinking) 
 Helpful (working for the welfare of others) 
 Enjoying life (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.) 
 Devout (holding to religious faith and belief) 
 Responsible (dependable, reliable) 
 Curious (interested in everything, exploring) 
 Forgiving (willing to pardon others) 
 Successful (achieving goals) 
 Clean (neat, tidy) 
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SSVS 
 
 
Rate the importance of the following values as a life-guiding principle for you. Use the 
following scale for rating each value using scale: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
in which: 
 
0= opposed to my principles 
1= not important 
4= important 
8= of supreme importance 
 
 
1. POWER (social power, authority, wealth)                                       
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
2. ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition,  
 influence on people and events) 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
3. HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life,   
 self-indulgence)     0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
4. STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life,   
 an exciting life)       0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
5. SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity,   
 independence, choosing one's own goals)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
6. UNIVERSALISM (broad-mindedness, beauty of nature  
 and arts, social justice, a world at peace,  
 equality, wisdom, unity with nature,  
 environmental protection)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
7. BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness,  
 loyalty, responsibility)    0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
8. TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting  
 one's portion in life, devotion, modesty)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
9. CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders,  
 self-discipline, politeness)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
10. SECURITY (national security, family security, social  
 order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favours)    0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
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CS SSVS 
 
In the previous task we asked you to think about what your values are. Now think about 
how satisfied you are with your current values and rate your satisfaction with each value.  
 
Use the following scale for rating you satisfaction for each value: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
in which: 
 
 0  =  Completely unsatisfied 
 8  =  Completely satisfied 
 
 
1. POWER (social power, authority, wealth)                                       
 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
2. ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition,  
 influence on people and events) 0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
3. HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life,   
 self-indulgence)     0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
4. STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life,   
 an exciting life)       0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
5. SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity,   
 independence, choosing one's own goals)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
6. UNIVERSALISM (broad-mindedness, beauty of nature  
 and arts, social justice, a world at peace,  
 equality, wisdom, unity with nature,  
 environmental protection)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
7. BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness,  
 loyalty, responsibility)    0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
8. TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting  
 one's portion in life, devotion, modesty)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
9. CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders,  
 self-discipline, politeness)  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
10. SECURITY (national security, family security, social  
 order, cleanliness, reciprocation of favours)    0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
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PVQ (Male Version) 
 
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how 
much each person is or is not like you. Put an X in the box to the right that shows how 
much the person in the description is like you. 
    HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS PERSON? 
 Very  
much  
like me 
  Like  
  me 
Somewhat   
like  
me 
A little  
like me 
Not  
like me 
Not like  
me at all 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is 
important to him. He likes to do things in his own 
original way.  
      
2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a 
lot of money and expensive things. 
      
3. He thinks it is important that every person in the 
world be treated equally. He believes everyone 
should have equal opportunities in life. 
      
4. It's very important to him to show his abilities. He 
wants people to admire what he does. 
      
5. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. 
He avoids anything that might endanger his safety. 
      
6. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things 
in life. He always looks for new things to try. 
      
7. He believes that people should do what they're told. 
He thinks people should follow rules at all times, 
even when no-one is watching.                                                                                          
      
8. It is important to him to listen to people who are 
different from him. Even when he disagrees with 
them, he still wants to understand them. 
      
9. He thinks it's important not to ask for more than 
what you have. He believes that people should be 
satisfied with what they have. 
      
10. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is 
important to him to do things that give him 
pleasure. 
      
11. It is important to him to make his own decisions 
about what he does. He likes to be free to plan and 
to choose his activities for himself. 
      
12. It's very important to him to help the people around 
him. He wants to care for their well-being. 
      
13. Being very successful is important to him. He likes 
to impress other people. 
      
14. It is very important to him that his country be safe. 
He thinks the state must be on watch against 
threats from within and without. 
      
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15. He likes to take risks. He is always looking for 
adventures.  
      
16. It is important to him always to behave properly. 
He wants to avoid doing anything people would say 
is wrong. 
      
17. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others 
what to do. He wants people to do what he says. 
      
18. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He 
wants to devote himself to people close to him. 
      
19. He strongly believes that people should care for 
nature. Looking after the environment is important 
to him. 
      
20. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard 
to do what his religion requires. 
      
21. It is important to him that things be organized and 
clean. He really does not like things to be a mess. 
      
22. He thinks it's important to be interested in things. 
He likes to be curious and to try to understand all 
sorts of things. 
      
23.He believes all the worlds‟ people should live in 
harmony. Promoting peace among all groups in the 
world is important to him. 
      
24. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants 
to show how capable he is. 
      
25. He thinks it is best to do things in traditional ways. 
It is important to him to keep up the customs he 
has learned.  
      
26. Enjoying life‟s pleasures is important to him. He 
likes to „spoil‟ himself. 
      
27. It is important to him to respond to the needs of 
others. He tries to support those he knows. 
      
28. He believes he should always show respect to his 
parents and to older people. It is important to him to 
be obedient. 
      
29. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even 
people he doesn‟t know. It is important to him to 
protect the weak in society. 
      
30. He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an 
exciting life. 
      
31. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy 
is very important to him. 
      
32. Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives 
to do better than others. 
      
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33. Forgiving people who have hurt him is important to 
him. He tries to see what is good in them and not to 
hold a grudge. 
      
34. It is important to him to be independent. He likes to 
rely on himself. 
      
35. Having a stable government is important to him. 
He is concerned that the social order be protected. 
      
36. It is important to him to be polite to other people all 
the time. He tries never to disturb or irritate others. 
      
37. He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is 
very important to him. 
      
38. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He 
tries not to draw attention to himself. 
      
39. He always wants to be the one who makes the 
decisions. He likes to be the leader. 
      
40. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit 
into it. He believes that people should not change 
nature. 
      
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PVQ (Female Version) 
 
Here we briefly describe some people. Please read each description and think about how 
much each person is or is not like you.  Put an X in the box to the right that shows how 
much the person in the description is like you. 
 
    HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS 
PERSON? 
 Very  
much  
like me 
 Like  
 me 
Somewhat   
like  
me 
A little  
like me 
Not  
like me 
Not like  
me at all 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is 
important to her. She likes to do things in her own 
original way.  
      
2. It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have 
a lot of money and expensive things. 
      
3. She thinks it is important that every person in the 
world be treated equally. She believes everyone 
should have equal opportunities in life. 
      
4. It's very important to her to show her abilities. She 
wants people to admire what she does. 
      
5. It is important to her to live in secure 
surroundings. She avoids anything that might 
endanger her safety. 
      
6. She thinks it is important to do lots of different 
things in life. She always looks for new things to 
try. 
      
7. She believes that people should do what they're 
told. She thinks people should follow rules at all 
times, even when no-one is watching.                                                                                          
      
8. It is important to her to listen to people who are 
different from her. Even when she disagrees with 
them, she still wants to understand them. 
      
9. She thinks it's important not to ask for more than 
what you have. She believes that people should 
be satisfied with what they have. 
      
10. She seeks every chance she can to have fun. It 
is important to her to do things that give her 
pleasure. 
      
11. It is important to her to make her own decisions 
about what she does. She likes to be free to plan 
and to choose her activities for herself. 
      
12. It's very important to her to help the people 
around her. She wants to care for their well-
being. 
      
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    HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS 
PERSON? 
 Very  
much  
like me 
 Like  
 me 
Somewhat   
like  
me 
A little  
like me 
Not  
like me 
Not like  
me at all 
13. Being very successful is important to her. She 
likes to impress other people. 
      
14. It is very important to her that her country be 
safe. She thinks the state must be on watch 
against threats from within and without. 
      
15. She likes to take risks. She is always looking for 
adventures.  
      
16. It is important to her always to behave properly. 
She wants to avoid doing anything people would 
say is wrong. 
      
17. It is important to her to be in charge and tell 
others what to do. She wants people to do what 
she says. 
      
18. It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. 
She wants to devote herself to people close to 
her. 
      
19. She strongly believes that people should care for 
nature. Looking after the environment is important 
to her. 
      
20. Religious belief is important to herm. She tries 
hard to do what her religion requires. 
      
21. It is important to her that things be organized 
and clean. She really does not like things to be a 
mess. 
      
22. She thinks it's important to be interested in 
things. She likes to be curious and to try to 
understand all sorts of things. 
      
23.She believes all the worlds‟ people should live in 
harmony. Promoting peace among all groups in 
the world is important to her. 
      
24. She thinks it is important to be ambitious. She 
wants to show how capable she is. 
      
25. She thinks it is best to do things in traditional 
ways. It is important to her to keep up the 
customs she has learned.  
      
26. Enjoying life‟s pleasures is important to her. She 
likes to „spoil‟ herself. 
      
27. It is important to her to respond to the needs of 
others. She tries to support those she knows. 
      
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    HOW MUCH LIKE YOU IS THIS 
PERSON? 
 Very  
much  
like me 
 Like  
 me 
Somewhat   
like  
me 
A little  
like me 
Not  
like me 
Not like  
me at all 
28. She believes she should always show respect to 
her parents and to older people. It is important to 
her to be obedient. 
      
29. She wants everyone to be treated justly, even 
people she doesn‟t know. It is important to her to 
protect the weak in society. 
      
30. She likes surprises. It is important to her to have 
an exciting life. 
      
31. She tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying 
healthy is very important to her. 
      
32. Getting ahead in life is important to her. She 
strives to do better than others. 
      
33. Forgiving people who have hurt her is important 
to her. She tries to see what is good in them and 
not to hold a grudge. 
      
34. It is important to her to be independent. She 
likes to rely on herself. 
      
35. Having a stable government is important to her. 
She is concerned that the social order be 
protected. 
      
36. It is important to her to be polite to other people 
all the time. She tries never to disturb or irritate 
others. 
      
37. She really wants to enjoy life. Having a good 
time is very important to her. 
      
38. It is important to her to be humble and modest. 
She tries not to draw attention to herself. 
      
39. She always wants to be the one who makes the 
decisions. She likes to be the leader. 
      
40. It is important to her to adapt to nature and to fit 
into it. She believes that people should not 
change nature. 
      
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SWLS 
 
Below are five statements that you may agree or disagree with. Using the 1-7 scale below, 
indicate your agreement with each item by placing the appropriate number on the line 
preceding that item.  
 
7 = Strongly agree 
6 = Agree 
5 = Slightly agree 
4 = Neither agree nor disagree 
3 = Slightly disagree 
2 = Disagree 
1 = Strongly disagree 
 
_____ In most ways, my life is close to my ideal. 
_____ The conditions of my life are excellent. 
_____ I am completely satisfied with my life. 
_____ So far, I have gotten the most important things I want in life. 
_____ If I could live my life over, I would change nothing. 
_____ TOTAL 
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SHS 
 
For each of the following statements and/or questions, please circle the point on the scale 
that you feel is most appropriate in describing you.  
 
1. In general, I consider myself: 
 
Not a very                       A very 
happy person                      happy 
person 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2. Compared to most of my peers, I consider myself: 
 
Less happy              More happy 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
         
3. Some people are generally very happy. They enjoy life regardless of what is 
going on, getting the most out of everything. To what extent does this characterization 
describe you? 
 
 
Not at all             A great deal 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
4. Some people are generally not very happy. Although they are not depressed, 
they never seem as happy as they might be. To what extent does this characterization 
describe you? 
 
A great deal                   Not at all 
 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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HM 
 
In general, how happy or unhappy do you usually feel? Check the one statement that best 
describes your average happiness. 
 
10. Extremely happy (feeling ecstatic, joyous, fantastic)  _____ 
9.  Very happy (feeling really good, elate)    _____ 
8.  Pretty happy (spirits high, feeling good)    _____ 
7.  Mildly happy (feeling fairly good and somewhat cheerful) _____ 
6.  Slightly happy (just a bit above normal)    _____ 
5.  Neutral (not particularly happy or unhappy)   _____ 
4.  Slightly unhappy (just a bit below neutral)   _____ 
3.  Mildly unhappy (just a bit below)    _____ 
2.  Pretty unhappy (somewhat “blue”, spirits down)  _____ 
1.  Extremely unhappy (utterly depressed, completely down) _____ 
 
Consider your emotions a moment further. On the average, what percent of the time do 
you feel happy? What percent of the time do you feel unhappy? What percent of the time 
do you feel neutral (neither happy nor unhappy)? Write down you best estimates, as well 
as you can, in the spaces below. Make sure that the three numbers add up to 100%. 
 
On average: 
 
The percent of time I feel happy  _____ 
The percent of time I feel unhappy  _____ 
The percent of time I feel neutral  _____ 
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BDI-II 
 
 
Permission to reproduce the BDI-II here was declined by the copyright owner. For more 
information on the content of the BDI-II, see: http://www.PearsonAssessments.com  
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B – Study Two: The Values Study 
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 334 
 
 
 335 
 
 
 336 
 
 
 337 
 
 
 338 
 
 
 339 
 
 
 340 
 
 
 
 
 341 
 
 
C – Study Three: The Values Study Follow up 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 342 
 
 
 343 
 
 
 344 
 
 
 345 
 
 
 346 
 
 
 347 
 
 
 348 
 
 
 349 
 
 
 350 
 
 
 351 
 
 
 352 
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D – Correlations between depressed mood and subjective wellbeing variables. 
 
 
Table 39 
 Pearson Product-moment Correlations relating Depressed Mood and Subjective Wellbeing 
 
 
Note. SwLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale. HM = Happiness Measures. SHS = Subjective 
Happiness Scale. CES-DS-4IH = Centre for Epidemiological Studies, Depression Scale, 
Four Item Happiness. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory II.  
Study One: n = 103, Study Two: n = 492, Study Three: n = 173. 
**p < .01. 
 
 
 
      
  SwLS HM SHS CES-DS-4IH 
      
Study One      
  BDI-II   
 
 -.373** -.466** -.541**  
Study Two      
  CES-DS  -.637** -.662**  -.813** 
Study Three      
  Time 1 
CES-DS 
 -.660** -.739**  -.797** 
  Time 2 
CES-DS 
 -.530** -.563**  -.798** 
